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A.  Consolidated Supervision of Banking Groups and Investment 
Firm Groups 
I.  The Concept of Consolidated Supervision 
The basic concept of consolidated supervision is that a realistic assessment of a 
credit institution’s or financial institution’s
1 compliance with supervisory standards should take 
into consideration all credit and financial institutions in which the investor credit institution or 
financial institution holds a participation or that are its subsidiaries.
2  Like participations in the 
nonbanking sector,
3 equity investments in credit institution or financial institutions require 
particular attention, because they may affect the financial stability and soundness of the investor 
credit institution if the subsidiary credit or financial institution runs into financial difficulties 
(contagion risk).  Equity investments also constitute a long-term freezing of the assets of the 
investor credit institution.
4  Only consolidated supervision prevents a credit institution from 
escaping compliance with supervisory standards by moving activities into subsidiaries or by 
double-leveraging its capital.
5  A noncredit institution parent of one or more credit institutions 
                                                     
1   For the definitions of credit institution and financial institution, see infra notes 7 & 8. 
2   For the definitions of subsidiary and participation, see infra notes 10 & 15 and accompanying text. 
3   Art. 51, Directive 2000/12/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 March 2000 relating to 
the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institution, O.J. Eur. Comm. No. L 126/1 (2000) [herein 
Banking Directive], as amended by Directive 2000/28/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
18 September 2000, O.J. Eur. Comm. No. L 275/37 (2000), and by the Supplementary Supervision 
Directive. 
4   See Proposal for a Second Council Directive, COM(87)715 Final, O.J. Eur. Comm. No. C 84/1 (1988) 
(explanatory memorandum accompanying the proposal for the Second Banking Directive) [herein 1988 
Explanatory Memorandum]. 
5   For a discussion of double or multiple gearing and excessive leveraging, see infra notes 247 & 248.  
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can equally use the group structure to evade compliance with supervisory standards applicable to 
the credit institutions.   
Consolidated supervision principally relates to the following supervisory 
standards:  capital adequacy, solvency ratio, lending limits, adequacy of funds to cover market 
risks, and restrictions on investments by credit institutions in the nonbank sector.  Consolidated 
supervision also applies to groups that include investment firms. 
II.  Groups Subject to Consolidated Supervision 
The Banking Directive
6 requires consolidated supervision of (1) every credit 
institution
7 that has another credit institution or a financial institution
8 as a subsidiary or that 
                                                     
6   Arts. 52–56, Banking Directive.  These Articles are based on the Council Directive of 6 April 1992 on the 
supervision of credit institutions on a consolidated basis, 92/30/EEC, O.J. Eur. Comm. No. L 110/52 
(1992), as amended by the Capital Adequacy Directive.  Directive 92/30/EEC replaced Council Directive 
of 13 June 1983 on the supervision of credit institutions on a consolidated ba sis, 83/350/EEC, O.J. Eur. 
Comm. No. L 193/18 (1983) (Directive 83/350/EEC only covered the consolidated supervision of credit 
institution groups the parent of which was a credit institution).  
7   Art. 1(1), second subparagraph, Banking Directive defines credit institution for “the purposes of applying 
the supervision on a consolidated basis” as (1) an undertaking whose business is to receive deposits or other 
repayable funds from the public and to grant credits for its own account and that has been authori zed in a 
Member State, (2) an electronic money institution within the meaning of Directive 2000/46/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 18 September 2000, on the taking up, pursuit of and prudential 
supervision of the business of electronic money institutions, O.J. Eur. Comm. No. L 275/39 (2000), that has 
been authorized in a Member State, and (3) any private or public undertaking that corresponds to the 
definition of (1) or (2) above and that has been authorized in a country other than a Member State.  The 
entities named in (3) are herein referred to as non-EU credit institutions. 
Member States are the member states of the European Union [herein EU], i.e., Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and 
United Kingdom. 
8   Pursuant to Art. 1(5), Banking Directive, financial institution means an undertaking other than a credit 
institution, the principal activity of which is to acquire holdings or to carry on one or more of the activities 
listed in numbers 2–12 of Annex I to the Banking Directive.  These activities are:  (2) lending; (3) f inancial 
leasing; (4) money transmission services; (5) issuing and administering means of payment (e.g., credit 
cards, travellers’ cheques and bankers’ drafts); (6) guarantees and commitments; (7) trading for own 
account or for account of customers in:  (a) money market instruments (cheques, bills, certificates of 
deposit, etc.), (b) foreign exchange, (c) financial futures and options, (d) exchange and interest-rate 
instruments, (e) transferable securities; (8) participation in securities issues and the provision of services 
related to such issues; (9) advice to undertakings on capital structure, industrial strategy and related 
questions and advice as well as services relating to mergers and the purchase of undertakings; (10) money 
broking; (11) portfolio management and advice; and (12) safekeeping and administration of securities. 
Number 1 covers “acceptance of deposits and other repayable funds”.  An institution that engages in that 
activity and also grants credits is a credit institution.  Number 13 covers credit reference services and 
number 14 covers safe custody services. 
  It is curious that under the wording of Art. 1(5), Banking Directive (“the principal activity of which is to 
acquire holdings or …”), an undertaking that holds only or principally participations in undertakings that 
are not engaged in financial activities (i.e., an industrial holding company) qualifies as financial institution.  
See, e.g., the German law transforming Art. 1(5), Banking Directive, § 1(3), Gesetz über das Kreditwesen  
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holds a participation in such institution, and (2) every credit institution whose parent is a 
financial holding company.
9  Subsidiary
10 is, in summary, an undertaking (1) in which a parent 
                                                                                                                                                                          
of July 10, 1961, 1961 BGBl. I 881, in the version of Sept. 9, 1998, 1998 BGBl. I 2776, as amended 
[herein KWG], that defines financial undertaking (Finanzunternehmen) as including such industrial 
holding companies. See Karl-Heinz Boos, Reinfried Fischer & Hermann Schulte-Mattler, 
KREDITWESENGESETZ, at 171, § 1 margin note 160 (2000).  The definition of an industrial holding 
company as financial institution remains without consequence for purposes of consolidated supervision 
except in the case in which a credit institution or an investment firm is part of the holding group.    
9   Art. 52(1) & (2), Banking Directive.   
  Art. 1(21), Banking Directive, as amended by Art. 29(1)(b), Supplementary Supervision Directive, defines 
financial holding company as a “financial institution, the subsidiary undertakings of which are either 
exclusively or mainly credit institutions or financial institutions, at least one of such subsidiaries being a 
credit institution, and which is not a mixed financial holding company within the meaning of [the 
Supplementary Supervision Directive]”.  See infra note 174 for the definition of mixed financial holding 
company.  The inclusion of a financial holding company in the consolidated supervision does not imply that 
the competent authorities are required to play a supervisory role in relation to the financial holding 
company standing alone.  Art. 52(2), Banking Directive.  See infra note 26 and accompanying text.  Since 
credit institutions that are subsidiaries of financial holding companies are subject to consolidated 
supervision, the term credit institutions in the definition of financial holding company must include 
non-EU-authorized credit institutions.  See supra note 7 (definition of credit institution for purposes of 
consolidated supervision as including non-EU-authorized credit institutions).  For the definition of financial 
holding company in the Capital Adequacy Directive, see infra note 23. 
Compare the definition of a bank holding company in § 2(a)(1), Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, as 
amended [herein BHCA], 12 U.S.C. § 1841(a)(1) (2000).  The typical bank holding company [herein 
“BHC”] under the BHCA would be a financial institution and a financial holding company under the 
Banking Directive and as such would be subject to consolidated supervision.  If the BHC is a financial 
holding company [herein FHC] under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 [herein GLBA], the 
subsidiaries of which exclusively or mainly are banks and broker-dealers, it would also be a financial 
holding company under the Banking Directive and as such would be subject to consolidated supervision.  
The same is true if the FHC itself is a broker-dealer with a bank subsidiary.  See infra text accompanying 
notes 21–23.  However, if an FHC is an insurance company or mainly has subsidiaries that are insurance 
companies, it would not be a financial holding company under the Banking Directive and would not be 
subject to consolidated supervision.  It may be subject to supplementary supervision as a financial 
conglomerate, see infra C., and may be subject to supplementary supervision as an insurance group, see 
infra B.  In the United States, control over one U.S. bank makes a company a bank holding company, 
§ 2(a)(1), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1841(a)(1) (2000).  For a discussion of whether BHCs and FHCs are subject 
to supervision on a consolidated basis by virtue of the BHCA, see infra E.  For a discussion of FHCs, see 
Michael Gruson, Foreign Banks and the Financial Holding Company [herein Gruson, Financial Holding 
Company], ch. 10 in Michael Gruson & Ralph Reisner (eds.), REGULATION OF FOREIGN BANKS, vol. 1 (4th 
ed., 2003) [herein Gruson & Reisner].  See GLBA, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 106th Cong., 1st Sess. (Nov. 12, 
1999), 113 Stat. 1338 (1999). 
10   Subsidiary is defined for purposes of consolidated supervision in Art. 1(13),  second subparagraph, 
Banking Directive by reference to Art. 1(1), Seventh Council Directive 83/349/EEC of 13 June 1983 based 
on the Article 54(3)(g) of the Treaty on consolidated accounts, O.J. Eur. Comm. No. L 193/1 (1983) 
[herein Consolidated Accounts Directive], as amended by Eleventh Council Directive 89/666/EEC of 21 
December 1989, O.J. Eur. Comm. No. L 395/36 (1989), by Council Directive 90/604/EEC of 8 November 
1990, O.J. Eur. Comm. No. L 317/57 (1990), by Council Directive 90/605/EEC of 8 November 1990, O.J. 
Eur. Comm. No. L 317/60 (1990), by Directive 2001/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 27 September 2001, O.J. Eur. Comm. No. L 283/28 (2001), and by Directive 2003/51/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 18 June 2003, O.J. Eur. Comm. No. L 178/16 (2003).  
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(a) has, or controls alone, pursuant to a shareholder agreement, a majority of the shareholders’ or 
members’ voting rights, or (b) has the right to appoint or remove a majority of the members of 
the administrative, management or supervisory board and is at the same time a shareholder or a 
member, or (2) that can be controlled by the parent (the parent “has the right to exercise a 
dominant influence”) pursuant to a contract between the parent and the subsidiary or a provision 
in the subsidiary’s charter, the parent at the same time being a shareholder or a member.
11  In 
addition, a subsidiary is any undertaking over which, in the opinion of the competent authorities, 
a parent effectively exercises a dominant influence.
12  The term subsidiary includes direct and 
indirect subsidiaries.
13  The definition of parent undertaking [parent] corresponds to the 
definition of subsidiary.
14  Participations for the purpose of supervision on a consolidated basis 
are (1) rights in the capital of other undertakings which “by creating a durable link with those 
[other] undertakings, are intended to contribute to the company’s [the holder of the participation] 
activities”, or (2) the ownership, directly or indirectly, of 20 percent or more of the voting rights 
or capital of another undertaking.
15  Thus, the Banking Directive applies consolidated supervision 
to (1) groups that are headed by credit institutions and include at least one credit institution or 
financial institution as a subsidiary or participation,
16 and (2) groups that are headed by financial 
institutions whose subsidiaries are either exclusively or mainly credit institutions or financial 
                                                     
11   See Art. 1(1)(a), (b), (c) & (d)(bb), Consolidated Accounts Directive referred to in Art. 1(13), second 
subparagraph, Banking Directive.  The Member States have some discretion to modify the 
parent-subsidiary definition based on dominant influence, Art. 1(1)(c), Consolidated Accounts Directive.  
In particular, a Member State may define a parent-subsidiary relationship as a relationship based on 
dominant influence of the parent over another company even though the parent is not a shareholder in or a 
member of the other company.  Id.   
  The definition of subsidiary for purposes of consolidated supervision does not include all entities that must 
be consolidated for accounting purposes, because Art. 1(13), second subparagraph, Banking Directive 
refers only to Art. 1(1) and not to Art. 1(2), Consolidated Accounts Directive.  Note that the term 
subsidiary for purposes of supplementary supervision includes subsidiaries pursuant to Art. 1(2), 
Consolidated Accounts Directive.  See infra notes 148 & 150 and accompanying text. 
12   Art. 1(13), second subparagraph, Banking Directive.  In this case the dominant influence need not be 
exercised pursuant to a contract or charter provision.  The same test applies to the determination of 
subsidiary for purposes of supplementary supervision, see infra note 152 and accompanying text. 
13   Art. 1(13), third subparagraph, Banking Directive (“All subsidiaries of subsidiary undertakings shall also 
be considered subsidiaries of the undertaking that is their original parent.”). 
14   Parent undertaking is defined in Art. 1(12), second subparagraph, Banking Directive referring to Art. 1(1), 
Consolidated Accounts Directive and adding “any undertaking which, in the opinion of the competent 
authorities, effectively exercises a dominant influence over another undertaking”. 
15   Art. 1(9), Banking Directive, as amended by Art. 29(1)(a), Supplementary Supervision Directive, referring 
to Art. 17, first sentence, Annual Accounts Directive.  Note that the term participation for purposes of 
consolidated supervision was defined differently by the Banking Directive prior to the amendment of Art. 
1(9), Banking Directive by Art. 29(1)(a), Supplementary Supervision Directive.  Although for purposes of 
easier presentation, a participation is frequently referred to herein as a 20 percent equity holding, a lower 
percentage of equity ownership could constitute a participation if the durable link and the requisite 
intention to contribute to the participation holder’s activities exist.  See infra notes 88, 150 & 156. 
16   Art. 52(1), Banking Directive.  The term group is not used in the Banking Directive.  
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institutions (at least one subsidiary must be a credit institution).
17  Once consolidated supervision 
is required, ancillary banking services undertakings
18 shall be included in the consolidation,
19 
although the existence of such undertaking does not trigger the need for consolidated 
supervision. 
The Banking Directive requires consolidated supervision regardless of whether 
the members of the group are located in different Member States.  
The following diagram shows the credit institutions that are subject to 
consolidated supervision under the Banking Directive: 
Diagram 1:  Credit Institutions Subject to Consolidated Supervision  
participation of  
20% or a 
subsidiary 
Credit
Institution
Financial Holding 
Company
(Financial Institution)
Credit 
Institution*
Credit* 
Institution
participation of  
20% or a 
subsidiary 
subsidiary
Credit 
Institution*
Financial Holding Company:
• Principal activity is acquisition 
of holdings or being engaged in 
nos. 2–12 Annex I activities
• Subsidiaries are exclusively or 
mainly credit institutions or 
financial institutions
• One subsidiary is a credit 
institution
Financial 
Institution
Financial
Institution
subsidiary
* Subject to consolidated supervision.  
                                                     
17   Art. 52(2), Banking Directive.  These are the groups headed by a financial holding company. 
18   Ancillary banking services undertaking is defined in Art. 1(23), Banking Directive as an undertaking “the 
principal activity of which consists in owning or managing property, managing data-processing services, or 
any other similar activity which is ancillary to the principal activity of one or more credit institutions”.   Cf. 
the U.S. concept of operating subsidiaries, Gruson & Reisner, supra note 9, § 9.04 [8][a] & [b][vi]. 
19   Art. 54(5), Banking Directive.  Ancillary banking service undertakings shall be included in the 
consolidation in the cases of, and in accordance with the methods set forth in, Art. 54(1) –(4), Banking 
Directive.    
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For an understanding of the application of consolidated supervision under EU 
law, it is important to remember that a financial institution is an institution that is not a 
depository institution but that is engaged in one or more of the activities listed in numbers 2–12 
of Annex I to the Banking Directive.
20  The activities listed in numbers 2–12 of Annex I to the 
Banking Directive not only include lending and other more traditional banking activities, but also 
activities that in the United States would be considered as investment banking, such as 
underwriting, dealing and brokering. 
The provisions of the Banking Directive on consolidated supervision apply,
21 
mutatis mutandis, to (1) every investment firm
22 that has a credit institution, an investment firm 
                                                     
20   See supra note 8. 
21   Art. 7(2), Council Directive 93/6/EEC of 15 March 1993 on the capital adequacy of investment firms and 
credit institutions, O.J. Eur. Comm. No. L 141/1 (1993) [herein Capital Adequacy Directive], as amended 
by Directive 98/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 June 1998, O.J. Eur. Comm. 
No. L 204/13 (1998), by Directive 98/33/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 June 
1998, O.J. Eur. Comm. No. L 204/29 (1998), and by the Supplementary Supervision Directive (referring to 
the predecessor provisions of Arts. 52–56, Banking Directive).  If the investment firm group does not 
include a credit institution, the provisions of the Banking Directive on consolidated supervision (Arts. 
52-56) apply with certain modifications.  Art. 7(3), Capital Adequacy Directive.  Generally speaking, Arts. 
52-56, Banking Directive are applied to investment firm groups that do not include a credit institution by 
replacing every reference to credit institutions by a reference to investment firm.  Art. 7(3), Capital 
Adequacy Directive.  See Art. 7(10)–(13), Capital Adequacy Directive for the calculation of the 
consolidation requirements (permitting the setoff of certain positions) and Art. 7(14) & (15), Capital 
Adequacy Directive for a definition of consolidated own funds. 
22   Investment firm is defined in Art. 2(2), Capital Adequacy Directive by reference to Art. 1(2), Investment 
Services Directive, as any legal person the regular occupation or business of which is the provision of 
investment services listed in Section A of the Annex to the Investment Services Directive relating to any of 
the instruments listed in Section B of the Annex to the Investment Services Directive for third parties on a 
professional basis.  Art. 1(1) & (2), Council Directive 93/22/EEC of 10 May 1993 on investment services 
in the securities field [herein Investment Services Directive], O.J. Eur. Comm. No. L 141/27 (1993), as 
amended by European Parliament and Council Directive 95/26/EC of 29 June 1995, O.J. Eur. Comm. No. 
L 168/7 (1995), by Directive 97/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 March 1997, O.J. 
Eur. Comm. No. L 84/22 (1997), by Directive 2000/64/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 7 November 2000, O.J. Eur. Comm. No. L 290/27 (2000), and by the Supplementary Supervision 
Directive.  Currently a new Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
investment services and regulated markets, O.J. Eur. Comm. No. C 71/62 (2003), is under discussion.  It is 
intended to replace the Investment Services Directive by the end of 2004. 
Section A of the Annex to the Investment Services Directive lists the following services:  (1) (a) reception 
and transmission, on behalf of investors, of orders in relation to one or more of the instruments listed in 
Section B and (b) execution of such orders other than for own account, (2) dealing in any of the instruments 
listed in Section B for own account, (3) managing portfolios of investments in accordance with mandates 
given by investors on discretionary, client-by-client basis where such portfolios include one or more of the 
instruments listed in Section B, and (4) underwriting in respect of issues of any of the instruments listed in 
Section B and/or the placing of such issues.  Section B lists transferable securities, units in collective 
investment undertakings, money market instruments, financial futures contracts, forward interest-rate 
agreements, interest rate, currency and equity swaps, and options to acquire or dispose of any instruments 
falling within Section B. 
Investment firm does not include credit institutions and firms that receive and transmit customer orders 
without holding money or securities belonging to their customers.  Art. 2(2), Capital Adequacy Directive.   
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or another financial institution as a subsidiary or that holds a participation in such entity and 
(2) every investment firm whose parent is a financial holding company.
23  Investment firms are in 
effect brokers, dealers, investment managers having discretion, and underwriters.  All investment 
firms are financial institutions, but not all financial institutions are investment firms. 
The following diagram shows the investment firms that are subject to 
consolidated supervision under the Capital Adequacy Directive and the Banking Directive: 
                                                                                                                                                                          
It must be noted that the Capital Adequacy Directive also applies to credit institutions by setting up 
standards for market risks incurred by credit institutions and provides a framework for the supervision of 
credit institutions and investment firms with regard to the risks incurred by such institutions, in particular, 
market risks, i.e., position risks, counterparty risks, settlement risks and foreign exchange risks.  See 12th 
recital, Capital Adequacy Directive.  Many provisions of the Capital Adequacy Directive app ly to 
institutions which term includes credit institutions and investment firms.  Art. 2(3), Capital Adequacy 
Directive.  To the extent the Capital Adequacy Directive applies to credit institutions, it partly overlaps 
with the Banking Directive. 
23   Financial holding company, for purposes of the Capital Adequacy Directive, means any financial 
institution, the subsidiary undertakings of which are either exclusively or mainly credit institutions, 
investment firms or other financial institutions, at least one of which is a credit institution or an investment 
firm.  Art. 2(8), Capital Adequacy Directive.  This definition is substantively identical with the definition of 
financial holding company set forth in the Banking Directive prior to its amendment by the Supplementary 
Supervision Directive.  See supra note 9.  For investment firm groups that do not include a credit 
institution, financial holding company means a financial institution, the subsidiary undertakings of which 
are either exclusively or mainly investment firms or other financial institutions, at least one of which is an 
investment firm and which is not a mixed financial holding company within the meaning of the 
Supplementary Supervision Directive.  Art. 7(3), first indent, Capital Adequacy Directive, as amended by 
Art. 26, Supplementary Supervision Directive.  See infra note 174 for the definition of mixed financial 
holding company.  The Supplementary Supervision Directive does not amend the definition of financial 
holding company in Art. 2(8), Capital Adequacy Directive, although it amends Art. 7(3), first indent, 
Capital Adequacy Directive by adding “and which is not a mixed financial holding company within the 
meaning of [the Supplementary Supervision Directive]”.  Art. 7(3), first indent, Capital Adequacy 
Directive, as amended by Art. 26, Supplementary Supervision Directive.  This failure to conform the 
definition of financial holding company in Art. 2(8), Capital Adequacy Directive to the definitions of that 
term in Art. 7(3), first indent, Capital Adequacy Directive and in Art. 1(21), Banking Directive may be an 
oversight.  
Since credit institutions and investment firms that are subsidiaries of financial holding companies are 
subject to consolidated supervision, the term credit institution in the definition of financial holding 
company must include non-EU-authorized credit institutions.  See supra notes 7 & 9 (definition of credit 
institution for purposes of consolidated supervision as including non-EU-authorized credit institutions).  
The same should be correct for investment firms, but the Investment Services Directive and the Capital 
Adequacy Directive do not provide, for purposes of consolidated supervision, that investment firm means 
the institutions defined in Art. 2(2), Capital Adequacy Directive and recognized third country investment 
firms referred to in Art. 2(4), Capital Adequacy Directive.  See infra note 72 for the argument that non-EU 
financial institutions (including investment firms) are included in the consolidated supervision.  For 
purposes of supplementary supervision, the definition of investment firm includes EU-authorized 
investment firms and non-EU investment firms.  See infra note 135.  
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Diagram 2:  Investment Firms Subject to Consolidated Supervision   
Investment Firm*
Credit 
Institution
participation of 20% 
or a subsidiary
Investment Firm*
Financial 
Institution
(other than 
Investment Firm)
participation of 20% 
or a subsidiary
Investment Firm*
Investment Firm
participation of 20% 
or a subsidiary
Financial Holding 
Company
(Financial
Institution)
Investment Firm*
subsidiary
Financial 
Institution
subsidiary
Financial Holding Company:
• Principal activity is 
acquisition of holdings or 
being engaged in nos. 2–
12 Annex I activities
• Subsidiaries are 
exclusively or mainly 
investment firms or 
financial institutions
• One subsidiary is an 
investment firm  
*  Subject to consolidated supervision. 
Only credit institutions, investment firms and financial holding companies can 
head a group subject to consolidated supervision.  A financial institution that is not an investment 
firm or a financial holding company does not create a group subject to consolidated supervision 
even if the financial institution is a parent of a credit institution, financial institution or 
investment firm.  Consolidated supervision is not required for credit institutions or investment 
firms that are subsidiaries of companies that are neither credit institutions, investment firms or 
financial holding companies.  Financial institutions (other than investment firms) are part of a 
group subject to consolidated supervision only if they are subsidiaries of credit institutions, 
investment firms or financial holding companies; they are not part of a group subject to 
consolidated supervision if they are subsidiaries of other financial institutions that are neither 
investment firms nor financial holding companies.   
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Only the credit institutions and investment firms that are part of a group described 
above are subject to supervision on a consolidated basis.
24  Other members included in the group 
may be required to supply information that is relevant for the consolidated supervision, and that 
information may be subject to verification;
25 but they are not subject to consolidated supervision, 
and their inclusion in the group does not subject them to supervision on a stand-alone basis.
26 
The Member States have discretion to decide whether a credit institution, 
financial institution or ancillary banking services undertaking which is a subsidiary or in which a 
participation is held needs to be included in the consolidation in any of the following cases:  (1) 
the undertaking is situated in a non-EU country in which there are legal impediments to the 
transfer of the necessary information, (2) in the opinion of the competent authorities, the 
undertaking is only of negligible interest with respect to the objectives of monitoring credit 
institutions, or the balance sheet total of the undertaking is less than a certain amount, or (3) in 
the opinion of the competent authorities, the consolidation of the financial situation of the 
undertaking would be inappropriate or misleading as far as the objectives of the supervision of 
credit institutions are concerned.
27 
                                                     
24   See Art. 52(1) & (2), Banking Directive; Art. 7(2) &(3), Capital Adequacy Directive.  Although it is 
frequently said that a group headed by a credit institution, investment firm or financial holding company is 
subject to consolidated supervision, only the credit institutions and investment firms in such groups are 
technically subject to consolidated supervision. 
If the credit institution or investment firm heads the group, it is subject to consolidated supervision “on the 
basis of its consolidated financial situation” and if a financial holding company heads the group, the credit 
institution and investment firm subsidiaries in the group are subject to consolidated supervision “on the 
basis of the consolidated financial situation of that financial holding company”.  Art. 52(1) & (2), Banking 
Directive, Art. 7(2) & (3), Capital Adequacy Directive.  Note, however, that Art. 52(7), Banking Directive 
envisions that a Member State may subject financial holding companies to the same supervision as that 
exercised over credit institutions, particularly the requirements on consolidated supervision set forth in Art. 
52(5), Banking Directive.  See infra note 50. 
25   See Art. 52(10), Banking Directive (information from subsidiaries of a credit institution or a financial 
holding company that are not included within the scope of supervision on a consolidated basis); Art. 55, 
Banking Directive (information from and inspection of mixed-activity holding company and its 
subsidiaries); Art 56(7) (verification of information concerning financial holding companies, financial 
institutions, ancillary banking services undertakings, mixed -activity holding companies, subsidiaries of the 
kind covered in Art. 55 or 52(10), Banking Directive, if such entities are situated in another Member State).  
See also Art. 52(2), Banking Directive (the consolidated financial statements of a financial holding 
company are the basis of consolidated supervision of the credit institutions in the group).  These provisions 
also apply to investment firm groups.  Art. 7(2) & (3), Capital Adequacy Directive.  
26   See Art. 52(2), Banking Directive (for financial holding companies); Art. 56(3), in connection with Arts. 55 
& 52(10), Banking Directive (for financial holding companies, financial institutions, ancillary banking 
service undertakings and mixed-activity holding companies and its subsidiaries that are not credit 
institutions, subsidiaries of a credit institution or a financial holding company that are not included within 
the scope of supervision on a consolidated basis; the collection or possession by the competent authorities 
of information relating to these entities “shall not in any way imply that the competent authorities are 
required to play a supervisory role in relation to those institutions or undertakings standing alone”.  Id.). 
These provisions also apply to investment firm groups.  Art. 7(2) & (3), Capital Adequacy Directive.  
27   Art. 52(3), Banking Directive.  Undertakings are not supervised on a consolidated basis as set forth  in 
clause (2) if the balance sheet total of the undertaking is less than the smaller of €10 million or 1 percent of  
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As further discussed below, consolidated supervision is not limited to EU-
authorized credit institutions and investment firms.
28 
III.  Scope of Consolidated Supervision 
1.  Areas of Consolidated Supervision 
Supervision on a consolidated basis
29 of groups that include credit institutions
30 
means supervision on the basis of the consolidated financial situation
31 in the following areas:   
•  Consolidated calculation of own funds
32 
•  Consolidated computation of the solvency ratio
33 
                                                                                                                                                                          
the balance sheet total of the parent or the undertaking that holds the participation.   Id.  When a credit 
institution subsidiary is not included in the consolidated supervision on the basis of clause (2) or (3), the 
competent authorities of a Member State in which that credit institution subsidiary is located may ask the 
parent for information that may facilitate their supervision of that credit institution subsidiary. Art. 52(4), 
Banking Directive.  This provision also applies to investment firm groups.  Art. 7(2) & (3), Capital 
Adequacy Directive. 
28  See infra A.V. 
29   Art. 52, Banking Directive. 
30   Art. 52(5), Banking Directive applies directly to groups that include credit institutions as defined in Art. 
52(1) & (2), Banking Directive.   See supra text accompanying notes 7–9.  Art. 52(5), Banking Directive 
also applies, by virtue of Art. 7(2), Capital Adequacy Directive, to investment firm groups as defined in 
Art. 7(2), Capital Adequacy Directive (see supra text accompanying notes 21–23) that include a credit 
institution.  The consolidation of investment firm groups relates to the requirements of Arts. 4 & 5, Capital 
Adequacy Directive and must be carried out not only in accordance with Arts. 52–56, Banking Directive, 
but also in accordance with Art. 7(7)–(14), Capital Adequacy Directive.  Art. 7(2), Capital Adequacy 
Directive.  For investment firm groups that do not include a credit institution,  see infra note 38 and 
accompanying text. 
31   The consolidated supervision takes place on the basis of the consolidated financial data of (1) the credit 
institution that has a credit institution or financial institution subsidiary or that holds a participation in such 
institution (see Art. 52(1), Banking Directive), or (2) the financial holding company that has a credit 
institution subsidiary (see Art. 52(2), Banking Directive).  In the case of an investment firm group, the 
consolidated supervision takes place on the basis of the consolidated financial data of (1) the investment 
firm that has a credit institution, an investment firm or another financial institution as a subsidiary or that 
holds a participation in such institution (see Art. 7(2), first point, Capital Adequacy Directive in connection 
with Art. 52(1), Banking Directive), or (2) the financial holding company that has an investment firm 
subsidiary (see Art. 7(2), second point, Capital Adequacy Directive in connection with Art. 52(2), Banking 
Directive). 
32   Art. 52(5), first subparagraph, in connection with Art. 37, Banking Directive.  See 41st recital, Banking 
Directive.  This also applies to investment firm groups that include a credit i nstitution; see Art. 7(2) in 
connection with Art. 7(14) & (15), Capital Adequacy Directive which refer to the predecessor provisions of 
Arts. 34–39, Banking Directive.  For investment firm groups that do not include a credit institution, see 
infra note 38 and accompanying text. 
33   Art. 52(5), first subparagraph, in connection with Art. 40(3), Banking Directive.  This also applies to 
investment firm groups that include a credit institution, see Art. 7(2) in connection with Art. 4(1)(iii), 
Capital Adequacy Directive.  For investment firm groups that do not include a credit institution,  see infra 
note 38 and accompanying text.   
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•  Consolidated control of adequacy of own funds to cover market risks
34 
•  Consolidated control of large exposures
35 
•  Consolidated restriction on investments in the nonbank sector
36 
 
If (1) an investment firm has a financial institution (which may also be an 
investment firm) as a subsidiary or holds a participation in such an entity or (2) an investment 
firm is a subsidiary of a financial holding company, but the group referred to in (1) or (2) does 
not include a credit institution, the consolidation provisions of the Banking Directive apply 
mutatis mutandis.
37  Supervision on a consolidated basis of groups that include investment firms 
(but not credit institutions) means supervision on the basis of the consolidated financial situation 
in the areas mentioned above, except that it does not apply to the restriction on investments in the 
nonbank sector.
38 
The competent authorities must ensure that all undertakings that are included in 
the scope of the supervision on a consolidated basis have adequate internal control mechanisms 
for the production of data and information that are relevant for the purposes of supervision on a 
consolidated basis.
39 
                                                     
34   Art. 52(5), first subparagraph, in connection with Art. 4(1), Capital Adequacy Directive.  See 12th and 
22nd recital, Capital Adequacy Directive.  This also applies to investment firm groups that include a credit 
institution; see Art. 7(2) in connection with Art. 4(1), Capital Adequacy Directive.   For investment firm 
groups that do not include a credit institution, see infra note 38 and accompanying text.  
35   Art. 52(5), first subparagraph, in connection with Art. 50, Banking Directive.  This also applies to 
investment firm groups that include a credit institution; see Art. 7(2) in connection with Art. 5, Capital 
Adequacy Directive, which refers to the predecessor provisions of Arts. 48–50, Banking Directive, as 
modified by Annex VI, Capital Adequacy Directive.   For investment firm groups that do not include a 
credit institution, see infra note 38 and accompanying text.  
36   Art. 52(5), second subparagraph, in connection with  Art. 51(1) & (2), Banking Directive.  This also applies 
to investment firm groups that include a credit institution, see Art. 7(2), Capital Adequacy Directive.  For 
investment firm groups that do not include a credit institution, see infra note 38 and accompanying text. 
37   Art. 7(3), Capital Adequacy Directive. 
38   Art. 7(3), 5th indent, Capital Adequacy Directive that excludes the application of Art. 52(5), second 
subparagraph, Banking Directive (formerly Art. 3(5), Council Directive 92/30/EEC of 6 April 1992 on the 
supervision of credit institutions on a consolidated basis).  Investment firms are not restricted to their 
investments in the industrial or commercial sector.  As to the meaning of supervision on the basis of the 
consolidated financial situation, see supra note 31. 
39   Art. 52(6 ), Banking Directive, Art. 7(2) & (3), Capital Adequacy Directive.  It follows from the language 
of Art. 52(6), Banking Directive that the group of companies that must comply with the internal control 
mechanism requirement is broader than the group of credit institutions and investment firms subject to 
consolidated supervision (the internal control mechanism requirement must be met by “all the undertakings 
included in the scope of the supervision on a consolidated basis that is exercised over a credit institution in 
implementation of [Art. 52(1) & (2), Banking Directive]”).  
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The credit institutions and investment firms subject to consolidated supervision 
are responsible for computing the information required for consolidated supervision and are also 
responsible for compliance by the group of which they are a member with the consolidated 
supervision requirements. 
Consolidation for the purposes of supervision on a consolidated basis may take 
different forms.  In the case of credit institutions and financial institutions that are subsidiaries of 
a parent, the competent authorities must require full consolidation.
40  However, proportional 
consolidation of a credit institution or financial institution subsidiary may be prescribed if, in the 
opinion of the competent authorities, the liability of a parent holding a share of the capital is 
limited to that share of the capital because of the liability of the other shareholders or members 
whose solvency is satisfactory.
41  If an undertaking included in the consolidated supervision 
holds participations in credit institutions or financial institutions and the undertaking’s liability is 
limited to the share of the capital held, the participations must be consolidated on a proportional 
basis.
42  For all other participations or capital ties, the competent authorities shall determine 
whether and how consolidation is to be carried out.
43  In particular, they may permit or require 
                                                     
40   Art. 54(1), first subparagraph, Banking Directive.  The discussion in the text accompanying notes 40–44 
also applies to investment firm groups, subject to modifications set forth in the Capital Adequacy Directive.  
See Art. 7(2) & (3) and Art. 7(7)–(14), Capital Adequacy Directive. 
41   Art. 54(1), second subparagraph, Banking Directive.  The liability of the other shareholders and members 
must be clearly established – if necessary, by means of formal, signed commitments.  Id.  In the case in 
which undertakings are linked by a horizontal structure in the meaning of Art. 12(1), Consolidated 
Accounts Directive, the competent authorities shall determine how consolidation is to be carried out.  Art. 
54(1), Banking Directive, as amended by Art. 29(7), Supplementary Supervision Directive.  For a 
discussion of horizontal structures, see infra notes 158 & 159.  A horizontal structure essentially exists if 
there is control, in the absence of an equity investment, due to management on a unified basis or c ross-
membership of governing boards. 
42   Art. 54(2), Banking Directive.  That provision speaks about participations in credit institutions and 
financial institutions “managed by an undertaking included in the consolidation together with one or more 
undertakings not included in the consolidation”.  The liability of all undertakings holding participations in 
the credit institution or financial institution must be limited to the share of the capital they hold.   Id.  
43   Art. 54(3), Banking Directive.   
  The competent authorities may require consolidation even in cases in which they find that, in the absence 
of a participation or other capital ties, a credit institution exercises a significant influence over one or more 
other credit institutions or financial institutions; or in which two or more credit institutions or financial 
institutions are placed under single management other than pursuant to a contract or clauses in their 
charters.  Art. 54(4), Banking Directive, as amended by Art. 29(7)(b), Supplementary Supervision 
Directive.  In these cases, the competent authorities may permit or require the use of the consolidation 
method provided for in Art. 12, Consolidated Accounts Directive.   Id.  The cases described in Art. 54(4), 
Banking Directive are very similar, but not identical, to the horizontal structure referred to in Art. 2(12), 
Supplementary Supervision Directive, see supra note 41 & infra note 158 and accompanying text.  
Whereas Art. 2(12), Supplementary Supervision Directive refers to the Art. 12(1), Consolidated Accounts 
Directive for the description of horizontal structures, Art. 54(4), Banking Directive contains a separate 
description of horizontal structures and refers only to the consolidation methods of Art. 12(1), Consolida ted 
Accounts Directive.  Art. 54(4), Banking Directive addresses only the need for and method of accounting 
consolidation of certain entities for purposes of consolidated supervision, it does not expand Art. 52(1) & 
(2), Banking Directive, which specifies which credit institutions or investment firms are subject to 
consolidated supervision.  Art. 54(4), last sentence, Banking Directive.  In order to be subject to  
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use of the equity method.
44  When consolidated supervision is required, the consolidation 
includes ancillary banking services undertakings.
45 
2.  Subconsolidation 
Consolidated supervision of credit institutions and investment firms is not limited 
to the top-tier credit institution and its subsidiaries.  A credit institution subsidiary that is 
included in the consolidated supervision of its parent credit institution may in turn be the parent 
of other credit institution or financial institution subsidiaries and, in that capacity, would be 
subject, together with its subsidiaries, to supervision on a subconsolidated basis.
46  The same rule 
applies to investment firms.
47  In addition, the credit institution or investment firm is subject to 
supervision on an individual basis. 
A credit institution is subject to subconsolidated and individual supervision by the 
competent authorities of the Member State that authorized it if the parent credit institution has 
been authorized and is situated in another Member State.
48  The same rule applies to investment 
firms.
49  The rule that consolidated and individual supervision is carried out by different Member 
States if a parent credit institution is authorized and situated in one Member State and owns a 
                                                                                                                                                                          
consolidated supervision, a credit institution or investment firm must have a parent-subsidiary or 
participation relationship with another credit institution, investment firm, financial institution or be a 
subsidiary of a financial holding company, see Art. 52(1) & (2), Banking Directive; a horizontal structure is 
not sufficient to make a credit institution or investment firm subject to consolidated supervision, except, of 
course, in cases in which a Member State has provided for a parent-subsidiary relationship based on 
dominant influence in the case of a horizontal structure.  See supra note 11.  
44   Art. 54(3), Banking Directive.  Consolidation on an equity method shall not, however, constitute inclusion 
of the undertakings concerned in supervision on a consolidated basis.  Id.   
45   Art. 54(5), Art. 1(23), Banking Directive.  See supra notes 18 & 19 and accompanying text. 
46   Art. 52(1), Banking Directive requires consolidated supervision of “every credit institution” that has a 
credit institution or financial institution as a subsidiary or that holds a participation in such institution.  In 
the same way, Art. 52(2), Banking Directive does not require that the parent financial holding company is 
the ultimate holding company of the group, it can be an intermediary holding company .  See Art. 52(5), 
second subparagraph, Banking Directive stating that compliance with the restrictions on investments in the 
nonbank sector shall be supervised and controlled on the basis of the consolidated and subconsolidated 
financial situation of the credit institution.   
47   Art. 7(2) & (3), Capital Adequacy Directive. 
48   Art. 52(8), Banking Directive.  By virtue of agreements between the competent authorities of the Member 
State that authorized the subsidiary credit institution and the Member State that authorized the parent credit 
institution, the regular banking supervision of the subsidiary credit institution can be delegated to the 
authority supervising the parent credit institution.  Art. 52(9), Banking Directive. Very similar rules apply 
to groups that include investment firms, Art. 7(8) & (9), Capital Adequacy Directive.  Art. 52(8), Banking 
Directive and Art. 9(8), Capital Adequacy Directive on their face are very vague because it is not clear 
what “that authorization” and “that institution” refer to.  The meaning of Art. 52(8), Banking Directive and 
Art. 7(8), Capital Adequacy Directive is clarified by Art. 52(9), Banking Directive and Art. 7(9), Capital 
Adequacy Directive, respectively. 
49   Art. 7(2) & (3), Capital Adequacy Directive.    
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subsidiary credit institution that is authorized and situated in another Member State differs from 
the rule applicable to a credit institution that is authorized in one Member State (the “Home 
Member State”) and establishes a branch in another Member State (the “Host Member State”):  
pursuant to Arts. 18 and 19, Banking Directive, the branch is only supervised by the Home 
Member State and not by the Host Member State.  A Member State may waive the requirement 
for supervision of an entity on an individual or subconsolidated basis if the entity is a credit 
institution subject to consolidated supervision as a parent or if it is a subsidiary of such credit 
institution and is included in the consolidated supervision of the parent.
50  The same 
subconsolidation rules apply to groups that include investment firms.
51  
3.  Mixed-Activity Holding Companies 
The Banking Directive also introduces the concept of a mixed-activity holding 
company, which is defined for credit institution groups as a “parent undertaking, other than a 
financial holding company or a credit institution or a mixed financial holding company within 
the meaning of [the Supplementary Supervision Directive], the subsidiaries of which include at 
least one credit institution”,
52 and for investment firm groups that do not include a credit 
institution, mixed-activity holding company is defined as a “parent undertaking, other than a 
financial holding company or an investment firm or a mixed financial holding company within 
the meaning of [the Supplementary Supervision Directive], the subsidiaries of which include at 
least one investment firm”.
53   
                                                     
50   Art. 52(7), Banking Directive.  The same exemption option applies if the parent is a financial holding 
company that has its head office in the same Member State as the credit institution, provided that it is 
subject to the same supervision as that exercised over credit institutions.  Id.  See supra note 24. 
51   Art. 7(7), Capital Adequacy Directive. 
52   Art. 1(22), Banking Directive. 
53   Art. 7(3), second indent, Capital Adequacy Directive, as amended by Art. 26, Supplementary Supervision 
Directive.  See infra note 174 for the definition of mixed financial holding company and supra notes 9 & 23 
for the definition of financial holding company.  
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Diagram 3:  Mixed-Activity Holding Company   
Consolidated supervision does not extend to mixed-activity holding companies.
54  
However, the competent authorities responsible for the supervision of a credit institution that is a 
subsidiary of a mixed-activity holding company shall exercise general supervision over 
transactions between the credit institution and the mixed-activity holding company and its 
subsidiaries.
55  Furthermore, the competent authorities of the Member States shall require mixed-
activity holding companies and their subsidiaries to supply them (directly or via credit institution 
subsidiaries) with any information which would be relevant for the purpose of supervising their 
credit institution subsidiaries.
56  The competent authorities may also obtain such information 
from subsidiaries of a credit institution or a financial holding company that is not included within 
the scope of supervision on a consolidated basis.
57  The competent authorities shall require credit 
                                                     
54   See Art. 52(1) & (2), Banking Directive.  Because mixed-activity holding companies are not subject to 
consolidated supervision, the term credit institution for purposes of the definition of mixed-activity holding 
company does not include non-EU credit institutions.  Art. 1(1), Banking  Directive.  See supra note 7.  The 
term investment firm as defined in Art. 2(2), Capital Adequacy Directive does not include non-EU 
investment firms.  See supra note 23 
55   Art. 55a, first subparagraph, Banking Directive, added by Art. 29(9), Supplementary Supervision Directive.  
56   Art. 55(1), Banking Directive. See 60th recital, Banking Directive.  Member States shall provide that their 
competent authorities may carry out (or have carried out by external inspectors) on-the-spot inspections to 
verify information received from mixed-activity holding companies and their subsidiaries.  Art. 55(2), 
Banking Directive.  These rules also apply to mixed-activity holding companies of investment firms, Art. 
7(2) & (3), Capital Adequacy Directive. 
57   Art. 52(10), Banking Directive.  The procedures for transmitting and verifying the information set forth in 
Art. 55, Banking Directive apply to information from such subsidiaries.  Art. 52(10), Banking Directive.  
See supra note 56.  See also supra note 26.  
– if the subsidiaries of the parent are 
exclusively or mainly credit 
institutions, investment firms or other 
financial institutions and at least one 
subsidiary is a credit institution or an 
investment firm, the parent is a 
financial holding company and not a 
mixed-activity holding company
– if the group constitutes a financial 
conglomerate (significant 
investments in the banking plus 
investment services sector and 
insurance sector; at least one 
subsidiary is an EU-regulated entity; 
group mainly engaged in the financial 
sector), then the parent is a mixed 
financial holding company and not a 
mixed-activity holding company
Parent must not be: credit institution
financial holding company
mixed financial holding
company
Parent must not be: investment firm
financial holding company
mixed financial holding
company
Parent
EU-authorized
Credit
Institution
Parent
EU-authorized
Investment
Firm
Subsidiary
Subsidiary 
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institutions to have in place adequate risk management processes and internal control 
mechanisms, including reporting and accounting procedures, in order to identify, measure, 
monitor and control transactions with their parent mixed-activity holding company and its 
subsidiaries.
58  Credit institutions must report significant transactions with their parent mixed-
activity holding company and its subsidiaries.
59  Where intra-group transactions are a threat to a 
credit institution’s financial position, the competent authorities shall take appropriate measures.
60 
4.  Management of Financial Holding Companies 
Persons who effectively direct the business of a financial holding company must 
be of sufficiently good repute and have sufficient experience to perform those duties.
61 
IV.  Member States Responsible for Exercising Consolidated Supervision 
If the parent of a credit institution or financial institution is another credit 
institution, supervision on a consolidated basis shall be exercised by the Member State which 
authorized such parent credit institution.
62 If the parent undertaking of a credit institution is a 
financial holding company, consolidated supervision shall be exercised by the Member State that 
authorized the credit institution.
63  However, if a financial holding company has credit institution 
subsidiaries in more than one Member State, supervision on a consolidated basis shall be 
undertaken by the Member State in which the financial holding company and one credit 
institution have been set up.
64  The competent authorities concerned may by agreement waive 
these rules which determine the competent authorities in case the parent of a credit institution is a 
financial holding company.
65  If the financial holding company has been set up in a Member 
State in which no credit institution subsidiary is located, the Member States concerned (including 
the Member State in which the financial holding company was set up) will have to reach an 
agreement as to which Member State shall exercise consolidated supervision.
66  In the absence of 
                                                     
58   Art. 55a, second subparagraph, Banking Directive, added by Art. 29(9), Supplementary Supervision 
Directive.  Cf. supra note 39 and accompanying text discussing the requirement to establish internal control 
mechanism for the purpose of consolidated supervision. 
59   Art. 55a, second subparagraph, Banking Directive, added by Art. 29(9), Supplementary Supervision 
Directive. 
60   Art. 55a, third subparagraph, Banking Directive, added by Art. 29(9), Supplementary Supervision 
Directive. 
61   Art. 54a, Banking Directive, added by Art. 29(8), Supplementary Supervision Directive. 
62   Art. 53(1), Banking Directive. 
63   Art. 53(2), first subparagraph, Banking Directive. 
64   Art. 53(2), second subparagraph, Banking Directive. 
65   Art. 53(3) & (4), Banking Directive.  The agreement shall contain procedures for cooperation and for the 
transmission of information.  Art. 53(4), Banking Directive. 
66   Art. 53(2), third subparagraph, Banking Directive.  The agreement shall contain procedures for cooperation 
and for the transmission of information.  Art. 53(4), Banking Directive.  
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such agreement, the Member State to exercise consolidated supervision is selected on the basis 
of the largest credit institution balance sheet and, if that figure is the same in two or more 
Member States, on the basis of the first date of authorization of the credit institution 
subsidiaries.
67   
The Banking Directive provides for certain measures to facilitate the supervision 
on a consolidated basis.  Member States must take the necessary steps to ensure that there are no 
legal impediments preventing the undertakings included within the scope of supervision on a 
consolidated basis, mixed-activity holding companies and their subsidiaries or subsidiaries of 
credit institutions or of financial holding companies that are not included within the scope of 
supervision on a consolidated basis from exchanging among themselves information relevant for 
consolidated supervision.
68  If a parent and any of its subsidiaries that is a credit institution are 
situated in different Member States, the competent authorities of each Member State shall 
communicate to each other all relevant information which may allow or aid the exercise of 
supervision on a consolidated basis.
69  If, in applying the Banking Directive, the competent 
authorities of one Member State wish in specific cases to verify information concerning credit 
institutions or other entities in a consolidated group situated in another Member State, they must 
ask the competent authorities of that other Member State to have that verification carried out.
70  
The requested authorities must carry out the verification themselves, by allowing the requesting 
authorities to carry it out, or by allowing an auditor or expert to carry it out.
71 
V.  Consolidated Supervision of Non-EU Entities 
Consolidated supervision is not limited to credit institutions and investment firms 
located in the EU.
72  This does not mean, however, that the provisions of the Banking Directive 
                                                     
67   Art. 53(2), third subparagraph, Banking Directive. 
68   Art. 56(1), Banking Directive.  
69   Art. 56(2), Banking Directive. 
70   Art. 56(7), Banking Directive.  For an enumeration of the entities in a consolidated group other th an credit 
institutions as to which verification may be requested, see supra note 25. 
71   Art. 56(7), Banking Directive.  The requesting authority may, if it so wishes, participate in the verification 
when it does not carry out the verification itself.  Art. 56(7), Banking Directive, as amended by Art. 29(10), 
Supplementary Supervision Directive. 
72   This follows from the definition of credit institutions that includes for purposes of consolidated supervision 
EU-authorized credit institutions as well as non-EU credit institutions.  See supra notes 7 & 9.  The 
definition of financial institution (which includes investment firms) in Art. 1(5), Banking Directive does 
not include undertakings authorized by a country other than a Member State.  In other words, financial 
institution does not include recognized third-country investment firms referred to in Art. 2(4), Capital 
Adequacy Directive.  See supra note 23.  Furthermore, Art. 7, Capital Adequacy Directive, which makes 
the consolidation rules of the Banking Directive applicable to groups including investment firms (see supra 
A.II.) does not include recognized third-country investment firms.  However, it might follow from Art. 
52(3), Banking Directive that a financial institution (including investment firms) located in a non -EU 
country is included in consolidated supervision because otherwise the power given by Art. 52(3), Banking 
Directive to exclude such third-country entities from consolidated supervision would make little sense.  
Art. 56a, Banking Directive, added by Art. 29(11), Supplementary Supervision Directive (which applies to 
investment firms, see infra note 77) is based on a recognition that non-EU investment firms are subject to  
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relating to consolidated supervision apply directly to (1) EU authorized credit institutions and 
investment firms whose parents have their head offices in non-EU countries or (2) credit 
institutions or investment firms situated in non-EU countries whose parents have their head 
offices in a Member State.  Other than the BHCA, the Banking Directive hesitates to regulate 
directly non-EU entities.
73   
Application of the principle of supervision on a consolidated basis to credit 
institutions whose parents have their head offices in non-EU countries and to credit institutions 
situated in non-EU countries whose parents (credit institutions or financial holding companies) 
have their head offices in a Member State shall be made possible by virtue of reciprocal bilateral 
agreements to be entered into between the competent authorities of the Member States and the 
non-EU countries concerned.
74  The Commission may submit proposals to the Council, either at 
the request of a Member State or on its own initiative, for the negotiation of such agreements.
75  
The aim of the agreements is to ensure that the competent authorities of the Member States are 
able to obtain the information necessary for consolidated supervision of EU-authorized credit 
institutions and financial holding companies located in the EU which are the parents of non-EU 
credit institutions or financial institutions, or holding participations in such institutions.
76  The 
agreements also have the aim to provide the competent authorities in non-EU countries with 
information necessary for the supervision of parents with head offices in such countries and 
having subsidiary credit institutions or financial institutions in a Member State or holding 
participations in such institution.
77 
The Supplementary Supervision Directive amended the Banking Directive to deal 
with the situation of an EU-authorized credit institution or investment firm that is a subsidiary of 
a non-EU credit institution or financial institution but is not subject to consolidated supervision – 
presumably because no agreement was entered into with the non-EU country of the parent.  If an 
EU-authorized credit institution is a subsidiary of a non-EU credit institution or financial 
institution and is not subject to consolidated supervision under Art. 52, Banking Directive, the 
competent authority shall verify whether the EU-authorized credit institution is subject to 
consolidated supervision by the home country of the non-EU credit institution or financial 
                                                                                                                                                                          
consolidated supervision, although such supervision cannot be exercised directly over the non-EU 
investment firms that are parents of EU-authorized credit institutions or investment firms. 
For purposes of supplementary supervision, the definition of investment firm includes EU-authorized and 
non-EU investment firms.  See infra note 135. 
73   For a discussion of a similar approach in connection with supplementary supervision,  see infra C.IV.  The 
BHCA applies not only to U.S. banks but also directly to foreign banks that control a U.S. bank subsidiary 
and to foreign banks that maintain a branch, agency or commercial lending company in the United States.  
Section 8(a), International Banking Act of 1978, 12 U.S.C. § 3106(a) (2000). 
74   Art. 25(1), Banking Directive. 
75   Art. 25(1), Banking Directive.  See 21st recital, Banking Directive. 
76   Art. 25(2), first indent, Banking Directive. 
77   Art. 25(2), second indent, Banking Directive.  Art. 25, Banking Directive is not applicable to investment 
firms, and the Capital Adequacy Directive does not contain similar provisions.  
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institution that is equivalent to that governed by the principles laid down in Art. 52, Banking 
Directive.
78  In the absence of such equivalent supervision, Member States shall apply the 
provisions of Art. 52, Banking Directive to the credit institution by analogy.
79  As an alternative, 
Member States shall allow their competent authorities to apply other appropriate supervisory 
techniques which achieve the objectives of the supervision on a consolidated basis.
80  The 
competent authorities which would be responsible for consolidated supervision, must agree on 
those methods; they may, in particular, require the establishment of a financial holding company 
which has its head office in the European Union, and apply the provision on consolidated 
supervision to the consolidated position of that financial holding company.
81 
The question of whether an EU-authorized credit institution that is a subsidiary of 
a U.S. holding company is subject to U.S. consolidated supervision that is equivalent to the 
consolidated supervision provided in Art. 52, Banking Directive will be discussed below.
82 
B.  Supplementary Supervision of Insurance Groups 
I.  Insurance Groups Subject to Supplementary Supervision 
Insurance groups not are subject to consolidated supervision but to a more limited 
supplementary supervision under the Insurance Group Directive.
83  Supplementary supervision 
applies to any EU-authorized life or non-life insurance undertaking
84 that has at least one 
                                                     
78   Art. 56a, first subparagraph, Banking Directive, added by Art. 29(11), Supplementary Supervision 
Directive.  The verification shall be carried out by the competent authority, which would be responsible for 
analogous consolidated supervision, see infra note 79, at the request of the parent undertaking or of any of 
the EU-authorized entities or on its own initiative.  Id.  Art. 56a, Banking Directive also applies to 
investment firm groups.  Art. 7(2) & (3), Capital Adequacy Directive. 
79   Art. 56a, fourth subparagraph, Banking Directive, added by Art. 29(11), Supplementary Supervision 
Directive. 
80   Art. 56a, fifth subparagraph, Banking Directive, added by Art. 29(11), Supplementary Supervision 
Directive. 
81   Art. 56a, fifth subparagraph, Banking Directive, added by Art. 29(11), Supplementary Supervision 
Directive. 
82   See infra E. 
83   Directive 98/78/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 October 1998 on the 
supplementary supervision of insurance undertakings in an insurance group, O.J. Eur. Comm. No. L 330/1 
(1998) [herein Insurance Group Directive], as amended by the Supplementary Supervision Directive. 
84   Insurance undertaking is an undertaking that has received official authorization in accordance with (1) Art. 
6,  First Council Directive 73/239/EEC of 24 July 1973 on the coordination of laws, regulations and 
administrative provisions relating to the taking-up and pursuit of the business of direct insurance other than 
life assurance, O.J. Eur. Comm. No. L 228/3 (1973) [herein First Non-Life Insurance Directive], as 
amended by Council Directive 76/580/EEC of 29 June 1976, O.J. Eur. Comm. No. L 189/13 (1976), by 
Council Directive 84/641/EEC of 10 December 1984, O.J. Eur. Comm. No. L 339/21 (1984), by Council 
Directive 87/343/EEC of 22 June 1987, O.J. Eur. Comm. No. L 185/72 (1987), by Council Directive 
87/344/EEG of 22 June 1987, O.J. Eur. Comm. No. L 185/77 (1987), by Council Directive 88/357/EEC of 
22 June 1988, O.J. Eur. Comm. No. L 172/1 (1988), by Council Directive 90/618/EEC of 8 November 
1990, O.J. Eur. Comm. No. L 330/44 (1990), by Council Directive 92/49/EEC of 18 June 1992, O.J. Eur.  
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subsidiary,
85 that is an EU-authorized life or non-life insurance undertaking, reinsurance 
undertaking,
86 or non-EU insurance undertaking,
87 or holds a participation
88 in any such entity or 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Comm. No. L 228/1 (1992), by European Parliament and Council Directive 95/26/EC of 29 June 1995, O.J. 
Eur. Comm. No. L 168/7 (1995), by Directive 2002/13/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 5 March 2002, O.J. Eur. Comm. No. L 77/17 (2002), and by the Supplementary Supervision Directive, 
or (2) Art. 6, First Council Directive 79/267/EEC of 5 March 1979 on the coordination of laws, regulations 
and administrative provisions relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of direct life assura nce, 
O.J. Eur. Comm. No. L 63/1 (1979) [herein First Life Insurance Directive], as amended by Council 
Directive 90/619/EEC of 8 November 1990, O.J. Eur. Comm. L 330/50 (1990), by Council Directive 
92/96/EEC of 10 November 1992, O.J. Eur. Comm. No. L 360/1 (1992), by European Parliament and 
Council Directive 95/26/EC of 29 June 1995, O.J. Eur. Comm. No. L 168/7 (1995), by the Banking 
Directive, by Directive 2002/83/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 November 2002, 
O.J. Eur. Comm. No. L 345/1 (2002), and by Supplementary Supervision Directive.  In other words, an 
insurance undertaking is an EU-authorized life or non-life insurance company.  Art. 1(a), Insurance Group 
Directive. 
85   Subsidiary undertaking [subsidiary] is (1) a subsidiary within the meaning of Art. 1(1) & (2), Consolidated 
Accounts Directive, see supra notes 10 & 11 and accompanying text for a discussion of Art. 1(1), 
Consolidated Accounts Directive and infra note 150 for a discussion of Art. 1(2), Consolidated Accounts 
Directive, and (2) any undertaking over which, in the opinion of the competent authorities, a parent 
effectively exercises a dominant influence. Art. 1(e), Insurance Group Directive.  Subsidiary includes direct 
and indirect subsidiaries.  Id. 
The Insurance Group Directive introduces the term participating undertaking to include parents, 
undertakings that hold a participation and undertakings that are linked with another undertaking by a 
horizontal structure.  The horizontal structure was added to the definition of participating undertaking by 
Art. 28(1), Supplementary Supervision Directive and refers to Art. 12(1), Consolidated Accounts Directive.  
A horizontal structure essentially exists if there is control, in the absence an equity investment, due to 
management on a unified basis or cross-membership of governing boards, see infra notes 158 & 159.  Art. 
1(g), Insurance Group Directive. 
86   Reinsurance undertaking is defined in Art. 1(c), Insurance Group Directive as an undertaking, other than an 
EU-authorized insurance undertaking or a non-EU insurance undertaking, “the main business of which 
consists in accepting risks ceded by an insurance undertaking, a non-member-country insurance 
undertaking or other reinsurance undertaking”. 
87   Art. 1(b), Insurance Group Directive defines non-member-country insurance undertaking as an undertaking 
that would require authorization in accordance with Art. 6, First Life Insurance Directive or Art. 6, First 
Non-Life Insurance Directive if it had its registered office in the EU.  Non-member-country insurance 
undertakings are sometimes referred to herein as non-EU insurance undertakings. 
88   Participation is defined in Art. 1(f), Insurance Group Directive (1) by reference to Art. 17, first sentence, 
Fourth Council Directive 78/660/EEC of 25 July 1978 based on Art. 54(3)(g) of the Treaty on the annual 
accounts of certain types of companies, O.J. Eur. Comm. No. L 222/11 (1978) [herein Annual Accounts 
Directive], as amended by Council Directive 83/349/EEC of 13 June 1983, O.J. Eur. Comm. L 193/1 
(1983), by Council Directive 84/569/EEC of 27 November 1984, O.J. Eur. Comm. L 314/28 (1984), by 
Council Directive 89/666/EEC of 21 December 1989, O.J. Eur. Comm. L 395/36 (1989), by Council 
Directive 90/604/EEC of 8 November 1990, O.J. Eur. Comm. L 317/57 (1990), by Council Directive 
90/605/EEC of 8 November 1990, O.J. Eur. Comm. L 317/60 (1990), by Council Directive 94/8/EC of 21 
March 1994, O.J. Eur. Comm. L 82/33 (1994), by Council Directive 1999/60/EC of 17 June 1999, O.J. Eur. 
Comm. L 162/15 (1999), by Directive 2001/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 
September 2001, O.J. Eur. Comm. L 283/28 (2001), by Council Directive 2003/38/EC of 13 May 2003, 
O.J. Eur. Comm. L 120/22 (2003), and by Directive 2003/51/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 18 June 2003, O.J. Eur. Comm. L 178/16 (2003), as a right in the capital of other undertakings 
which “by creating a durable link with those [other] undertakings, are intended to contribute to the  
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is linked by a horizontal structure with any such entity.
89  Supplementary supervision also applies 
to every EU-authorized life or non-life insurance undertaking the parent
90 of which is an 
insurance holding company,
91 a reinsurance undertaking or a non-EU insurance undertaking.
92  
Lastly, supplementary supervision applies to every EU-authorized life or non-life insurance 
undertaking the parent of which is a mixed-activity insurance holding company.
93 
The following diagram shows the insurance undertakings that are subject to 
supplementary supervision under the Insurance Group Directive: 
                                                                                                                                                                          
company’s [the holder of the participation] activities” or (2) the holding, directly or indirectly, of 20 
percent or more of the voting rights or capital of another undertaking.  Note that in the case of (1), a 
participation would exist even though the equity ownership is below 20 percent.  See supra note 15 and 
infra note 156. 
89   Art. 2(1), Insurance Group Directive. 
For a discussion of horizontal structures, see infra notes 158 & 159.  A horizontal structure essentially 
exists if there is control in the absence of an equity investment, due to management on a unifi ed basis or 
cross-membership of governing boards. 
90   Parent undertaking [parent] is (1) a parent within the meaning of Art. 1(1) & (2), Consolidated Accounts 
Directive, see supra notes 10 & 11 and accompanying text for a discussion of Art. 1(1), Consolidated 
Accounts Directive and infra note 150 for a discussion of Art. 1(2), Consolidated Accounts Directive, and 
(2) any undertaking that, in the opinion of the competent authorities, effectively exercises a dominant 
influence over another undertaking.  Art. 1(d), Insurance Group Directive. 
91   Insurance holding company is a parent the main business of which is to acquire and hold participations in 
subsidiaries, where those subsidiaries are exclusively or mainly EU-authorized insurance undertakings, 
reinsurance undertakings or non-EU insurance undertakings, at least one of such subsidiaries being an EU-
authorized life or non-life insurance undertaking, and which is not a mixed financial holding company 
within the meaning of the Supplementary Supervision Directive.  Art. 1(i), Insurance Group Directive, as 
amended by Art. 28, Supplementary Supervision Directive.  See infra note 174 for the definition of mixed 
financial holding company. 
92   Art. 2(2), Insurance Group Directive. 
93   Art. 2(3), Insurance Group Directive.  Mixed-activity insurance holding company is a parent, other than an 
EU-authorized insurance undertaking, a non-EU insurance undertaking, a reinsurance undertaking, an 
insurance holding company or a mixed financial holding company as defined in the Supplementary 
Supervision Directive, that includes at least one EU-authorized life or non-life insurance undertaking 
among its subsidiaries.  Art. 1(j), Insurance Group Directive, as amended by Art. 28, Supplementary 
Supervision Directive.  See infra note 174 for the definition of mixed financial holding company, and supra 
note 91 for the definition of insurance holding company.  Note that mixed-activity insurance holding 
companies are subject to supplementary supervision, whereas mixed-activity holding companies in the 
banking and investment sector are not subject to consolidated supervision.  See supra A.III.3. 
The dividing line between the definitions of insurance holding company, supra note 91, and mixed-activity 
insurance holding company, supra, is unclear:  an insurance holding company is a company other than a 
mixed-activity insurance holding company and a mixed-activity insurance holding company is a company 
other than an insurance holding company.  No definitional problem exists between the definitions mixed-
activity insurance holding company and mixed financial holding company, infra note 174.  
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Diagram 4:  Insurance Undertakings Subject to Supplementary Supervision 
(a)  Groups headed by an EU-authorized insurance undertaking  
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(b)  Groups in which an EU-authorized insurance undertaking is a Subsidiary   
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(c)  Groups headed by a Mixed-Activity Insurance Holding Company
Mixed-activity Insurance Holding Company: 
•  Parent undertaking other than 
  –  EU-authorized insurance undertaking 
  –  non-EU insurance undertaking 
  –  reinsurance undertaking 
  –  insurance holding company 
  –  mixed financial holding company 
  
•  One subsidiary is an EU-authorized life or non-life 
  insurance undertaking 
 
•   –     if the subsidiaries of the parent are 
  exclusively or mainly EU-authorized insurance 
  undertakings, reinsurance undertakings, or non-EU 
  insurance undertakings, the parent is a insurance 
  holding company and not a mixed-activity 
  insurance holding company 
  –     if the group constitutes a financial conglomerate 
  (significant investments in the banking plus 
  investment services sector and insurance sector; 
  at least one subsidiary is an EU-regulated entity; group 
   mainly engaged in the financial sector), then 
  the parent is a mixed financial holding company 
  and not a mixed-activity insurance holding 
  company 
subsidiary 
EU-authorized life or non-life 
insurance undertaking 
Mixed-activity insurance 
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  26 
    Member States may decide not to take into account in the supplementary 
supervision undertakings having their registered office in a non-Member State if there are legal 
impediments to the transfer of the necessary information, or if the undertaking that should be 
included is of negligible interest, or if the inclusion of the financial situation of the undertaking 
would be inappropriate or misleading.
94  The EU Council may upon request of the Commission 
negotiate agreements with the non-EU countries regarding supplementary supervision of (1) EU-
authorized insurance undertakings that are subsidiaries of or 20 percent owned by non-EU 
insurance undertakings, by insurance holding companies, by reinsurance undertakings or by 
mixed-activity insurance holding companies that have their head office outside the EU or 
(2) non-EU insurance undertakings that are subsidiaries of or 20 percent owned by EU-
authorized insurance undertakings, by insurance holding companies, by reinsurance undertakings 
or by mixed-activity insurance holding companies that have their head office in the EU.
95 
Different from the Banking Directive and the Supplementary Supervision 
Directive,
96 the Insurance Group Directive does not require verification that an EU-authorized 
insurance undertaking that is a subsidiary of a non-EU insurance or other undertaking is subject 
to equivalent supplementary supervision by the home country of the parent and does not require 
analogous application of the Insurance Group Directive in case equivalence is not found. 
The exercise of supplementary supervision over insurance groups does not imply 
that the competent authorities are required to play a supervisory role in relation to non-EU 
insurance undertakings, insurance holding companies or mixed-activity insurance holding 
companies or reinsurance undertakings taken individually.
97 
II.  Scope of Supplementary Supervision 
1.  Intra-group Transactions 
The supplementary supervision of all insurance groups relates to intra-group 
transactions.
98  The competent authorities shall exercise general supervision over transactions of 
an EU-authorized life or non-life insurance undertaking and (1) subsidiaries of the insurance 
                                                     
94   Art. 3(3), Insurance Group Directive. 
95   Art. 10a, Insurance Group Directive, added by Art. 28(4), Supplementary Supervision Directive.  It is 
curious that an agreement under Art. 10a(1)(a), Insurance Group Directive, added by Art. 28(4), 
Supplementary Supervision Directive, may cover a non-EU insurance or other undertaking that is a 
20 percent owner of an EU-authorized insurance undertaking, whereas Art 2(2), Insurance Group Directive 
applies supplementary supervision only to EU-authorized insurance undertakings that are subsidiaries of a 
non-EU insurance or other undertaking and does not apply supplementary supervision to EU-authorized 
insurance undertakings that are 20 percent owned by a non-EU insurance or other undertaking. 
96   See supra A.V. and infra C.IV. 
97   Art. 3(1), Insurance Group Directive.   
98   Art. 8(1), Insurance Group Directive.  A non-exclusive list of intra-group transactions is set forth in Art. 
8(1)(b), Insurance Group Directive, and includes loans, guarantees and off-balance-sheet transactions, 
elements eligible for the solvency margin, investments, reinsurance operations and agreements to share 
costs.  
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undertaking, undertakings in which the insurance undertaking holds a participation or 
undertakings that are linked to the insurance undertaking by a horizontal structure,
99 (2) the 
parent of the insurance undertaking, other undertakings holding a participation in the insurance 
undertaking or undertakings that are linked to the insurance undertaking by a horizontal 
structure,
100  and (3) undertakings of which an entity referred to in (2) is a parent, holds a 
participation or is linked by a horizontal structure (i.e., essentially undertakings under common 
control with the insurance undertaking).
101  See diagram 4 for the insurance groups subject to 
supervision of intra-group transactions.  Member States shall require at least annual reporting by 
the insurance undertaking to the competent authorities of significant intra-group transactions.
102  
Member States shall require insurance undertakings to have in place adequate risk management 
processes and internal control mechanisms, including reporting and accounting procedures, in 
order to identify, measure, monitor and control intra-group transactions.
103  If, on the basis of this 
information, it appears that the solvency of the insurance undertaking is, or may be, jeopardized, 
the competent authority shall take appropriate measures at the level of the insurance 
undertaking.
104 
2.  Adjusted or Analogous Solvency Ratio 
In cases in which an EU-authorized life or non-life insurance undertaking is the 
parent of, holds a participation in, or is linked by a horizontal structure with at least one EU-
authorized life or non-life insurance undertaking, reinsurance undertaking or non-EU insurance 
undertaking,
105 Member States shall require the computation of an adjusted solvency 
                                                     
99   Art. 8(1)(a)(i) in connection with Art. 1(h), Insurance Group Directive, as amended by Art. 28(1), 
Supplementary Supervision Directive (related undertaking of the insurance undertaking).  The horizontal 
structure was added to the definition of related undertaking by Art. 28(1), Supplementary Supervision 
Directive and refers to Art. 12(1), Consolidated Accounts Directive.  A horizontal structure essentially 
exists if there is control in the absence of an equity investment, due to management on a unified basis or 
cross-membership of governing boards.  See infra notes 158 & 159. 
100   Art. 8(1)(a)(ii) in connection with Art. 1(g), Insurance Group Directive, as amended by Art. 28(1), 
Supplementary Supervision Directive (participating undertaking in the insurance undertaking).  The 
horizontal structure was added to the definition of participating undertaking by Art. 28(1), Supplementary 
Supervision Directive and refers to Art. 12(1), Consolidated Accounts Directive.  See supra note 99. 
101   Art. 8(1)(a)(iii) in connection with Art. 1(h) & (g), Insurance Group Directive, as amended by Art. 28(1), 
Supplementary Supervision Directive (related undertaking of a participating undertaking in the insurance 
undertaking).  See Art. 2(1), (2) & (3) Insurance Group Directive, referring to supplementary supervision in 
the manner provided in Art. 8, Insurance Group Directive. 
  The Insurance Group Directive extends consolidated supervision to transactions between insurance 
undertakings and certain natural persons.  Art. 8(1)(b), Insurance Group Directive. 
102   Art. 8(2), first subparagraph, Insurance Group Directive. 
103   Art. 8(2), Insurance Group Directive, as amended by Art. 28(3), Supplementary Supervision Directive. 
104   Art. 8(2), second subparagraph, Insurance Group Directive. 
105   Art. 1(b), Insurance Group Directive.  
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calculation.
106  See diagram 4(a) for the insurance company group subject to the computation of 
an adjusted solvency ratio.  If the calculation results in a negative adjusted solvency, the 
competent authorities shall take appropriate measures at the level of the insurance undertaking.
107  
In cases where an EU-authorized life or non-life insurance undertaking is a 
subsidiary of an insurance holding company, reinsurance undertaking or a non-EU insurance 
undertaking,
108 the competent authorities, shall ensure that at the level of the parent undertaking 
solvency computations are carried out that are analogous to those applicable to groups that are 
headed by an EU-authorized life or non-life insurance undertaking.
109  See diagram 4(b) for the 
insurance company group subject to analogous solvency computation.  If, on the basis of this 
calculation, the competent authorities conclude that the solvency of the EU-authorized life or 
non-life subsidiary insurance undertaking subsidiary is, or may be, jeopardized, they shall take 
appropriate measures at the level of that insurance undertaking subsidiary.
110 
                                                     
106   Art. 9(1) referring to Art. 2(1), Insurance Group Directive.  This calculation must be computed in 
accordance with Annex I to the Insurance Group Directive, as amended by Art. 28(5), Supplementary 
Supervision Directive.  The calculation shall include (1) any subsidiary of the insurance undertaking, any 
undertaking in which the insurance undertaking holds a 20 percent interest, and any undertaking with 
which the insurance undertaking is linked by a horizontal structure, (2) the parent of the insurance 
undertaking and any holder of a 20 percent interest in the insurance undertaking, and (3) any undertaking 
for which such parent, such 20 percent holder or such horizontally linked undertaking is a parent, a 20 
percent holder or a horizontally linked undertaking.  Art. 9(2) in connection with Art. 1(g) & (h), Insurance 
Group Directive; Art. 1(g) & (h), Insurance Group Directive were amended by Art. 28(1), Supplementary 
Supervision Directive (adding horizontally linked undertakings by reference to Art. 12(1), Consolidated 
Accounts Directive).  See supra notes 99 & 100 for a discussion of horizontal structures. 
107   Art. 9(3), Insurance Group Directive. 
108   Art. 10(1) referring to Art. 2(2), Insurance Group Directive.  See supra text accompanying notes 90–93. 
109   Art. 10(2), Insurance Groups Directive; paragraph 3, Annex II to the Insurance Group Directive.  The 
analogy shall consist in applying the general principles and methods described in Annex I to the Insurance 
Group Directive at the level of the insurance holding company, reinsurance undertaking or non-EU 
insurance undertaking.  Id.  The calculation shall include all subsidiaries of the insurance holding company, 
reinsurance company or non-EU insurance company, undertakings in which any of them holds a 20 percent 
participation and undertakings with which any of them is horizontally linked in the manner provided for in 
Annex II to the Insurance Group Directive.  Art. 10(2) in connection with Art. 1(g) & (h), Insurance Group 
Directive; Art. 1(g) & (h), Insurance Group Directive were amended by Art. 28(1), Supplementary 
Supervision Directive (adding horizontally linked undertakings by reference to Art. 12(1), Consolidated 
Accounts Directive).  See supra notes 99 & 100 for a discussion of horizontal structures. 
110   Art. 10(3), Insurance Group Directive.    
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3.  Information 
The competent authorities shall prescribe that every insurance undertaking subject 
to supplementary supervision shall have adequate internal control mechanisms in place for the 
production of any data and information relevant for the purposes of such supplementary 
supervision.
111 
If competent authorities need information which would be relevant for the 
purpose of supervision of an insurance undertaking subject to supplementary supervision, the 
competent authorities must address such request for information first to the insurance 
undertaking.  Only if the insurance undertaking does not supply such information, the competent 
authority may address itself directly (1) to any subsidiary of the insurance undertaking or any 
undertaking in which the insurance undertaking holds a participation (20 percent interest), or any 
undertaking that is connected to the insurance undertaking by a horizontal structure, (2) to the 
parent of the insurance undertaking or any undertaking holding a participation in the insurance 
undertaking, or any undertaking that is connected with such parent or undertaking holding a 
participation by a horizontal structure, or (3) to any undertaking for which such parent or holder 
of a participation or such horizontally linked undertaking is a parent or a holder of a participation 
or is horizontally linked.
112  The competent authorities may carry on within their territory, either 
themselves or through intermediaries, on-the-spot verification of information referred to in the 
preceding sentence at the insurance undertaking subject to supplementary supervision, 
subsidiaries or parents of that insurance undertaking, or subsidiaries of the parent of the 
insurance undertaking.
113  Where the competent authorities of one Member State wish to verify 
important information concerning an undertaking situated in another Member State which is a 
related insurance undertaking
114 or a subsidiary, a parent or a subsidiary of a parent of the 
insurance undertaking subject to supplementary supervision, they must ask the competent 
authorities of that other Member State to have the verification carried out.
115 
                                                     
111   Art. 5(1), Insurance Group Directive.   
112   Art. 6(1) in connection with Art. 3(2), Insurance Group Directive.  Art. 3(2), Insurance Group Directive 
uses the terms related undertaking, participating undertaking and related undertaking of a participating 
undertaking, defined in Art. 1(g) & (h), Insurance Group Directive, as amended by Art. 28(1), 
Supplementary Supervision Directive. 
113   Art. 6(1) & (2), Insurance Group Directive.  Note that on-the-spot verification does not extend to 
companies in which the insurance undertaking only  holds a participation, companies that hold a 
participation in the insurance undertaking or horizontally linked undertakings.  See Art. 6(2), Insurance 
Group Directive.   
Thus, the group of entities from which information can be requested is larger than th e group of entities with 
respect to which such information can be verified. 
114   See Art. 1(h), Insurance Group Directive, as amended by Art. 28(1), Supplementary Supervision Directive 
(related undertaking means either a subsidiary, another undertaking in which a participation is held or an 
undertaking linked by a horizontal structure).  See supra notes 99 & 100 for a discussion of horizontal 
structures.  
115   Art. 6(3), Insurance Group Directive.  The authorities receiving such request must act on it by carrying out 
the verification themselves, by allowing the requesting authorities to carry it out or by allowing an expert or  
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4.  Management of Insurance Holding Companies 
Persons who effectively direct the business of an insurance holding company 
must be of sufficiently good repute and have sufficient experience to perform their duties.
116 
III.  Member States Responsible for Supplementary Supervision 
Supplementary supervision shall be exercised by the competent authorities of the 
Member State in which the EU-authorized life or non-life insurance undertaking was 
authorized.
117  Where an insurance holding company, reinsurance undertaking, non-EU insurance 
undertaking or mixed-activity insurance holding company has as subsidiaries EU-authorized life 
or non-life insurance undertakings in more than one Member State, the competent authorities of 
the Member States concerned may reach agreement as to which of them will be responsible for 
exercising supplementary supervision.
118  If insurance undertakings established in different 
Member States are directly or indirectly related or are under common control, the competent 
authorities of each Member State shall communicate to one another all relevant or essential 
information that may allow or facilitate the exercise of supplementary supervision.
119 
C.  Cross-Sectoral Supplementary Supervision of Financial 
Conglomerates  
I.  Purpose of Cross-Sectoral Supplementary Supervision 
On November 20, 2002, the European Parliament adopted Directive 
2002/87/EC
120 introducing supplementary supervision of financial conglomerates [herein the 
                                                                                                                                                                          
auditor to carry it out.  Id.  The competent authority which made the request may, if it so wishes, participate 
in the verification when it does not carry out the verification itself.  Art. 6(3), Insurance Group Directive, as 
amended by Art. 28(2), Supplementary Supervision Directive. 
116   Art. 10b, Insurance Group Directive, added by Art. 28(4), Supplementary Supervision Directive. 
117   Art. 4(1), Insurance Group Directive.  The Insurance Group Directive does not address the case in which an 
EU-authorized insurance undertaking in one Member State is the parent of an EU-authorized insurance 
undertaking in another Member State. 
118   Art. 4(2), Insurance Group Directive. 
119   Art. 7, Insurance Group Directive. This Section refers (1) to insurance undertakings that are directly or                                                                           
indirectly related undertakings, i.e., undertakings that are either a subsidiary or in which a participation is 
held or that are linked by a horizontal structure, Art. 1(h), Insurance Group Directive, as amended by Art. 
28(1), Supplementary Supervision Directive, and (2) to insurance undertakings that have a common 
participating undertaking, i.e., an undertaking that is a parent undertaking or holds a participation or that is 
linked by a horizontal structure, Art. 1(g), Insurance Group Directive, as amended by Art. 28(1), 
Supplementary Supervision Directive.  Relevant information that may allow or facilitate the exercise of 
supervision pursuant to the Insurance Group Directive shall be communicated upon request, essential 
information shall be communicated on own initiative.  Art. 7(1), Insurance Group Directive.   
120   Directive 2002/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2002 on the 
supplementary supervision of credit institutions, insurance undertakings and investment firms in a financial 
conglomerate and amending Council Directives 73/239/EEC, 79/267/EEC, 92/49/EEC, 92/96/EEC, 
93/6/EEC and 93/22/EEC, and Directives 98/78/EC and 2000/12/EC of the European Parliament and of the  
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Supplementary Supervision Directive].  The Supplementary Supervision Directive requires a 
closer coordination among supervisory authorities of different sectors of the financial industry 
and among the supervisory authorities of the different Member States. 
 
The principal objective of the Supplementary Supervision Directive is to face the 
accelerating pace of consolidation in the financial industry and the intensification of links 
between financial markets.  Over the past years, a number of cross-sector groups combining 
insurance companies, banks and investment firms have been created and have become of 
significant importance in the EU.
121  Such groups straddle traditional sectoral boundaries.
122  
Combined financial operations may create new prudential risks or exacerbate existing ones.
123  
Laws and regulations in the different financial sectors have traditionally adopted different 
approaches with different definitions of capital, different types of risks and different capital 
requirements.
124  For instance, insurance supervisors have historically been primarily concerned 
with the liability side of the balance sheet as the main source of risk, although assets are of 
course monitored too.
125  Regulations in the banking sector regard the asset side of the balance 
sheet as the principal source of risk, although an examination of the source of funding is an 
important aspect of the supervisory process.
126  Securities supervisors require securities firms to 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Council, O.J. Eur. Comm. No. L 35/1 (2003) [herein the Supplementary Supervision Directive].  See also 
Commission of the European Communities, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on the supplementary supervision of credit institutions , insurance undertakings and investment 
firms in a financial conglomerate, O.J. Eur. Comm. No. C 213/227 (2001) [herein the Proposed 
Supplementary Supervision Directive].  For a discussion of the Proposed Supplementary Supervision 
Directive, see Michael Gruson, Supervision of Financial Holding Companies in Europe:  The EU Directive 
on Supplementary Supervision of Financial Conglomerates, 36 INT’L L. 1229 (2002) [herein Gruson, 
Supplementary Supervision]. 
  A number of interested parties had commented on the Proposed Supplementary Supervision Directive.  See 
Gruson, Supplementary Supervision, supra, at 1231 n.13 for a list of such comments.    
121   Recitals (2) & (3), Supplementary Supervision Directive. 
122   Commission of the European Community, Explanatory Memorandum to the Proposed Supplementary 
Supervision Directive (Apr. 24, 2001), O.J. Eur. Comm. No. C 213/227 (2001) [herein 2001 Explanatory 
Memorandum], at 2, sub 1. 
123   2001 Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 122, at 2 sub 1. 
124  Tripartite Group of Bank, Securities and Insurance Regulators, The Supervision of Financial 
Conglomerates (Bank for International Settlements, July 1995) [herein Tripartite Report], at 39, sub no. 
104; The Joint Forum, The Joint Forum Compendium of Documents (July 2001) [herein Joint Forum 
Report], Capital Adequacy Principles Paper, at 12, sub no. 6.  The Tripartite Group was formed at the 
initiative of the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision (Basle Committee) in early 1993 to address a 
range of issues relating to the supervision of financial conglomerates.  The Joint Forum was established in 
early 1996 under the aegis of the Basle Committee, the International Organization of Securities 
Commissions (IOSCO) and the International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS) to take forward 
the work of the Tripartite Group.  The Joint Forum Report is a compilation of papers that have been 
prepared by the Joint Forum since its inception in January 1996. 
125   Tripartite Report, supra note 124, at 16, sub no. 41. 
126   Tripartite Report, supra note 124, at 16, sub no. 41.  
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have sufficient liquid assets to repay promptly all liabilities at any time.
127  The scope for 
potential supervisory problems increases if a financial conglomerate spans a number of financial 
markets due to the web of financial interrelationships characteristic for financial conglomerates.  
On the other hand, such conglomerates may gain financial solidity by diversifying that risk.
128  
The Supplementary Supervision Directive intends to ensure the stability of the European 
financial market, establish common prudential standards for the supervision of such financial 
groups throughout Europe, and introduce level playing fields and legal certainty between 
financial institutions.
129 
The basic philosophy of the Supplementary Supervision Directive is that the solo 
supervisions of individually regulated entities should continue to be the foundation for effective 
supervision, but that the various supervisors need to establish a coordinated approach in order 
that prudential assessment can be made from a group-wide perspective.
130 
II.  Determination of Financial Conglomerates and the Addressees of 
  Supplementary Supervision 
1.  Sectoral and Cross-Sectoral Supervision 
The EU legal framework for the supervision of financial institutions before the 
adoption of the Supplementary Supervision Directive was incomplete because it only covered the 
so-called sectoral supervision; that is, supervision over institutions within a particular sector of 
the financial industry.
131  Except in the case of credit institutions and investment firms,
132 cross-
sectoral supervision of financial groups (combining institutions from different financial sectors) 
existed only to a very limited extent.
133  The Supplementary Supervision Directive changes this 
                                                     
127   Tripartite Report, supra note 124, at 16, sub no. 41. 
128   Tripartite Report, supra note 124, at 16, sub no. 41. 
129   2001 Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 122, at 2, sub 1. 
130  Tripartite Report, supra note 124, at 16, sub no. 42. 
131   Arts. 52–56, Banking Directive provide for prudential regulation of banking groups; Art. 7, Capital 
Adequacy Directive provides for prudential regulation of investment firm groups; and the Insurance Group 
Directive provides for additional supervision of insurance groups.    
132   See Art. 7, Capital Adequacy Directive; Art. 52, Banking Directive (the term financial institution includes 
investment firms). See supra A.II. 
133   E.g., Art. 56(4), Banking Directive requires cooperation and exchange of information between the different 
supervisory authorities if a credit institution, financial holding company of a credit institution or 
mixed-activity holding company of a credit institution has as a subsidiary an insurance company or an 
undertaking providing investment services.  The same rule applies where a mixed-activity holding 
company of a credit institution itself is an insurance undertaking.  Art. 55(2), Banking Directive.  Art. 7(3), 
8th indent, Capital Adequacy Directive extends this rule to situations where an investment firm, a financial 
holding company of an investment firm or a mixed-activity holding company of an investment firm has as a 
subsidiary an insurance company.  Note that financial holding company and mixed-activity holding 
company have different meanings depending on whether they relate to credit institutions or investment 
firms.  See supra notes 9, 23 & 72 (financial holding company) and notes 52 & 53 (mixed-activity holding 
company).  Similarly, Art. 7(2), Insurance Group Directive requires close cooperation and information- 
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situation by, generally speaking, introducing supplementary supervision of regulated entities in 
financial conglomerates that straddle several financial sectors.  
The Supplementary Supervision Directive uses the term financial sector to refer 
to the banking, insurance or investment services sector.
134  A regulated entity is defined as a 
credit institution, an insurance undertaking or an investment firm.
135   
                                                                                                                                                                          
sharing among competent authorities where EU-authorized life or non-life insurance undertakings and 
either a credit institution or an investment firm, or both, are directly or indirectly related (i.e., one being a 
subsidiary of the other or holding a participation (20 percent or more of the voting rights or capital) in the 
other, Art. 1(h) & (f), Insurance Group Directive) or have a common participating undertaking (i.e., an 
undertaking that is a parent undertaking or holds a participation, Art. 1(g), Insurance Group Directive).  
Art. 1(g) & (h), Insurance Group Directive was amended by Art. 28(1), Supplementary Supervision 
Directive by adding horizontally linked undertakings by reference to Art. 12(1), Consolidated Accounts 
Directive.  See supra notes 99 & 100 for a discussion of horizontal structures. 
134   Art. 2(8), Supplementary Supervision Directive.  Art. 2(8), Supplementary Supervision Directive defines 
financial sector as a sector composed of one or more entities of the banking sector, of the insurance sector 
or of the investment services sector or of a mixed financial holding company, as defined in Art. 2(15), 
Supplementary Supervision Directive. 
  The banking sector consists of (i) credit institutions (see supra note 7), (ii) financial institutions (i.e., 
undertakings, other than credit institutions, the principal activity of which is to acquire holdings or to carry 
on one or more of the activities referred to in numbers 2–12 of the list appearing in the Annex to the 
Banking Directive, see supra note 8), and (iii) ancillary banking services undertakings (i.e., undertakings 
the principal activity of which consists in owning or managing property, managing data-processing 
services, or any other similar activity which is ancillary to the principal activity of one or more credit 
institutions, see supra note 18), as defined in Art. 1(1), second subparagraph, 1(5) & 1(23), respectively, 
Banking Directive.  Art. 2(8)(a) & (1), Supplementary Supervision Directive. 
  The insurance sector consists of (i) insurance undertakings within the meaning of Art. 6, First Non-Life 
Insurance Directive, Art. 6, First Life Insurance Directive (i.e., EU-authorized life or non-life insurance 
undertakings), and Art. 1(b), Insurance Group Directive (i.e., non-EU insurance undertakings, see supra 
note 87), (ii) reinsurance undertakings, as defined in Art. 1(c), Insurance Group Directive (i.e., 
undertakings, other than insurance undertakings or non-EU insurance undertakings (see supra note 87), the 
main business of which consists in accepting risks ceded by an insurance undertaking, a non-EU insurance 
undertaking or other reinsurance undertakings), and (iii) insurance holding companies, as defined in Art. 
1(i), Insurance Group Directive (i.e., parents, the main business of which is to acquire and hold 
participations in subsidiaries, where those subsidiaries are exclusively or mainly insurance undertakings, 
reinsurance undertakings or non-EU insurance undertakings, one at least of such subsidiaries being an 
insurance undertaking).  Art. 2(8)(b), (2) & (6), Supplementary Supervision Directive. 
  The investment services sector consists of (i) investment firms, as defined in Art. 1(2), Investment Services 
Directive (i.e., any legal person the regular occupation or business of which is the provision of investment 
services for third parties on a professional basis), and in Art. 2(4), Capital Adequacy Directive (i.e., 
recognized third-country investment firms), and (ii) financial institutions, as defined in Art. 2(7), Capital 
Adequacy Directive by reference to (the predecessor provision of) Art. 1(5), Banking Directive (i.e., 
undertakings, other than credit institutions, the principal activity of which is to acquire holdings or to carry 
on one or more of the activities referred to in numbers 2–12 of the list appearing in the Annex to the 
Banking Directive).  Art. 2(8)(c) & (3), Supplementary Supervision Directive. 
Asset management companies within the meaning of Art. 2(5), Supplementary Supervision Directive are 
also part of the financial sector, either the banking sector, the investment se rvices sector or the insurance 
sector.  Art. 30, first subparagraph, Supplementary Supervision Directive.  
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The financial sector is not limited to the EU, because the banking sector includes non-EU credit 
institutions, the insurance sector includes non-EU insurance undertakings, and the investment services 
sector includes non-EU investment firms and asset management companies include non-EU asset 
management companies, see infra note 135. 
  Sectoral rules means the EU legislation relating to the prudential supervision, in particular laid down in 
(1) the First Non-Life Insurance Directive, (2) the First Life Insurance Directive, (3) the Insurance Group 
Directive, (4) the Capital Adequacy Directive, (5) the Investment Services Directive, and (6) the Banking 
Directive.  Art. 2(7), Supplementary Supervision Directive. 
135   Art. 2(4), Supplementary Supervision Directive.  For the purpose of the Supplementary Supervision 
Directive, the following definitions apply: 
  Credit institution means a credit institution within the meaning of Art. 1(1), second subparagraph, Banking 
  Directive.  Credit institution means: 
    (i)  an institution that takes deposits from the public and extends credit for its own account   
    that is authorized by a Member State, 
    (ii)  an electronic money institution within the meaning of Directive 2000/46/EC of the   
    European Parliament and of the Council of 18 September 2000 on the taking up, pursuit  
    of and prudential supervision of the business of electronic money institutions, O.J. Eur.  
    Comm. No. L 275/39 (2000), that is authorized by a Member State, and 
    (iii)  any private or public undertaking that corresponds to the definition of (i) or (ii) above and   
    that has been authorized by a country other than a Member State [herein a non-EU credit  
    institution]. 
Art. 2(1), Supplementary Supervision Directive.   
  Insurance undertaking means: 
    (i)  an undertaking within the meaning of Art. 6, First Non-Life Insurance Directive or Art. 6, 
    First Life Insurance Directive, that is, a life insurance company or a non-life insurance  
    company authorized by a Member State, and  
    (ii)  an undertaking within the meaning of Art. 1(b), Insurance Group Directive; that is, a  
    non-member-country insurance undertaking, i.e., an undertaking that would require 
    authorization under the First Life Insurance Directive or the First Non-Life Insurance  
    Directive if it had its registered office in the EU [herein a non-EU insurance  
    undertaking].   
Art. 2(2), Supplementary Supervision Directive. 
  Investment firm means: 
    (i)  an investment firm within the meaning of Art. 1(2), Investment Services Directive, i.e.,  
    any legal person whose regular occupation or business it is to provide any investment   
    service for third parties on a professional basis (investment services are any of the  
    services listed in the Annex A to the Investment Services Directive (brokerage, dealing,  
    portfolio management and underwriting)), and 
    (ii)  a recognized third-country investment firm referred to in Art. 2(4), Capital Adequacy  
    Directive, i.e., a firm that (x) would be covered by the definition of investment firm in   
    Art. 2(2), Capital Adequacy Directive (this Article refers to Art. 1(2), Investment  
    Services Directive) if it were established within the EU, (y) is authorized in a third   
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The following table sets forth the entities that are part of the financials sectors:   
Diagram 5:  Financial Sector Entities 
  Banking Sector  Investment Sector  Insurance Sector 
Mixed financial 
holding company 
Regulated Entities  credit institution 
 
asset management 
company 
investment firm  
 
asset management 
company 
life insurance 
undertaking 
 
non-life insurance 
undertaking 
 
asset management 
company 
 
 
Non-Regulated 
Entities 
financial institution 
(other than an 
investment firm) 
 
ancillary banking 
service undertaking 
financial institution 
(other than an 
investment firm) 
reinsurance 
undertaking 
 
insurance holding 
company 
mixed financial 
holding company 
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
    country, and (z) is subject to and complies with prudential rules considered by the  
    competent authorities to be at least as stringent as those laid down in the Capital     
    Adequacy Directive [herein non-EU investment firms].   
Art. 2(3), Supplementary Supervision Directive.   
Asset management companies that are part of a financial conglomerate are also regulated entities.  Art. 
  30, third subparagraph, Supplementary Supervision Directive.  Asset management company means: 
  (i)  a management company within the meaning of Art. 1a(2), Council Directive 85/611/EEC 
of 20 December 1985 on the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative 
provisions relating to undertakings for collective investments in transferable securities 
(UCITS), O.J. Eur. Comm. No. L 375/3 (1985) [herein UCITS Directive], as amended by 
Council Directive 88/220/EEC of 22 March 1988, O.J. Eur. Comm. No. L 100/31 (1988), 
by European Parliament and Council Directive 95/26/EC of 29 June 1995, O.J. Eur. 
Comm. No. L 168/7 (1995), by Directive 2000/64/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 7 November 2000, O.J. Eur. Comm. No. L 290/27 (2000), by Directive 
2001/107/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 January 2002, O.J. 
Eur. Comm. No. L 41/20 (2002), and by Directive 2001/108/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 21 January 2002, O.J. Eur. Comm. No. L 41/35 (2002), 
and 
  (ii)  an undertaking the registered office of which is outside the EU and which would require 
authorization in accordance with Art. 5(1), UCITS Directive if it had its registered office 
within the EU. 
Art. 2(5), Supplementary Supervision Directive. 
It is curious that a non-EU investment firm that is subject to less supervision than an EU investment firm is 
not a regulated entity and is disregarded in the determination whether a financial conglomerate exists.   See 
infra note 167 for a discussion of such determination.  
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The definition of regulated entity itself does not require that the regulated entity 
be located in the EU and therefore also includes non-EU entities that would have to be 
authorized under one of the sectoral Directives if they were located in the EU.  However, only 
regulated entities that have obtained an authorization pursuant to one of the sectoral Directives
136 
are subject to supplementary supervision within the meaning of the Supplementary Supervision 
Directive.
137  Such an authorization is only required for undertakings that are located in the EU.
138  
Thus, supplementary supervision only applies to regulated entities that are established and 
authorized in the EU, except that EU-regulated entities with a parent outside the EU are not 
subject to supplementary supervision.  As further discussed below, if the parent of an EU-
regulated entity has its head office in a country outside the EU, the Supplementary Supervision 
Directive yields in favor of the supervision by the home country of the parent if that supervision 
is equivalent to the supervision under the Supplementary Supervision Directive.  Only if the 
parent’s home country does not have an equivalent supervision, are the EU-regulated entities 
subject to analogous or appropriate supplementary supervision under the Supplementary 
Supervision Directive.
139 
It is important to note that the Supplementary Supervision Directive does not 
replace the existing sole, consolidated or supplementary supervision of the different sectoral 
groups but introduces a supplementary supervision of the regulated entities in a group that 
straddles more than one financial sector.  This supplementary supervision deals with the 
                                                     
136   Art. 6, First Non-Life Insurance Directive; Art. 6, First Life Insurance Directive; Art. 3(1), Investment 
Services Directive; Art. 4, Banking Directive. 
137   See Arts. 1 & 5(1), Supplementary Supervision Directive.  The Supplementary Supervision Directive uses 
the term regulated entity with two meanings:  As defined in Art. 2(4), Supplementary Supervision 
Directive, the term also includes non-EU-authorized entities.  See supra notes 134 & 135.  As used in Art. 
1, Supplementary Supervision Directive, the term regulated entities only refers to entities which have 
obtained an authorization under a sectoral Directive.  The Supplementary Supervision Directive calls EU-
authorized regulated entities regulated entities referred to in Article 1.  See, e.g., Art. 5(1), Supplementary 
Supervision Directive.  Regulated entities referred to in Article 1 are herein sometimes called EU-regulated 
entities and regulated entities that are not EU-regulated entities are herein  sometimes called non-EU-
regulated entities. 
138   Art. 6, First Non-Life Insurance Directive and Art. 6, First Life Insurance Directive require an authorization 
of insurance undertakings having established their head office within the territory of a Member State.  Art. 
3(1) in connection with Art. 1(6), Investment Services Directive states that only investment firms having 
their registered office or head office in a Member State are subject to authorization.  Although Art. 4, 
Banking Directive provides for the authorization of credit institutions prior to commencement of activities 
in a Member State without expressly referring to the head office or registered office of that credit 
institution, it is clear from the context of the Banking Directive and Arts. 23–25, Banking Directive 
(governing relations with third countries) that only credit institutions established under the laws of a 
Member State are subject to authorization pursuant to Art. 4, Banking Directive. 
139  See infra C.IV.  If a financial conglomerate is headed by a non-EU entity (a regulated entity or a mixed 
financial holding company), the EU-regulated entities are subject to analogous or appropriate 
supplementary supervision according to Arts. 5(3) & 18(2) & (3), Supplementary Supervision Directive if 
the parent is not subject to supervision that is equivalent to that provided by the Supplementary Supervision 
Directive.  When Arts. 5(3) & 18(1), Supplementary Supervision Directive speak about “a regulated entity 
… having its head office outside the Community”, they refer to credit institutions, investment firms and 
insurance companies authorized by a state that is not a Member State.  
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relationship among the EU-regulated entities within the group and of EU-regulated entities with 
other entities in the group.  Furthermore, supplemental supervision does not lead to supervision 
of unregulated entities within a group on a stand-alone basis.
140  However, certain entities in a 
financial conglomerate that are not EU-regulated entities are subject to supervision in their 
relations with the EU-regulated entities, for instance, in the computation of capital adequacy at 
the level of the financial conglomerate
141 or in the evaluation of intra-group transactions.
142 
2.  Financial Conglomerates 
The Supplementary Supervision Directive applies to certain EU-regulated entities 
(credit institutions, insurance undertakings and investment firms) that have obtained an 
authorization pursuant to one of the sectoral Directives.
143  If such entities are part of a financial 
conglomerate, they may be subject to supplementary prudential supervision.
144  In order to 
determine whether a regulated entity is subject to supplementary supervision, three inquiries 
must be made:  first, whether the regulated entity is part of a group; second, whether the group 
meets the requirements of a financial conglomerate; and third, whether the regulated entity is 
one that is the addressee of supplementary supervision.
145 
a)  Definition of Group 
The Supplementary Supervision Directive defines a financial conglomerate as a 
group of undertakings meeting certain conditions.
146  A group is determined (a) by a 
parent-subsidiary relationship, (b) by a relationship based on a participation, or (c) by a 
horizontal structure.
147   
A subsidiary or subsidiary undertaking
148 is, in summary, an undertaking (1) in 
which a parent (a) has, or controls alone, pursuant to a shareholder agreement, a majority of the 
shareholders’ or members’ voting rights, or (b) has the right to appoint or remove a majority of 
                                                     
140   Art. 5(5), Supplementary Supervision Directive.  Art. 5(5), Supplementary Supervision Directive states that 
the exercise of supplementary supervision at the level of the financial con glomerate shall in no way imply 
that the competent authorities are required to play a supervisory role in relation to mixed financial holding 
companies, non-EU-regulated entities or unregulated entities in a financial conglomerate, on a stand -alone 
basis.  
141   See infra C.III.1. 
142   See infra C.III.2. 
143   Art. 5(1), Supplementary Supervision Directive.  For the relevant sectoral Directives, see supra note 134. 
144   Art. 1, Supplementary Supervision Directive. 
145   See infra C.II.3. for a discussion of the third point. 
146   Art. 2(14), Supplementary Supervision Directive. 
147   Art. 2(12), Supplementary Supervision Directive. 
148   Subsidiary undertaking and parent undertaking are defined in Art. 2(9) & (10), Supplementary Supervision 
Directive by reference to Art. 1, Consolidated Accounts Directive.  
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the administrative, management or supervisory board and is at the same time a shareholder or a 
member, or (2) that can be controlled by the parent (the parent “has the right to exercise a 
dominant influence”) pursuant to a contract between the parent and the subsidiary or a provision 
in the subsidiary’s charter, the parent at the same time being a shareholder or a member.
149  
Furthermore, a Member State may consider an undertaking as a parent undertaking if it has the 
power to exercise, or actually exercises, a dominant influence or control over another 
undertaking (a subsidiary) or manages another undertaking (a subsidiary) and the parent on a 
unified basis.
150  The definition of parent undertaking and subsidiary undertaking is based on the 
requirement to prepare consolidated accounts.
151  However, the definitions go beyond the group 
of companies required to prepare consolidated accounts, because a parent-subsidiary relationship 
also exists if, in the opinion of the competent authorities, the parent undertaking effectively 
exercises a dominant influence over another undertaking.
152  The group includes direct and 
indirect subsidiaries of a parent.
153   
A group also includes all entities in which the parent or a subsidiary thereof holds 
a participation.
154  A participation is (1) a right in the capital of other undertakings which “by 
creating a durable link with those [other] undertakings, are intended to contribute to the 
                                                     
149   See Art. 1(1), Consolidated Accounts Directive referred to in Art. 2(9) & (10), Supplementary Supervision 
Directive.  The Member States have some discretion to modify the parent-subsidiary definition based on 
dominant influence, Art. 1(1)(c), Consolidated Accounts Directive.  See supra note 11. 
150   Art. 1(2), Consolidated Accounts Directive referred to in Art. 2(9) & (10), Supplementary Supervision 
Directive.  Note that the term subsidiary for purposes of consolidated supervision does not include 
subsidiaries pursuant to Art. 1(2), Consolidated Accounts Directive.  See supra note 11. 
 
Art. 1(2), Consolidated Accounts Directive was amended in 2003 by Art. 2(1), Directive 2003/51/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 18 June 2003, OJ. Eur. Comm. L 178/16 (2003).  Before that 
amendment, Art. 1(2), Consolidated Accounts Directive referred to Art. 17, Annual Accounts Directive, 
which defines participating interest.  Pursuant to Art. 17, second sentence, Annual Accounts Directive, a 
lower percentage than 20 percent of equity ownership could constitute a participation if the Member State 
requires consolidation under certain conditions in the case of a participating interest of less than 20 percent.  
Art. 17, second sentence, Annual Accounts Directive is excluded from the definition of participation in the 
Banking Directive and in the Supplementary Supervision Directive, see supra note 15 and infra notes 155 
& 156, but prior to the above amendment of Art. 1(2), Consolidated Accounts Directive was not excluded 
from Art. 2(9) & (10), Supplementary Supervision Directive (definition of parent undertaking and 
subsidiary undertaking) in connection with Art 1(2), Consolidated Accounts Directive referring to Art. 17, 
Annual Accounts Directive.   
151   See supra note 148. 
152   Art. 2(9) (an undertaking is a parent undertaking if it “in the opinion of the competent authorities, 
effectively exercises a dominant influence over another undertaking”) & (10) (corresponding language for 
subsidiary undertaking), Supplementary Supervision Directive.  See supra note 12 for the same test for the 
determination of subsidiary for consolidated supervision. 
153   Art. 2(10), Supplementary Supervision Directive (“all subsidiary undertakings of subsidiary undertakings 
shall also be considered as subsidiary undertakings of the parent undertaking”).   
154   Art. 2(12), Supplementary Supervision Directive.  
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company’s [the holder of the participation] activities”,
155 or (2) the ownership, directly or 
indirectly, of 20 percent or more of the voting rights or capital of another undertaking.
156  The 
Supplementary Supervision Directive abolishes the presumption of the Annual Accounts 
Directive that the holding of 20 percent of the capital of another undertaking constituted a 
participation; the direct or indirect ownership of 20 percent or more of the voting rights or capital 
of an undertaking constitutes a participation in any case.
157 
Lastly, a group exists if undertakings are linked to each other in a horizontal 
structure.  Such horizontal group exists if undertakings that have no equity relationship are (1) 
managed on a unified basis pursuant to a contract between those undertakings or provisions in 
the charters of those undertakings or (2) if the administrative, management or supervisory bodies 
of those undertakings consist for the major part of the same persons in office during the financial 
year.
158  The U.S. bank regulatory practice would describe the horizontal group as a case of 
control without equity investment.
159 
A U.S. observer would say that a group in the meaning of the Supplementary 
Supervision Directive is determined by concepts very similar to the U.S. Bank Holding 
                                                     
155   Art. 2(11), Supplementary Supervision Directive referring to Art. 17, first sentence, Annual Accounts 
Directive. 
156   Art. 2(11), Supplementary Supervision Directive.  Participation for purposes of consolidated supervision 
was defined differently in the Banking Directive but the Supplementary Supervision Directive amended the 
Banking Directive in order to conform the definitions of participation.  See supra notes 15 & 88.  Although 
for purposes of easier presentation, a participation is frequently referred to herein as 20 percent equity 
holding, a lower percentage of equity ownership could constitute a participation if a durable link and the 
requisite intention to contribute to the participation holder’s activities exist. 
157   The presumption is contained in Art. 17, second sentence, Annual Accounts Directive.  The Member States 
can reduce the 20 percent threshold.  Id.  Art. 2(11), Supplementary Supervision Directive does not refer to 
Art. 17, second sentence, Annual Accounts Directive, but defines participation as ownership of at least 20 
percent of the voting rights or capital of an undertaking.  Thus, a Member State cannot reduce the 
20 percent threshold of a participation.  However, a lesser percentage can still result in a participation as set 
forth supra note 156. 
158   Art. 2(12), Supplementary Supervision Directive referring to Art. 12(1), Consolidated Accounts Directive.  
Art. 12(1), Consolidated Accounts Directive gives Member States discretion whether or not to require 
horizontal groups to prepare consolidated financials statements.  Art. 2(12), Supplementary Supervision 
Directive refers only to the description of horizontal groups in Art. 12(1), Consolidated Accounts Directive, 
not to the discretion of the Member States.  Thus, Member States do not have discretion whether or not to 
have horizontal groups as financial conglomerates.   
  The Proposed Supplementary Supervision Directive defined a group as two or more natural or legal 
persons between whom there are close links.  See Art. 2(11), Proposed Supplementary Supervision 
Directive.  By eliminating the close link requirement from the definition of group, the Directive responds to 
a major criticism of the Proposed Supplementary Supervision Directive.  See Gruson, Supplementary 
Supervision, supra note 120, at 1237–38, 1255.  The concept of close link is still used to define intra-group 
transactions, Art. 2(18), Supplementary Supervision Directive.  See infra 292. 
159   See Gruson & Reisner, supra note 9, § 9.03[2][a] & note 153 and accompanying text.  
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Company Act’s concept of control which determines whether a parent-subsidiary relationship 
exists.
160 
b)  Definition of Financial Conglomerate 
A group constitutes a financial conglomerate if it meets certain conditions.
161  For 
purposes of determining a financial conglomerate the Supplementary Supervision Directive 
distinguishes between groups that are headed by an EU- regulated entity and groups that are 
not.
162  
If the group is headed by an EU- regulated entity,
 163 the group qualifies as a 
financial conglomerate if it meets the following requirements:
164 
(a)  such EU-regulated entity is either a parent of an entity in a financial 
sector, an entity that holds a participation in an entity in a financial sector, or an entity 
that is linked with another entity in a financial sector by way of a horizontal group,
165  
(b)  the group must straddle financial sectors:  at least one of the entities 
(parent or subsidiary) in the group is within the insurance sector and at least one is within 
                                                     
160   Section 2, BHCA, 12 U.S.C § 1841 (2000).  See Gruson & Reisner, supra note 9, § 9.03. 
161   Art. 2(14), Supplementary Supervision Directive. 
162   Art. 2(14), Supplementary Supervision Directive.  For a discussion of regulated entities, see supra notes 
135–139 and accompanying text. 
163   Art. 2(14)(a), Supplementary Supervision Directive refers to a regulated entity within the meaning of 
Article 1.  This means that the head of the group must be an insurance undertaking, a credit institution or an 
investment firm, each of which has obtained an authorization pursuant to the relevant sectoral Directive, 
i.e., it must be an EU-regulated entity.  See supra notes 135–139 and accompanying text. 
164   Art. 2(14)(a), (b), (d) & (e), Supplementary Supervision Directive. 
165   Art. 2(14)(b), Supplementary Supervision Directive.  As to the definition of horizontal group, see supra 
note 158 and accompanying test.   
  The entity in the insurance sector need not be a regulated insurance undertaking, it could also be a 
reinsurance undertaking as defined in Art. 2(6), Supplementary Supervision Directive by reference to Art. 
1(c), Insurance Group Directive, or an insurance holding company as defined in Art. 1(i), Insurance Group 
Directive.  Art. 2(8)(b), Supplementary Supervision Directive.  The entity in the banking sector may be a 
credit institution as defined in Art. 2(1), Supplementary Supervision Directive by reference to Art. 1(1), 
second subparagraph, Banking Directive, a financial institution as defined in Art. 1(5), Banking Directive 
or an ancillary banking services undertaking as defined in Art. 1(23), Banking Directive.  Art. 2(8)(a), 
Supplementary Supervision Directive.  The entity in the investment services sector may be an investment 
firm as defined in Art. 2(3), Supplementary Supervision Directive by reference to Art. 1(2), Investment 
Services Directive and Art. 2(4) Capital Adequacy Directive, or a financial institution as defined in Art. 
2(7), Capital Adequacy Directive by reference to Art. 1(5), Banking Directive.  Art. 2(8)(c), Supplementary 
Supervision Directive. 
The terms insurance undertaking, credit institution and investment firm include such institutions authorized 
in or outside the EU.  See supra note 135.   
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the banking or investment services sector, whereby the entity that is a subsidiary may be 
in or outside the EU,
166 and 
(c)  the consolidated and/or aggregated activities of the entities within the 
insurance sector and the consolidated and/or aggregated activities of the entities in the 
banking and investment services sector are both significant.
167 
If the group is not headed by an EU-regulated entity, it could be headed by a 
mixed financial holding company or by a non-EU-regulated entity or it could not be headed by 
anyone (horizontal group).  Such group not headed by an EU-regulated entity qualifies as a 
financial conglomerate if it meets the following requirements:
168  
                                                     
166   Art. 2(14)(d), Supplementary Supervision Directive.  The terms insurance undertaking, credit institution 
and investment firm include such institutions authorized in or outside the EU. See supra note 135.   
167   Art. 2(14)(e), Supplementary Supervision Directive.  The significance of the activities of those entities may 
either be measured by looking at the financial sector entities in the financial sector in question as compared 
to all financial sector entities in the group, Art. 3(2), Supplementary Supervision Directive, or by looking at 
the balance sheet total of the smallest financial sector in the group, Art. 3(3) , Supplementary Supervision 
Directive.   
  For the purpose of determining whether the activities in a financial sector are significant, the average of 
(i) the ratio of the balance sheet total of that financial sector to the balance sheet total of the financial sector 
entities in the group and (ii) the ratio of the solvency requirements of the same financial sector to the total 
solvency requirements of the financial sector entities in the group, must exceed 10 percent.  Art. 3(2) , first 
subparagraph, Supplementary Supervision Directive.  For the purposes of calculating the average, the 
banking sector and the investment services sector shall be considered together.  Id., second subparagraph.   
  Activities are also presumed to be significant if the balance sheet total of the smallest financial sector in the 
group exceeds €6 billion.  Art. 3(3), Supplementary Supervision Directive.  The smallest financial sector in 
a financial conglomerate is the sector with the smallest average of the two ratios set forth in Art. 3(2), first 
subparagraph, Supplementary Supervision Directive.  For the measurement of the smallest financial sector, 
the banking sector and the investment services sector shall be considered together.   Id.  However, if the 
group that reaches the € 6 billion threshold does not reach the 10 percent threshold referred to in Art. 3(2), 
Supplementary Supervision Directive, the relevant competent authorities may agree not to regard the group 
as a financial conglomerate or not to apply Art. 7, 8 or 9, Supplementary Supervision Directive if the 
competent authorities are of the opinion that the inclusion of the groups in the scope of the Supplementary 
Supervision Directive or the application of such provisions is not necessary or would be inappropriate or 
misleading.  Art. 3(3), Supplementary Supervision Directive.  Art. 3(3), Supplementary Supervision 
Directive does not clearly state that the possible exclusion for groups that do not reach the 10  percent 
threshold applies only to those groups that met the € 6 billion threshold, but any other reading would make 
no sense. 
  The significance test intends to distinguish between homogenous groups and financial conglomerates.  The 
Supplementary Supervision Directive intends only to cover the latter groups.  The former are covered by 
the existing sectoral Directives on a group-wide basis.  See 2001 Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 
122, at 5, sub 2, arts. 2, 3.   
168   Art. 2(14)(a), (c), (d) & (e), Supplementary Supervision Directive.  
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(a)   at least one of the subsidiaries in the group is an EU-regulated entity,
169 
(b)  the group must straddle financial sectors:  at least one of the entities 
(subsidiaries) in the group is within the insurance sector and at least one is within the 
banking or investment services sector whereby such entities may be in or outside the EU 
(except that, as stated under (a) above, one entity in the group must be an EU-regulated 
entity),
170 
(c)  the group’s activities mainly occur in the financial sector
171 (i.e., the 
financial sector entities represent at least 40 percent of the group),
172 and   
(d)  the consolidated and/or aggregated activities of the entities within the 
insurance sector and the consolidated and/or aggregated activities of the entities in the 
banking and investment services sector are both significant.
173 
The Supplementary Supervision Directive introduces and defines the term mixed 
financial holding company
174 to cover financial conglomerates headed by a non-regulated entity 
                                                     
169   Art. 2(14)(a), Supplementary Supervision Directive refers to a subsidiary that is a regulated entity within 
the meaning of Art. 1, Supplementary Supervision Directive.  This means that at least one member of the 
group must be a credit institution, insurance undertaking or investment firm that has obtained its 
authorization pursuant to one of the sectoral Directives, i.e., it must be an EU-regulated entity.  See supra 
notes 135–139 and accompanying text.  The requirement that an EU-regulated entity be a subsidiary does 
not fit the definition of horizontal group.  Presumably one of the members of the horizontal group must be 
an EU-regulated entity.  
170   Art. 2(14)(d), Supplementary Supervision Directive.  See supra note 166 and accompanying test. 
171   Art. 2(14)(c), Supplementary Supervision Directive. 
172  For the purpose of determining whether the activities of a group mainly occur in the financial sector, the 
ratio of the balance sheet total of the regulated and nonregulated financial sector entities in the group to the 
balance sheet total of the group as a whole must exceed 40 percent.  Art. 2(14)(c) in connection with Art. 
3(1), Supplementary Supervision Directive.  This test intends to distinguish between financial and non-
financial groups.  See 2001 Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 122, at 5, sub 2, Arts. 2, 3.  Financial 
sector entities is not defined.  It must mean the entities of which a financial sector is composed of, see Art. 
2(8), Supplementary Supervision Directive, i.e., credit institutions, financial institutions, ancillary banking 
service undertakings, investment firms, insurance undertakings, reinsurance undertakings, insurance 
holding companies, mixed financial holding companies, and asset management companies.  See supra 
notes 134 & 135 and infra note 174 and accompanying text.  See supra diagram 5 setting forth the financial 
sector entities.  Asset management companies that are part of a financial conglomerate are also financial 
sector entities. Art. 30, third subparagraph, Supplementary Supervision Directive.  Art. 3(1), 
Supplementary Supervision Directive does not require that the regulated entities be EU-regulated entities.  
Nonregulated financial sector entities that are included in the 40 percent computation are financial 
institutions other than investment firms, ancillary banking service undertakings, reinsuranc e undertakings, 
insurance holding companies and mixed financial holding companies.  See supra note 134.  These entities 
are the entities that are part of the financial sector, Art. 2(8), Supplementary Supervision Directive, but not 
regulated entities, Art. 2(4), Supplementary Supervision Directive. 
173   Art. 2(14)(d), Supplementary Supervision Directive.  For a discussion of the significance test, see supra 
note 167. 
174   Mixed financial holding company is a parent undertaking, other than a regulated entity (EU-regulated or 
non-EU-regulated), which, together with its subsidiaries, of which at least one is an EU -regulated entity,  
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holding company.  In fact, every non-regulated entity head of a financial conglomerate by 
definition is a mixed financial holding company.
175  The Supplementary Supervision Directive 
could have called such entities “non-regulated entity holding companies”.  The mixed financial 
holding company could be a non-regulated financial sector entity,
176 such as a financial 
institution
177 (a mere holding company without its own activities would likely be a financial 
institution)
178 or a reinsurance undertaking,
179 or it could be a commercial or industrial company.  
The definitions of financial conglomerate and mixed financial holding company do not require 
that the head of the financial conglomerate or the mixed financial holding company must be 
established or have its head office in the EU.  However, if the financial conglomerate is headed 
by a regulated entity, it is subject to supplementary supervision only if the regulated entity is an 
EU-regulated entity.
180  If a financial conglomerate headed by a mixed financial holding 
company is to be covered by supplementary supervision, the mixed financial holding company 
                                                                                                                                                                          
and other entities, constitutes a financial conglomerate.  Art. 2(15), Supplementary Supervision Directive.  
Art. 2(15), Supplementary Supervision Directive does not refer to a regulated entity referred to in Article 1, 
but to a regulated entity which has its head office in the Community, which presumably means the same. 
175   Compare Art. 2(15) with Art. 5(2)(b), Supplementary Supervision Directive.  If the head of a financial 
conglomerate is a non-EU-regulated entity, it is not a mixed financial holding company.  See Art. 5(3), 
Supplementary Supervision Directive. 
Note that the Tripartite Report, supra note 124, at 36, sub no. 97, defines mixed conglomerates quite 
differently as those groups which are predominantly commercially or industrially oriented, but contain at 
least one regulated financial entity (which is more than merely a “captive” entity doing business only on 
behalf of the group) in some part of their corporate structure.  Typically, mixed conglomerates would be 
headed by a commercial or industrial company (or by an unregulated non-financial holding company) with 
the regulated entities embedded downstream in the group structure.  The Supplementary Supervision 
Directive covers such mixed conglomerates only if the conglomerate’s activities in the financial sector 
represent at least 40 percent of the conglomerate’s balance sheet, see supra note 172.  See Tripartite Report 
at 36–38, sub nos. 97–103.   
176   See supra note 172. 
177   See supra notes 8, 134 & 172.  The term financial holding company refers only to the banking sector and 
the investment services sector.  See supra note 9.  A financial institution that is an investment firm could 
not be a mixed financial holding company because it is a regulated entity. 
178   See supra note 8 (a financial institution is an undertaking, the principal activity of which is to acquire 
holdings).  The typical bank holding company under the BHCA would be a financia l institution, see supra 
note 9. 
179   See supra notes 134 & 172. 
180   See Art. 2(14) in connection with Art. 5(2), Supplementary Supervision Directive.  Art. 5(2)(a), 
Supplementary Supervision Directive refers to regulated entities in Art. 5(1), Supplementary Supervision 
Directive which covers only EU-authorized regulated entities (regulated entities referred to in Art. 1, 
Supplementary Supervision Directive).  Thus, Art. 5(2)(a), Supplementary Supervision Directive does not 
refer to non-EU-regulated entities.  The term regulated entity as defined in Art. 2(4) by reference to Art. 
2(1), (2) & (3), Supplementary Supervision Directive covers EU-regulated and non-EU-regulated entities.  
See supra note 135.  
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must be located in the EU.
181  A financial conglomerate headed by a non-EU-regulated entity and 
a financial conglomerate headed by a mixed financial holding company having its head office 
outside the EU are still financial conglomerates but the regulated entities in those financial 
conglomerates are not subject to supplementary supervision; they may, however, be subject to 
equivalent supplementary supervision by the home country of the non-EU-regulated entity or the 
mixed financial holding company or to analogous or appropriate supplementary supervision by a 
Member State under the Supplementary Supervision Directive.
182 
A group that is not headed by an EU-regulated entity only qualifies as a financial 
conglomerate if the group’s activities mainly occur in the financial sector (i.e., based on the 
balance sheets, the financial sector entities must represent at least 40 percent of the group).
183  On 
the other hand, a group that is headed by an EU-regulated entity qualifies as a financial 
conglomerate even though its activities do not mainly occur in the financial sector.  In both cases 
(financial conglomerate headed by an EU-regulated entity and financial conglomerate not so 
headed), the activities of the entities in the insurance sector and the activities of the entities in the 
banking and investment services sector must be significant (i.e., based on balance sheets and 
solvency ratio requirements, each financial sector must represent at least 10 percent of the group 
or the balance sheets of the smallest sector in the group must exceed € 6 billion).
184  Once a 
financial conglomerate is subject to supplementary supervision, this supervision extends to 
entities outside the EU.
185 
The competent authorities of the EU Member States
186 may by agreement exclude 
an entity when determining whether the activities of a group mainly occur in the financial sector 
or when determining the significance of the insurance sector and of the banking/investment 
services sector.  An entity may be excluded from the calculation of ratios (1) if the entity is 
situated in a third country where there are legal impediments to the transfer of the necessary 
information or (2) if – with respect to the objectives of the supplementary supervision – the 
entity is of negligible interest or its inclusion would be inappropriate or misleading.
187  The 
competent authorities also may by agreement in exceptional cases, replace the criterion based on 
                                                     
181   See Art. 5(2)(b), Supplementary Supervision Directive.  Art. 2(15) (definition of mixed financial holding 
company) requires that a mixed financial holding company must have at least one regulated entity 
subsidiary which has its head office in the EU.  See supra notes 174–180 and accompanying text. 
182   See Arts. 5(3) & 18, Supplementary Supervision Directive.  See infra C.IV.  The Supplementary 
Supervision Directive does not address the case of a horizontal group of which one member has its head 
office outside the EU. 
183   See supra note 171 & 172. 
184   See supra note 167 & 173. 
185   See text accompanying infra notes 220–227. 
186     Art. 2(16), Supplementary Supervision Directive defines competent authorities as the national authorities 
of the Member States which are empowered by law or regulation to supervise credit institutions, and/or 
insurance undertakings and/or investment firms.  Thus, the Supplementary Supervision Directive does not 
introduce a new authority but provides cooperation between the existing national supervisory authorities. 
187   Art. 3(4)(a) in connection with Art. 6(5), Supplementary Supervision Directive.  
  45 
balance sheet total
188 with the criterion of income structure or off-balance sheet activities or both 
or add the criterion of income structure or off-balance activities or both to the criterion based on 
balance sheet total, if the competent authorities are of the opinion that these parameters are of 
particular relevance.
189  Other provisions of the Supplementary Supervision Directive give the 
competent authorities discretion to lower certain thresholds for identifying a financial 
conglomerate or to disregard compliance with thresholds in order to avoid sudden regime shifts, 
i.e, sudden inclusion under or exclusion from supplementary supervision.
190 
Diagram 6.  Financial Conglomerates 
Financial Conglomerates Subject to Supplementary Supervision 
(a)  Group headed by an EU-Regulated Entity  
EU-Regulated 
Insurance Company
Credit Institution,
Investment Firm, Financial 
Institution or Ancillary Banking 
Services Organization
EU-Regulated 
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Investment Firm
Insurance Company,
Reinsurance Company or 
Insurance Holding Company
Inside or 
outside 
the EU
Inside or 
outside 
the EU
participation of  20% 
or a subsidiary
participation of  20% 
or a subsidiary
 
•  Banking plus investment services sector and insurance sector must each be 
significant. 
(b)  Group headed by a Mixed Financial Holding Company with EU Head Office  
                                                     
188   See Art. 3(1) (determination whether activities of a group mainly occur in the financial sector) & 3(2)  
(determination whether activities in different financial sectors are significant), Supplementary Supervision 
Directive. 
189   Art. 3(5), Supplementary Supervision Directive.   
190   See Art. 3(4)(b) & (6), Supplementary Supervision Directive. 
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•  Banking plus investment services sector and insurance sector must each be 
significant. 
•  Group must be mainly engaged in the financial sector. 
(c)  Horizontal Financial Conglomorate  
EU-Regulated 
Insurance Company
EU-Regulated Credit Institution 
or Investment Firm
Credit Institution,
Investment Firm, Financial 
Institution or Ancillary Banking 
Services Organization
Insurance Company,
Reinsurance Company  or 
Insurance Holding Company
Inside or 
outside the EU
Inside or 
outside the EU
 
•  Banking plus investment services sector and insurance sector must each be 
significant. 
•  Group must be mainly engaged in the financial sector. 
 
  Financial Conglomerates Subject to Equivalent, Analogous or Appropriate 
Supplementary Supervision  
(d)  Group headed by a Non-EU-Regulated Entity  
 
•  Banking plus investment services sector and insurance sector must each be 
  significant. 
•  Group must be mainly engaged in the financial sector. 
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(e)  Group headed by Mixed Financial Holding Company with Non-EU Head Office  
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•  Banking plus investment services sector and insurance sector must each be 
significant. 
•  Group must be mainly engaged in the financial sector. 
From the U.S. perspective, it is surprising that conglomerates that are headed by a 
mixed financial holding company are subject to supplementary supervision only if the group is 
mainly engaged in the financial sector, i.e., banking, insurance or investment services, and that in 
all financial conglomerates the banking sector and the insurance sector must be significant.  If it 
is the purpose of the Supplementary Supervision Directive to protect regulated entities, the 
relative size of such regulated entities should not be a relevant factor.  However, the 
Supplementary Supervision Directive goes further than the rules on consolidated supervision.  
The rules on consolidated supervision require consolidated supervision for credit institutions in 
which another credit institution holds a participation or that are subsidiaries of another credit 
institution or of a financial holding company, i.e., a company the subsidiaries of which are 
exclusively or mainly credit institutions or financial institutions and that has at least one credit 
institution subsidiary.
191 Consolidated supervision does not extend to a group headed by a mixed-
activity holding company, which is defined as a parent other than a financial holding company, a 
credit institution or a mixed financial holding company, whose subsidiaries include at least one 
credit institution.
192  Thus, neither the proverbial steel company that acquires a bank nor the 
acquired bank is subject to consolidated supervision under EU law because the steel company is 
not a financial holding company.
193   
However, if the steel company is located in the EU and acquires a bank and an 
insurance company, and their combined balance sheet total of both amounts to 40 percent of the 
balance sheet total of the group, the steel company would be a mixed financial holding 
company
194 heading a financial conglomerate and the financial conglomerate would be subject to 
supplementary supervision under the Supplementary Supervision Directive.  A holding company 
                                                     
191   Art. 52(1) & (2), Banking Directive.  See supra A.II. 
192   Art. 1(22), Banking Directive.  See supra A.III.3. 
193   See supra note 9. 
194  See supra note 174.  
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without its own business activities whose principal activity consists of acquiring holdings in 
industrial and financial companies is a financial institution
195 and if the subsidiaries of such 
financial institution mainly consist of credit institutions or financial institutions,
196 it is a financial 
holding company and the group headed by it is subject to consolidated supervision.
197  If the 
subsidiaries do not mainly consist of credit or financial institutions, it is not a financial holding 
company subject to consolidated supervision.  If the above holding company holds a credit 
institution and an insurance company, one of which is a subsidiary, and both of which are 
significant and if the group’s activities mainly (based on the 40 percent test) consist of financial 
sector activities, it is a mixed financial holding company that heads a financial conglomerate 
subject to supplementary supervision.  If its activities do not consist mainly of financial sector 
activities, it is neither subject to consolidated nor to supplementary supervision.
198 
c)  Discretionary Expansion of Financial Conglomerate 
The Supplementary Supervision Directive gives the competent authorities 
discretion to apply supplementary supervision to groups that do not meet the definition of 
financial conglomerate or even the definition of group.  The Supplementary Supervision 
Directive provides:
199  
Where persons hold participations or capital ties in one or more regulated 
entities or exercise significant influence over such entities without holding 
a participation or capital ties, [although the conditions of Art. 5(2) or (3), 
Supplementary Supervision Directive are not met,] the relevant competent 
authorities shall, by common agreement and in conformity with national 
law, determine whether and to what extent supplementary supervision of 
the regulated entities is to be carried out, as if they constitute a financial 
conglomerate.
200 
                                                     
195   Art. 1(5), Banking Directive.  See supra note 8.  The holding company is not a regulated entity , see Art. 
2(4), Supplementary Supervision Directive. 
196   See supra A.II. 
197  See supra A.II. 
198   It must be noted, however, that the “mainly” test for purposes of the definition of a financial holding 
company, differs from the “mainly” test for purposes of the definition of a mixed financial holding 
company:  a financial holding company must exclusively or mainly hold credit institution or financial 
institution subsidiaries, see supra note 9, whereas a group headed by a mixed financial holding company 
must mainly be engaged in the financial sector based on the 40 percent test, see supra note 172. 
199   Art. 5(4), Supplementary Supervision Directive.   
200   The 2001 Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 122, at 6, sub 2, Art. 4, states:  
  As some groups are not covered by the definitions under Art. 2, but do have financial 
entities with substantial activities in the financial markets the supervision of which would 
respond to the objectives of the Directive, the Directive introduces a basis for competent 
authorities to submit also these special group structures to supplementary supervision, on 
the condition that well defined conditions are met.  
  49 
In other words, the competent authorities may exercise supplementary supervision over regulated 
entities that are controlled by another entity or in which another entity has a capital investment, 
even though the relationship does not qualify as a group or as a financial conglomerate.  
Regulated entities in such quasi financial conglomerates (“as if they constituted a financial 
conglomerate”) are, in the discretion of the relevant competent authorities, subject to 
supplementary supervision if (1) at least one of the regulated entities is an EU-regulated entity,
201 
(2) at least one of the entities in the quasi financial conglomerate is within the insurance sector 
and at least one is within the banking or investment services sector,
202 and (3) the consolidated 
and/or aggregated activities of the entities in the quasi financial conglomerate within the 
insurance sector and the consolidated and/or aggregated activities of the entities within the 
banking and investment services sector are each significant.
203 
d)  Determination of Financial Conglomerate 
The Supplementary Supervision Directive does not impose on financial 
conglomerates a duty to report to or file with any supervisory authority the fact that they are 
financial conglomerates.  The competent authorities themselves must make that determination.  
Competent authorities that have authorized regulated entities must identify any group that is a 
                                                                                                                                                                          
The scope of Art. 5(4), Supplementary Supervision Directive is not clear:   
(a) It seems that person in Art. 5(4), Supplementary Supervision Directive refers to legal entities as well as 
to natural persons.   
(b) The relationship between the person and the regulated entity may be based solely on influence over 
such entities.  Whereas a parent-subsidiary relationship requires a dominant influence, see supra notes 11 & 
149 and accompanying text, Art. 5(4), Supplementary Supervision Directive permits a significant influence 
without defining that term.  (Art. 3(2) & (3), Supplementary Supervision Directive refers to significant 
activities, not to significant influence.)  Pursuant to Art. 5(4), Supplementary Supervision Directive, a 
significant influence without capital ties is sufficient, whereas a parent-subsidiary relationship based on 
equity requires at least a participation.  See supra notes 154–157.  However, Member States are permitted 
to define the parent-subsidiary relationship as a relationship based on dominant influence even in the 
absence of an equity relationship, see supra note 11.  
(c) The relationship between the person and the regulated entity may be based on participations or capital 
ties in the regulated entity.  Whereas, presumably, under Art. 5(4), Supplementary Supervision Directive 
any capital ties below the level of a participation are sufficient, a parent-subsidiary relationship based on 
equity requires at least a participation.   
(d) The conditions for the existence of a financial conglomerate set forth in Art. 2(14)(c), Supplementary 
Supervision Directive (the group activities must mainly occur in the financial sector), see supra notes 171 
& 172, are not requirements under Art. 5(4), Supplementary Supervision Directive. 
201   Art. 5(4), second paragraph, Supplementary Supervision Directive.  See the identical requirement in Art. 
2(14)(a), Supplementary Supervision Directive. 
202   Art. 5(4), second subparagraph, referring to Art. 2(14)(d), Supplementary Supervision Directive. 
203   Art. 5(4), second subparagraph, referring to Art. 2(14)(e), Supplementary Supervision Directive.  See also 
Art. 5(3), Supplementary Supervision Directive which provides for analogous or appropriate application of 
the Supplementary Supervision Directive headed by a non-EU parent.  See infra C.IV. for a discussion of 
Art. 5(3), Supplementary Supervision Directive.  
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financial conglomerate.
204  If a competent authority is of the opinion that a regulated entity 
authorized by it is a member of a group that may be a financial conglomerate, which has not 
already been identified according to the Supplementary Supervision Directive, the competent 
authority shall communicate its view to the other competent authorities concerned.
205  The 
coordinator
206 shall inform the parent of the group (or in the absence of a parent, the regulated 
entity with the largest balance sheet total in the most important financial sector in a group) that 
the group has been identified as a financial conglomerate and of the appointment of the 
coordinator.
207  The coordinator shall also inform the competent authorities that have authorized 
regulated entities in the group and the competent authorities of the Member State in which the 
mixed financial holding company has its head office, as well as the Commission.
208 
The high degree of discretion given to the Member States and their supervisory 
authorities in determining whether a group or a financial conglomerate exists could lead to 
substantial differences among the Member States in the determination of whether supplementary 
supervision applies.  This would not only create legal uncertainties but could also cause 
competitive distortions.
209  It is noteworthy that a financial conglomerate does not exist if a group 
is composed only of credit institutions and investment firms.  In most – if not all – cases, an 
investment firm owning 20 percent or more of a credit institution or a credit institution owning 
more than 20 percent of an investment firm is covered by the rules on consolidated supervision 
of credit institutions and financial institutions.
210  Consolidated supervision, on the other hand, 
always requires the existence of a deposit-taking institution or investment firm in the group. 
3.  Undertakings in a Financial Conglomerate that Are the Addressees of 
Supplementary Supervision 
The Supplementary Supervision Directive does not envision that all companies in 
a financial conglomerate be subject to supplementary supervision and the scope of 
supplementary supervision differs between certain categories of companies in a financial 
conglomerate.  The Supplementary Supervision Directive distinguishes between entities that are 
the addressees of supplementary supervision, entities that are subject to certain obligations under 
the Supplementary Supervision Directive and entities that are only indirectly affected by the 
Supplementary Supervision Directive. 
                                                     
204   Art. 4(1), Supplementary Supervision Directive. 
205   Art. 4(1), Supplementary Supervision Directive. 
206   See infra C.III.4. for a discussion of the coordinator. 
207   Art. 4(2), Supplementary Supervision Directive. 
208   Art. 4(2), Supplementary Supervision Directive. 
209   Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament 
and of the Council on the supplementary supervision of credit institutions, insurance undertakings and 
investment firms in a financial conglomerate (Oct. 17, 2001), O.J. Eur. Comm. No. C 36/1 (2002), at 4, sub 
3.7. 
210   See supra A.II.  
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The Supplementary Supervision Directive refers to entities that are the addressees 
of the supplementary supervision as entities that are “subject to supplementary supervision at the 
level of the financial conglomerate”.
211  For instance, own funds for purposes of capital adequacy 
must be available at the level of the financial conglomerate,
212 significant risk concentrations are 
measured at the level of the financial conglomerate,
213 and risk management processes and 
internal control mechanisms must be in place at the level of the financial conglomerate.
214  Only 
certain EU-regulated entities [herein the Responsible Entities] are “subject to supplementary 
supervision at the level of the financial conglomerate”:
215 
1.  every EU-regulated entity that is at the head of a financial conglomerate, 
2.  every EU-regulated entity, whose parent undertaking is a mixed financial 
holding company having its head office in the EU, and 
3.  every EU-regulated entity linked with another financial sector entity by a 
relationship of a horizontal group,
216 that is, every EU-regulated entity in a 
horizontal financial conglomerate. 
These Responsible Entities must verify compliance with the requirements of 
supplementary supervision and are responsible for compliance by the financial conglomerate.  In 
particular, the Responsible Entities must submit reports to the coordinator.
217  If a financial 
                                                     
211   Art. 5(2), Supplementary Supervision Directive. 
212   Art. 6(2), Supplementary Supervision Directive. 
213   Art. 7(2), Supplementary Supervision Directive. 
214   Art. 9(1), Supplementary Supervision Directive. 
215   Art. 5(2), Supplementary Supervision Directive.  Art. 5(2), Supplementary Supervision Directive refers 
generally to regulated entities, but Art. 5(2) must be read in conjunction with Art. 5(1), Supplementary 
Supervision Directive which only refers to EU-regulated entities.  It follows from Art. 5(1), Supplementary 
Supervision Directive (“regulated entities referred to in Article 1”) in connection with Art. 1, 
Supplementary Supervision Directive (“regulated entities which have obtained an authorization pursuant to 
…”) that the regulated entities referred to in Art. 5(1), Supplementary Supervision Directive are regulated 
entities that have obtained an authorization pursuant to one of the sectoral directives,  i.e., EU-regulated 
entities, and that only such EU-regulated entities are subject to supplementary supervisions.  See supra 
notes 134 & 135.  See also the caption of Art 5, Supplementary Supervision Directive that refers to 
EU-regulated entities.  EU-regulated entities that are subject to supplementary supervision are subject to 
such supervision in addition to supervision pursuant to the applicable sectoral rules.  Art. 5(1), 
Supplementary Supervision Directive. 
216  Supra note 158 and accompanying text. 
217   Such reports are the results of calculations regarding sufficient own funds at the level of the financial 
conglomerate, Art. 6(2), Supplementary Supervision Directive; information about significant risk 
concentrations at the level of the financial conglomerate, Art. 7(2), Supplementary Supervision Directive; 
and information about significant intra-group transactions, Art. 8(2), Supplementary Supervision Directive.  
The information shall be submitted to the coordinator by the EU-regulated entity at the head of the financial 
conglomerate (see Art. 5(2)(a), Supplementary Supervision Directive), or, if the financial conglomerate is 
not headed by an EU-regulated entity, see Art. 5(2)(b) & (c), Supplementary Supervision Directive, by the 
regulated entity in the financial conglomerate identified by the coordinator after consultation with the other  
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conglomerate is headed by an EU-regulated entity, only that entity (and not the other regulated 
entities in the financial conglomerate) must meet the requirements that must be met “at the level 
of the financial conglomerate”.
218  In this case supervision “on the level of the financial 
conglomerate” means supervision on the holding company level.  On the other hand, if a 
financial conglomerate is headed by a mixed financial holding company having its head office in 
the EU, each EU-regulated entity in the financial conglomerate must meet the requirements that 
must be met “at the level of the financial conglomerate”.
219   
The Supplementary Supervision Directive imposes certain obligations on all 
regulated entities in a financial conglomerate in order to make supplementary supervision at the 
level of the financial conglomerate possible.
220  However, to the extent the regulated entities are 
non-EU-regulated entities, the supplementary supervision at the level of the financial 
conglomerate does not imply that the competent authorities play a supervisory role with respect 
to such non-EU-regulated entities.
221  Furthermore, the Supplementary Supervision Directive 
assigns duties and obligations in connection with supplementary supervision at the level of the 
financial conglomerate to mixed financial holding companies.
222  Again, this does not imply that 
the competent authorities play a supervisory role with respect to mixed financial holding 
companies.
223   
Finally, supplementary supervision of a financial conglomerate will indirectly 
affect all entities in a financial conglomerate, including non-EU-regulated entities, non-regulated 
entities and the mixed financial holding company in the financial conglomerate.  For instance, 
intra-group transactions
224 and risk concentrations
225 are defined to include relations between 
                                                                                                                                                                          
relevant competent authorities and with the financial conglomerate or by the mixed financial holding 
company.  Arts. 6(2), 7(2) & 8(2), Supplementary Supervision Directive. 
218   Art. 5(2)(a), Supplementary Supervision Directive. 
219   Art. 5(2)(b), Supplementary Supervision Directive. 
220   All regulated entities in a financial conglomerate must ensure that sufficient own funds are available on the 
level of the financial conglomerate, see Art. 6(2), Supplementary Supervision Directive; all regulated 
entities and mixed financial holding companies must report on (1) significant risk concentrations at the 
level of the financial conglomerate, see Art. 7(2), Supplementary Supervision Directive, and (2) significant 
intra-group transactions, see Art. 8(2), Supplementary Supervision Directive; and must have in place, at the 
level of the financial conglomerate, adequate risk management processes and internal control mechanisms, 
see Art. 9(1), Supplementary Supervision Directive.  In the above-cited Articles, the Supplementary 
Supervision Directive speaks generally of regulated entities, and not of regulated entities referred to in 
Article 1.  Thus, the Articles include EU-regulated entities as well as non-EU-regulated entities.   
221   Art. 5(5), Supplementary Supervision Directive. 
222   See the calculation duty and the requirement to submit reports to the coordinator, Art. 6(2), fourth and fifth 
subparagraphs, Arts. 7(2) & 8(2), second subparagraph, Supplementary Supervision Directive.  Member 
states must ensure that penalties and measures may be imposed on mixed financial holding companies that 
infringe laws, regulations or administrative provisions enacted to implement the Supple mentary 
Supervision Directive.  Art. 17(2), Supplementary Supervision Directive. 
223   Art. 5(5), Supplementary Supervision Directive. 
224   Art. 2(18), Supplementary Supervision Directive.    
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regulated entities (EU-regulated or non-EU-regulated) in a financial conglomerate and other 
entities or undertakings in the financial conglomerate.  For purposes of calculating the capital 
adequacy requirements of a financial conglomerate, mixed financial holding companies, 
non-EU-regulated entities and even non-regulated financial sector entities are included.
226  This 
does not imply that the competent authorities play a supervisory role with respect to these 
unregulated entities.
227 
Not all EU-regulated entities in a financial conglomerate are subject to 
supplementary supervision.  EU-regulated entities that are members of a financial conglomerate 
headed by an EU-regulated entity
228 are not addressees of supplementary supervision, although 
they are included in the supplementary supervision of the EU-regulated entity head of the 
financial conglomerate.   EU-regulated entities that are members of a financial conglomerate 
headed by a mixed financial holding company are subject to supplemental supervision only if the 
mixed financial holding company has its head office in the EU.
229 
EU-regulated entities in a financial conglomerate headed by a non-EU-regulated 
entity or by a mixed financial holding company, that has its head office outside the EU, are not at 
all subject to supplementary supervision.
230  If the parent undertaking of an EU-regulated entity is 
a regulated entity having its head office outside the EU or is a mixed financial holding company 
having its head office outside the EU, the EU-regulated entity is either subject to equivalent 
supervision by the home country of the parent or subject to analogous or appropriate 
supplementary supervision by a Member State pursuant to Art. 18, Supplementary Supervision 
Directive.
231 
Where a financial conglomerate is a subgroup of another financial conglomerate 
(the main financial conglomerate), Member States may apply the provisions of Arts. 6 to 17 of 
the Supplementary Supervision Directive (supplementary supervision) only to regulated entities 
within the main financial conglomerate and not to the subgroup.
232  The nonfinancial activities of 
a nonregulated entity heading a group could have the effect that the group does not meet the 
                                                                                                                                                                          
225   Art. 2(19), Supplementary Supervision Directive.   
226   Art. 6(3), Supplementary Supervision Directive. 
227   Art. 5(5), Supplementary Supervision Directive. 
228   Art. 5(2)(a), Supplementary Supervision Directive. 
229   See Art. 5(2), Supplementary Supervision Directive. 
230   Art. 2(15), Supplementary Supervision Directive. 
231   Art. 5(3) Supplementary Supervision Directive.  See Art. 18, Supplementary Supervision Directive 
discussed infra C.IV. 
232  Art. 5(2), second subparagraph, Supplementary Supervision Directive.  
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financial conglomerate tests.
233  In that case, one has to determine whether the non-qualifying 
group comprises subgroups that qualify as financial conglomerates.
234 
In order to avoid possible moral hazards,
235 the Supplementary Supervision 
Directive emphasizes that the exercise of supplementary supervision at the level of the financial 
conglomerate shall not imply that the competent authorities are required to play a supervisory 
role in relation to mixed financial holding companies, unregulated entities or non-EU-regulated 
entities in a financial conglomerate, on a stand-alone basis, even though such entities are affected 
by the supplementary supervision.
236 
With regard to asset management companies, the Supplementary Supervision 
Directive requires the inclusion of asset management companies in the sectoral and 
supplementary supervision.  Art. 30, Supplementary Supervision Directive provides that Member 
States shall include asset management companies in the scope of consolidated supervision of 
credit institutions and investment firms, and/or in the scope of supplementary supervision of 
insurance undertakings in an insurance group, and – where the group is a financial conglomerate 
–  in the scope of supplementary supervision within the meaning of the Supplementary 
Supervision Directive.
237  Asset management companies that are part of a financial conglomerate 
must be regarded as regulated entities.
238 
III.  Supplementary Supervision 
The Supplementary Supervision Directive introduces a series of rules with regard 
to the supplementary supervision of regulated entities in a financial conglomerate.  They relate in 
                                                     
233   See Art. 2(14)(c), Supplementary Supervision Directive.  The entity heading the group is not a mixed 
financial holding company if the group does not constitute a financial conglomerate.  See Art. 2(15), 
Supplementary Supervision Directive. 
234   The prohibition of separate regulation of subgroups set forth in Art. 5(2), second subparagraph, 
Supplementary Supervision Directive does not apply in that case because the subgroup is not a subgroup of 
another financial conglomerate. 
235   See 2001 Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 122, at 6, sub 2, Art. 4, and Tripartite Report, supra note 
124, at 36, sub no. 96 (the impression that the activities of unregulated entities in the financial 
conglomerate are in some way being monitored or supervised, even if only informally, creates a moral 
hazard). 
236  Art. 5(5) & Art. 12(4), Supplementary Supervision Directive.   
237   For the purposes of inclusion of asset management companies in the consolidated and/or supplementary 
supervision, (1) the relevant sectoral rules regarding the form and extent of the inclusion of financial 
institutions shall apply mutatis mutandis where asset management companies are included in the scope of 
consolidated supervision of credit institutions and investment firms and (2) the relevant sectoral rules 
regarding the form and extent of the inclusion of reinsurance undertakings shall apply mutatis mutandis 
where asset management companies are included in the scope of supplementary supervision of insurance 
undertakings.  Art. 30, second subparagraph, Supplementary Supervision Directive.  See supra notes 134 & 
135. 
238   Art. 30, third subparagraph, Supplementary Supervision Directive.  
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particular to capital adequacy,
239 intra-group transactions and risk concentration,
240 and to the 
management.
241 The Supplementary Supervision Directive also requires that for each financial 
conglomerate a single coordinator be appointed from among the competent authorities of the 
Member States concerned who shall be responsible for coordination and exercise of 
supplementary supervision.
242  The competent authorities are also required to cooperate and 
exchange information.
243 
It must be emphasized that supplementary supervision does not mean supervision 
on a consolidated basis like the supervision provided by some of the sectoral rules.  The 
Supplementary Supervision Directive follows a so-called “solo-plus” approach to supervision.  
The basis of supervision is the supervision of individual group entities on a solo basis by their 
respective sectoral regulators.  The solo supervision of individual entities is complemented by a 
general quantitative assessment of the group as a whole and by a quantitative group-wide 
assessment of the adequacy of capital.
244 The Supplementary Supervision Directive does not 
require any additional consolidation of the accounts of the financial conglomerate as a whole if 
existing Directives do not impose such consolidation.   
1.  Capital Adequacy 
One of the most important issues regarding the supervision of financial 
conglomerates is the supervision of the group’s financial condition.  Therefore, Art. 6 and Annex 
I of the Supplementary Supervision Directive require the competent authorities to exercise 
supplementary supervision of the capital adequacy of the regulated entities in a financial 
conglomerate.
245  Eliminating any inappropriate intra-group creation of own funds,
246 such as 
double or multiple gearing,
247 or excessive leveraging is the major goal of such supplementary 
                                                     
239   Art. 6, Supplementary Supervision Directive.  
240   Arts. 7, 8 & 9, Supplementary Supervision Directive. 
241   Art. 13, Supplementary Supervision Directive. 
242   Arts. 10 & 11, Supplementary Supervision Directive. 
243   Art. 12, Supplementary Supervision Directive. 
244   Tripartite Report, supra note 124, at 17, sub no. 43. 
245   Art. 6(1), Supplementary Supervision Directive. 
246   Annex I, sub I, 2(i), Supplementary Supervision Directive.  
247   According to the Joint Forum Report, Capital Adequacy Principles Paper, supra note 124, at 13, sub no. 
18, double gearing occurs whenever one entity holds regulatory capital issued by another entity within the 
same group and the issuer is allowed to count the capital in its own balance sheet; multiple gearing occurs 
when the dependant in the previous instance itself downstreams regulatory capital to a third-tier entity, and 
the parent’s externally generated capital is geared up a third time.  Annex I, sub I, 2(i), Supplementary 
Supervision Directive, refers to multiple gearing as the multiple use of elements eligible for the calculation 
of own funds at the level of the financial conglomerate.   
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group-wide capital adequacy requirements.
248 In such situations, the same own funds are used 
simultaneously as a buffer more than once – to cover the capital requirements of the parent 
company, as well as those of a subsidiary (and possibly also those of a subsidiary of a 
subsidiary).
249  Thus, the Member States must require regulated entities in a financial 
conglomerate to ensure that there are own funds at the level of the financial conglomerate that 
are always at least equal to the capital adequacy requirements as calculated in accordance with 
Annex I.
250  That means that all Responsible Entities
251 in a financial conglomerate must see to it 
that at the level of the financial conglomerate,
252 the capital adequacy requirements calculated in 
accordance with Annex I are met.  In addition to the regulated entities in a financial 
conglomerate, certain specifically mentioned nonregulated financial sector entities
253 in the 
financial conglomerate that may not be subject to capital adequacy requirements on a stand-alone 
basis must nonetheless be included for the purpose of calculating capital adequacy at the level of 
the financial conglomerate.
254  The solvency requirements for nonregulated financial sector 
                                                     
248   See 2001 Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 122, at 4, sub 1(b).  The Joint Forum Report, Capital 
Adequacy Principles Paper, supra note 124, at 14, sub no. 23, defines excessive leverage as situations 
where a parent issues debt (or other instruments not acceptable as regulatory capital in the downstream 
entity) and downstreams the proceeds as equity or other forms of regulatory capital to its regular 
subsidiaries. 
249   Tripartite Report, supra note 124, at 17, sub no. 44. 
250   Art. 6(2), first subparagraph, in connection with Art. 5(2), Supplementary Supervision Directive.  
251   See supra text accompanying note 215 and Art. 5(2), Supplementary Supervision Directive. 
252   See supra note 211 and accompanying text. 
253   See supra note 172. 
254   Art. 6(3), Supplementary Supervision Directive states that “[f]or the purpose of calculating the capital 
adequacy requirements…, the following entities shall be included in the scope of supplementary 
supervision”:  (1) credit institutions within the meaning of Art. 1(1), second subparagraph, Banking 
Directive, including non-EU credit institutions, see supra notes 7, 134 & 135; (2) financial institutions 
within the meaning of Art. 1(5), Banking Directive, see supra note 8; (3) ancillary banking services 
undertakings within the meaning of Art. 1(23), Banking Directive, see supra note 18; (4) investment firms 
within the meaning of Art. 1(2), Investment Services Directive, including the non-EU investment firms 
referred to in Art. 2(4), Capital Adequacy Directive, see supra notes 134 & 135; (5) insurance undertakings 
within the meaning of Art. 6, First Non-Life Insurance Directive and Art. 6 First Life Insurance Directive, 
including non-EU insurance undertakings, Art. 1(b), Insurance Group Directive, see supra notes 84, 134 & 
135; (6) reinsurance undertakings within the meaning of Art. 1(c), Insurance Group Directive, see supra 
notes 86 & 134; (7) insurance holding companies within the meaning of Art. 1(i), Insurance Group 
Directive, see supra note 134; (8) financial institutions within the meaning of Art. 2(7), Capital Adequacy 
Directive referring to (the predecessor provision of) Art. 1(5), Banking Directive, see supra note 8; (9) 
mixed financial holding companies within the meaning of Art. 2(15), Supplementary Supervision Directive, 
supra note 174; and (10) asset management companies, see Art. 2(5), Supplementary Supervision 
Directive, supra notes 134 & 135 and notes 237 & 238 and accompanying text.  See supra diagram 5 
setting forth the financial sector entities. 
 
The following entities of the entities listed above as being included in the scope of supplementary 
supervision for the purpose of calculating the capital adequacy requirement are not subject to capital 
adequacy requirements on a stand-alone basis:  financial institutions (other than investment firms), 
ancillary banking services undertakings, reinsurance undertakings, insurance holding companies, mixed  
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entities that are not included in the sectoral solvency requirement computation are computed on a 
notional basis.
255 
The solvency requirements for each separate financial sector represented in a 
financial conglomerate continue to be covered by own funds elements in accordance with the 
corresponding sectoral rules.
256  In case of a deficit of own funds at the financial conglomerate 
level, only own funds elements that are eligible according to each of the sectoral rules (cross-
sector capital) shall qualify for the verification of the compliance with the solvency requirements 
at the financial conglomerate level.
257  
Annex I sets forth three different methods for calculating the solvency position on 
the level of a financial conglomerate.  The competent authorities or the coordinator have the 
authority to choose which method shall be applied to a financial conglomerate
258 and they may 
                                                                                                                                                                          
financial holding companies and asset management companies.  These companies are the nonregulated 
financial sector companies mentioned in supra note 172 (except for asset management companies which 
Art. 30, third subparagraph, Supplementary Supervision Directive treats as regulated entities, see supra 
notes 237 & 238 and accompanying text). 
  Non-EU credit institutions, non-EU insurance undertakings and non-EU investment firms may be subject to 
capital adequacy requirements of their home country on a stand-alone basis.  If one of such non-EU-
regulated entities is part of a financial conglomerate headed by an EU-regulated entity or headed by a 
mixed financial holding company having its head office in the EU, it is subject to the requirements of 
supplementary supervision of capital adequacy; if one of such non-EU-regulated entities is part of a 
financial conglomerate headed by a non-EU-regulated entity or by a mixed financial holding company 
having its head office outside the EU, it is only subject to equivalent supervision by th e home country of 
the non-EU head of the financial conglomerate or to analogous or appropriate supplementary supervision 
by a Member State pursuant to Art. 18, Supplementary Supervision Directive.  See supra notes 181 & 182 
and accompanying text and infra C.IV. 
255   See Annex I, sub II, Method 1, fourth paragraph, Method 2, third paragraph, and Method 3, third paragraph, 
Supplementary Supervision Directive.  Notional solvency requirement means the capital requirement with 
which such an entity would have to comply under the relevant sectoral rules as if it were a regulated entity 
of that particular financial sector; a mixed financial holding company shall be treated according to the 
sectoral rules of the most important financial sector in the financial conglomerate.  In the case of asset 
management companies, solvency requirements means the capital requirement set out in Art. 5a(1)(a), 
UCITS Directive.  Annex I, sub I, 2(ii), last paragraph, Supplementary Supervision Directive. 
256   Annex I, sub I, 2(ii), first paragraph, Supplementary Supervision Directive. 
257   Annex I, sub I, 2(ii), first and second paragraphs, Supplementary Supervision Directive. 
258   It would have been desirable to leave the choice of the calculation method to the financia l conglomerate in 
order to give companies more flexibility.  See Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the 
European Parliament, Report on the proposal for a European Parliament and Council directive on the 
supplementary supervision of credit institutions, insurance undertakings and investment firms in a financial 
conglomerate [herein Report of Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs], available at 
http://www2.europar1.eu.int/omk/sipade2?PROG=REPORT&L=EN&SORT_ORDER=D&LEG_ID=5&C
OM_ID=620&LEVEL=2&SAME_LEVEL=1&SV=60&NAV=X (last visited on December 1, 2003), at 28 
& 34; Position Paper of the Banking Federation of the European Union on the Supplementary Supervision 
of Financial Conglomerates of October 3, 2001, available at http://www.fbe.be/docs_super.html (last 
visited on December 1, 2003), at 11.    
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also apply a combination of the three methods.
259  These methods are (1) accounting 
consolidation, (2) deduction and aggregation, and (3) requirement deduction. 
One can question the rationale for requiring adequate capital for a financial 
conglomerate on the group level, because in case of need of a regulated entity in the group, the 
group capital is not available to the needy regulated entity.  The Supplementary Supervision 
Directive does not establish a source of strength doctrine.  Under that doctrine a U.S. bank 
holding company and indirectly its subsidiaries are expected to support a deposit-taking 
subsidiary in case of need.  The GLBA amendments to the BHCA affirm this doctrine with 
certain limitations.
260 
a)  Method 1:  “Accounting Consolidation” Method 
Method 1 uses the consolidated accounts as a basis for calculating the 
supplementary capital adequacy.  Thus, it is only applicable for consolidated groups.  According 
to this method, the supplementary capital adequacy shall be calculated as the difference between: 
(x)  the own funds of the financial conglomerate calculated on the basis of the 
      consolidated position of the group;
261 and 
(y)  the sum of the solvency requirements for each different financial sector 
  represented in the group.
262 
                                                     
259   See Annex I, second and third paragraphs, and Annex I, sub II, Method 4, Supplementary Supervision 
Directive.  See also Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee, supra note 209, at 2 & 4; Report of 
Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, supra note 258, at 34. 
  A Member State may require that the calculation be carried out according to one particular method among 
those described in Annex I if a financial conglomerate is headed by a regulated entity that has been 
authorized in that Member State, Annex I, third paragraph, first sentence, Supplementary Supervision 
Directive.  However, where a financial conglomerate is not headed by an EU-regulated entity, Member 
States may authorize the application of any of the methods described in Annex I, except in situations where 
the relevant competent authorities are located in the same Member State, in which case the Member State 
may require the application of one of the methods, Annex I, third paragraph, second sentence, 
Supplementary Supervision Directive.  Member States shall allow their competent authorities, where they 
assume the role of coordinator with regard to a particular financial conglomerate, to decide, after 
consultation with the other relevant competent authorities and the financial conglomerate itself, which 
method shall be applied by that financial conglomerate, Annex I, second paragraph, Supplementary 
Supervision Directive. 
260   Michael Gruson, Foreign Banks and the Financial Holding Company, § 10.07[1] in Gruson & Reisner, 
supra note 9; Jeffrey D. Berman, Arthur S. Long & Tomer Seifan, U.S. Law Conditions Applicable to 
Foreign Bank Acquisitions of U.S. Banking Institutions, § 3.06[2] in Gruson & Reisner, supra note 9. 
261   The own funds are those that qualify in accordance with the relevant sectoral rules, Annex I,  sub II, Method 
1(i), Supplementary Supervision Directive.   See also Art. 6(4), Supplementary Supervision Directive. 
262   The solvency requirements for each different financial sector are calculated in accordance with the relevant 
sectoral rules, Annex I, sub II, Method 1(ii) and third paragraph, Supplementary Supervision Directive.  
See also Art. 6(4), Supplementary Supervision Directive.  In the case of nonregulated financial sector 
entities that are not included in the sectoral solvency requirement calculations, a notional solvency  
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Formula for calculating the supplementary capital adequacy according to Method 1: 
 
Supp.CA = OFConsolidated – (SBank + SInsurance + SInvestment + SNon-Regulated)
263 
 
The difference shall not be negative.
264  Because this method’s starting point and 
basis are the fully consolidated accounts of the financial conglomerate, by definition, all intra-
group on- and off-balance sheet accounts or exposures have been eliminated and the effects of 
double or multiple gearing and excessive leverage are equated.  Thus, calculating the group-wide 
capital adequacy simply consists in the deduction of the solvency requirements of the group’s 
financial sectors from the consolidated own funds. 
b)  Method 2:  “Deduction and Aggregation” Method 
The calculation of the supplementary capital adequacy pursuant to Method 2 is 
carried out on the basis of the separate accounts of each entity in the group that is included in the 
calculation of capital adequacy.
265  According to this method, the supplementary capital adequacy 
shall be calculated on the basis of the accounts of each of the entities in the group as the 
difference between: 
(x)  the sum of the own funds of each regulated and nonregulated entity in the 
    financial conglomerate;
266 and 
(y)  the sum of: 
  -  the solvency requirements for each regulated and nonregulated 
entity in the group;
267 and 
                                                                                                                                                                          
requirement shall be calculated.  Annex I, sub II, Method 1, fourth paragraph, Supplementary Supervision 
Directive.  See supra note 255. 
263   Supp.CA shall mean the supplementary capital adequacy, i.e., the surplus or deficit of the group-wide 
capital, OF shall mean own funds, and S shall mean the solvency requirements of a financial sector. 
264   Annex I, sub II, Method 1, ultimate paragraph, Supplementary Supervision Directive.  If the difference is 
negative, the group faces a capital deficit. 
265   See supra note 254. 
266   The elements eligible are those that qualify in accordance with the relevant sectoral rules, Annex I, sub II, 
Method 2(i), Supplementary Supervision Directive. 
267   The solvency requirements shall be calculated in accordance with the relevant sectoral rules, Annex I,  sub 
II, Method 2(ii), Supplementary Supervision Directive.   
  The calculation of own funds and solvency requirement shall take account of the proportional share held by 
a parent undertaking in a subsidiary or by an undertaking that holds a participation in another entity of the 
group.  Proportional share means the proportion of the subscribed capital that is held, directly or indirectly,  
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-  the book value of the participations in other entities of the group.
268 
Formula for calculating the supplementary capital adequacy according to Method 2: 
Supp.CA = (OF1 + OF2 + OF3 + …) –  
[(S1 + S2 + S3 + …) + (BV1 + BV2 + BV3 …)]
269 
The difference shall not be negative.
270  The effect of this method is to pretend the 
situation of consolidated accounts, and therefore to eliminate multiple gearing, excessive 
leverage and the misuse of accounting margins relating to the book value of participations by 
deducting those participations. 
c)  Method 3:  “Book Value/Requirement Deduction” Method 
Method 3 is based on the balance sheet of each entity within the group.  
According to this method, the calculation of the supplementary capital adequacy shall be carried 
out on the basis of the accounts of each of the entities in the group as the difference between: 
(x)  the own funds of the parent undertaking or the entity at the head of the  
      financial conglomerate;
271 and 
(y)  the sum of 
-  the solvency requirement of the parent undertaking or the head 
referred to in clause (x); and 
                                                                                                                                                                          
by that undertaking.  Art. 6(4), second subparagraph, and Annex I, sub II, Method 2, third paragraph, 
Supplementary Supervision Directive.   
  In the case of nonregulated entities, a notional solvency requirement shall be calculated.  Annex I,  sub II, 
Method 2, third paragraph, Supplementary Supervision Directive.  See supra note 255. 
268   Although the wording in this point is not very clear, participations in other entities of the group means any 
participation that is held within the group, e.g., participations of the parent in its subsidiaries or cross-
participations of the subsidiaries.  See Joint Forum Report, Capital Adequacy Principles Paper, supra note 
124, at 14, sub no. 20. 
269   Supp.CA shall mean the supplementary capital adequacy, i.e., the surplus or deficit of the group-wide 
capital, OF shall mean own funds, S shall mean the solvency requirements of an entity of the group and BV 
shall mean the book value of a participation. 
270   Annex I, sub II, Method 2, ultimate paragraph, Supplementary Supervision Directive.  If the difference is 
negative, the group faces a capital deficit. 
271   The elements eligible are those that qualify in accordance with the relevant sectoral rules, Annex I, sub II, 
Method 3(i), Supplementary Supervision Directive.  
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-  the higher of the book value of the parent undertaking’s or the 
head’s participation in other entities in the group and these entities’ 
solvency requirement.
272 
Formula for calculating the supplementary capital adequacy according to Method 3: 
Supp.CA = OFParent – [SParent + (BV1 or S1 + BV2 or S2 + BV3 or S3 + …)]
273 
The difference shall not be negative.
274  This method, which does not take into 
account the own funds of the subsidiaries, provides for an easy way to assess potential double 
gearing within the group.
275 
Whichever Method is used, when a regulated entity subsidiary has a solvency 
deficit or, in the case of a non-regulated financial sector entity subsidiary, a notional solvency 
deficit, the total solvency deficit of the subsidiary (and not only a proportional amount) has to be 
taken into account.  However, if in the opinion of the coordinator, the responsibility of the parent 
undertaking is limited strictly and unambiguously to the parent’s share in the capital of the 
subsidiary, the coordinator may permit the solvency deficit of the subsidiary undertaking to be 
taken into account on a proportional basis.
276 
                                                     
272   The calculation of own funds and solvency requirements shall take account of the proportional share held 
by a parent undertaking in a subsidiary or by an undertaking that holds a participation in another entity of 
the group.  Proportional share means the proportion of the subscribed capital that is held, directly or 
indirectly, by that undertaking.  Art. 6(4), second subparagraph, and Annex I, sub II, Method 3, (iii), 
Supplementary Supervision Directive. 
  When evaluating the elements eligible for the calculation of supplementary capital adequacy requirements, 
participations may be valued by the equity method in accordance with the options set out in Art. 59(2)(b), 
Annual Accounts Directive.  Annex I, sub II, Method 3, third paragraph, Supplementary Supervision 
Directive. 
  In the case of nonregulated entities, a notional solvency requirement shall be calculated.  Annex  I, sub II, 
Method 3, third paragraph, Supplementary Supervision Directive.  See supra note 255. 
273   Supp.CA shall mean the supplementary capital adequacy, i.e., the surplus or deficit of the group-wide 
capital, OF shall mean the own funds of the parent on the basis of the single account, S shall mean the 
solvency requirements and BV shall mean the book value of the parent’s participation. 
274   Annex I, sub II, Method 3, ultimate paragraph, Supplementary Supervision Directive.  If the  difference is 
negative, the group faces a capital deficit. 
275   See Joint Forum Report, Capital Adequacy Principles, supra note 124, at 21 & 26, Annex 1 & 2. 
276   Annex I, sub I (1), Supplementary Supervision Directive.  Where there are no capital ties between entities 
in a financial conglomerate, the coordinator may determine which proportional share will have to be taken 
into account, bearing in mind the liability to which the existing relationship gives rise.   Id., second 
paragraph.  
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d)  Capital Policies and Supervision   
The Member States shall require regulated entities to have in place adequate 
capital adequacy policies at the level of the financial conglomerate.
277  The requirement that 
regulated entities in financial conglomerates must ensure that on the level of the financial 
conglomerates the capital adequacy requirements of Annex I are met
278 and that regulated entities 
have in place adequate capital adequacy policies on the level of the financial conglomerate
279 
must be subject to supervisory overview by the coordinator.
280  The regulated entities or the 
mixed financial holding company must calculate the sufficiency of own funds on the level of the 
financial conglomerate at least annually.
281  The EU-regulated entity at the head of the financial 
conglomerate or the mixed financial holding company at the head of the financial conglomerate 
must submit the results of the calculation to the coordinator.
282  When calculating own funds at 
the level of the financial conglomerate, the competent authorities shall take into account the 
effectiveness of the transferability and availability of the own funds across the different legal 
entities in the group.
283 
The coordinator may decide not to include a particular entity for the purpose of 
calculating the capital adequacy requirements in the following cases:
284 
(a)  if the entity is situated in a third country where there are legal 
impediments to the transfer of the necessary information;
285 
(b)  if the entity is of negligible interest with respect to the objective of 
the supplementary supervision of regulated entities in a financial 
conglomerate;
286 or 
                                                     
277   Art. 6(2), second subparagraph, Supplementary Supervision Directive. 
278   Art. 6(2), first subparagraph, Supplementary Supervision Directive.  See supra notes 250 & 252 and 
accompanying text. 
279   Art. 6(2), second subparagraph, Supplementary Supervision Directive. 
280   Art. 6(2), third subparagraph, Supplementary Supervision Directive.   
281   Art. 6(2), fourth subparagraph, Supplementary Supervision Directive.   
282   Art. 6(2), fifth subparagraph, Supplementary Supervision Directive.  The coordinator may designate a 
regulated entity in the financial conglomerate as the entity required to submit the results of the calculation 
instead of the mixed financial holding company.  Art. 6(2), fifth subparagraph, Supplementary Supervision 
Directive.  Before such designation, the coordinator must consult with the other relevant competent 
authorities and with the financial conglomerate. 
283   Annex I, sub I, 2(ii), third paragraph, Supplemental Supervision Directive.  
284   Art. 6(5), Supplementary Supervision Directive. 
285   This exception must be without prejudice to the sectoral rules regarding the obligation of competent 
authorities to refuse authorization where the effective exercise of their supervisory functions is prevented. 
Art. 6(5)(a), Supplementary Supervision Directive.  
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(c)  if the inclusion of the entity would be inappropriate or misleading 
with respect to the objectives of supplementary supervision. 
2.  Intra-Group Transactions and Risk Concentration 
Another core regulation of the Supplementary Supervision Directive is the 
requirement of supplementary supervision on intra-group transactions and risk concentration of 
regulated entities in a financial conglomerate.
287  
a)  Intra-Group Transactions  
Intra-group transactions may cause supervisory concerns when they:  (1) result in 
capital or income being inappropriately transferred from the regulated entity; (2) are on terms or 
under circumstances which parties operating at arm’s length would not allow and may be 
disadvantageous to a regulated entity; (3) can adversely affect the solvency, the liquidity and the 
profitability of individual entities within a group; or (4) are used as a means of supervisory 
arbitrage, thereby evading capital or other regulatory requirements altogether.
288  Monitoring 
intra-group transactions is also an important factor in dealing with the risk of contagion within a 
financial conglomerate.  Contagion entails the risk that, if certain parts of a conglomerate are 
experiencing financial difficulties, they may infect other healthy parts of the conglomerate as a 
result of which the operation of the healthy parts may be hampered or even made impossible.
289  
Therefore, intra-group transactions can significantly exacerbate problems for a regulated entity 
once contagion spreads.
290 
Intra-group transactions as defined in the Supplementary Supervision Directive 
are transactions by a regulated entity in a financial conglomerate with any other undertaking in 
                                                                                                                                                                          
286   If several entities are intended to be excluded because of such negligible interest, they must nevertheless be 
included when collectively they are of non-negligible interest.  Art. 6(5), second subparagraph, 
Supplementary Supervision Directive. 
287   Arts. 7(1) & 8(1), in connection with Annex II, Supplementary Supervision Directive. 
288   The Joint Forum Report, Intra-Group Transactions and Exposure Principles, supra note 124, at 134, sub 
no. 12.  See also Tripartite Report, supra note 124, at 21, sub no. 55. 
289   Tripartite Report, supra note 124, at 18, sub no. 47. 
290   Tripartite Report, supra note 124, at 19, sub no. 50.  According to the Joint Forum Report, Intra-Group 
Transaction and Exposure Principles, supra note 124, at 131, sub no. 4, intra-group transactions and 
exposures take the form of direct and indirect claims between entities within a financial conglomerate.  
They can originate in a variety of ways, for example, through:  (1) cross shareholdings, (2) trading 
operations whereby one group company deals with, or on behalf of, another group company, (3) central 
management of short-term liquidity within the conglomerate, (4) guarantees, loans and commitments 
provided to, or received from, other companies in the group, (5) the provision of management and other 
service arrangements, e.g., pension arrangements or back office services, (6) exposures to major 
shareholders (including loans and off-balance sheet exposures such as commitments and guarantees), (7) 
exposures arising through the placement of client assets with other group companies, (8) purchase or sales 
of assets with other group companies, (9) transfer of risk through reinsurance, and (10) transactions to shift 
third-party-related risk exposures between entities within the conglomerate.   Id.  
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the financial conglomerate.
291  However, intra-group transactions go beyond transactions with 
members of the group.  Intra-group transactions include transactions with natural or legal 
persons linked to the undertakings within the group by close links, even though such linked 
persons are not members of the group, and, consequently, not members of the financial 
conglomerate.
292  The intra-group transactions are not limited to transactions of EU-regulated 
entities within a financial conglomerate but are transactions of any regulated entity.
293  The 
Supplementary Supervision Directive does not provide for quantitative limits or qualitative 
requirements with regard to intra-group transactions within a financial conglomerate.  The 
introduction of such limits and requirements or the introduction of other supervisory measures 
that would achieve the objectives of supplementary supervision with regard to intra-group 
transactions is left to the Member States.
294 
The scope of the provisions in the Supplementary Supervision Directive that deals 
with intra-group transactions is broader than the scope of the equivalent U.S. rules, Sections 23A 
and 23B, Federal Reserve Act,
295 because the Supplementary Supervision Directive applies to all 
                                                     
291   Art. 2(18), Supplementary Supervision Directive.  Intra-group transactions mean all transactions by which 
regulated entities within a financial conglomerate rely either directly or indirectly upon other undertakings 
within the same group or upon any natural or legal person linked to the undertaking within that group by 
“close links” for the fulfillment of an obligation, whether or not contractual, and whether or not for 
payment.  Id. 
292   Art. 2(18), Supplementary Supervision Directive.  Close link is defined as a situation in which two or more 
natural or legal persons are linked by (1) a participation, which means the ownership, direct or by way of 
control, of 20 percent or more of the voting rights or capital of an undertaking, or (2) control, which means 
the relationship between a parent and a direct or indirect subsidiary, in all the cases referred to in Art. 1(1) 
& (2), Consolidated Accounts Directive, or a similar relationship between any natural or legal person and 
an undertaking.  Art. 2(13), Supplementary Supervision Directive.  See supra note 11 and accompanying 
text for a discussion of Art. 1(1), Consolidated Accounts Directive and note 150 and accompanying text for 
a discussion of Art. 1(2), Consolidated Accounts Directive.  Art. 2(13), Supplementary Supervision 
Directive adds that a situation in which two or more natural or legal persons are permanently linked to one 
and the same person by a control relationship shall also be regarded as constituting a  close link between 
such persons.  Thus, a close link goes beyond the parent-subsidiary (“control”) relationship by including 
similar relationships and the relationship of two persons to each other caused by the fact that they are under 
common control (permanently linked to one and the same person by a control relationship). 
  It is difficult to imagine cases in which an undertaking in a group has a close link to another undertaking by 
means of a participation or control but the other undertaking is not a member of the group.  However, the 
link with a natural person and the link created through permanent control relationships by two natural or 
legal persons to a third person does not create a group relationship.  
293   See Arts. 2(18) and 8(1) & (2 ), Supplementary Supervision Directive referring generally to regulated 
entities. 
294   Art. 8(3), Supplementary Supervision Directive.  
295   Sections 23A & 23B, Federal Reserve Act, 12 U.S.C. § 371c & 371c-1 (2000), apply only to transactions 
between an insured depository institution, i.e., a U.S. bank, and its affiliates.  See Robert E. Mannion & 
Lisa R. Chavarria, Transactions Between Banks and Affiliated Enterprises, ch. 12, in Gruson & Reisner, 
supra note 9; Michael Gruson, Foreign Banks and the Financial Holding Company, § 10.07[4], in Gruson 
& Reisner, supra note 9.  
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transactions between all regulated entities within a financial conglomerate and other entities in 
the group.
296 
b)  Risk Concentration 
As to the problem of risk concentration,
297 supervisors of the different financial 
sectors use various approaches to monitor large exposures, due to the different risks they are 
facing.
298  In all three sectors, financial institutions face an increased risk of loss when their 
assets, liabilities or business activities are not diversified.
299  As not all risk concentrations are 
inherently bad (a certain degree of concentration is the inevitable result of a well-articulated 
business strategy as well as product specialization, the targeting of a customer base or a sound 
strategy of outsourcing data processing activities), supervisors need to balance the benefits 
against the risks of concentrations at the conglomerate level.
300  In identifying risks, the 
competent authorities have to take into account the different ways in which large losses can 
develop in a conglomerate as a result of risk concentration.
301   
                                                     
296   Art. 2(18), Supplementary Supervision Directive.  See also Art. 55a, first subparagraph, Banking Directive, 
added by Art. 29(9), Supplementary Supervision Directive (transactions between a credit institution and its 
mixed-activity holding company), see supra note 55 and accompanying text. 
297   Risk concentration means all exposures with a loss potential borne by entities [note that the exposures are 
not limited to those borne by regulated entities] within a financial conglomerate that are large en ough to 
threaten the solvency or the financial position in general of the regulated entities in the financial 
conglomerate; such exposures may be caused by counterparty risk/credit risk, investment risk, insurance 
risk, market risk, other risks, or a combination or interaction of these risks.  Art. 2(19), Supplementary 
Supervision Directive. 
  Pursuant to the Joint Forum Report, Risk Concentrations Principles, supra note 124, at 141, sub no. 4, risk 
concentration can take many forms, including exposures to:  (1) individual counterparties, (2) groups of 
individual counterparties or related entities, (3) counterparties in specific geographical locations, (3) 
industry sectors, (5) specific products, (6) service providers, e.g., back office services, and (7) natural 
disasters or catastrophes. 
298   The Joint Forum Report, Risk Concentrations Principles, supra note 124, at 143, sub nos. 8–10. 
299   The Joint Forum Report, Risk Concentrations Principles, supra note 124, at 144, sub no. 11. 
300   The Joint Forum Report, Risk Concentrations Principles, supra note 124, at 145, sub nos. 22 & 23.  
301   The Joint Forum Report, Risk Concentrations Principles, supra note 124, at 146, sub no. 23.  The Joint 
Forum Report addresses some of the losses as follows: 
•  Losses at the conglomerate level can reflect the aggregate of losses on similar types of exposures 
(e.g., bonds, loans and investments with the same obligor) across the sectors.  
•  Losses could reflect risk factors that have consequences for different types of exposures in 
different entities (e.g., a natural disaster could cause insurance loses in a conglomerate’s insurance 
operation and credit losses in its banking operation if both offered products in the affected region). 
•  Losses could reflect the interaction of risk factors (e.g., the loss potential in a derivative or 
exchange rate contract resulting from an exchange rate depreciation may be intensified if the same  
price movement adversely affects the repayment ability of a counterparty or the financial stability 
of the counterparty’s country of residence).  
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Like in the case of intra-group transactions, the Supplementary Supervision 
Directive does not provide for quantitative limits or quantitative requirements with regard to risk 
concentration at the level of the financial conglomerate.  The introduction of such limits and 
requirements or the introduction of other supervisory measures that would achieve the objectives 
of supplementary supervision with regard to risk concentration is left to the Member States.
302 
c)  Common Provisions 
To avoid the risks resulting from intra-group transactions and risk concentration, 
the Member States shall require regulated entities to have in place at the level of the financial 
conglomerate
303 adequate risk management processes
304 and internal control mechanisms
305 –  
including sound reporting and accounting procedures.
306  In addition, regulated entities that are 
Responsible Entities
307 must have adequate internal control mechanism for the production of any 
data and information that would be relevant for the purpose of supplementary supervision.
308 
In addition, the Member States shall require regulated entities or mixed financial 
holding companies to report on a regular basis and at least annually to the coordinator
309 any 
                                                                                                                                                                          
•  Losses could also reflect the breakdown of previously observed correlations, such as occurs in a 
flight to quality in which all risky assets decline in value, where previously many of them were 
measured to be uncorrelated. 
302   Art. 7(3), Supplementary Supervision Directive. 
303   See supra notes 211–219 and accompanying text for a discussion of the term at the level of the financial 
conglomerate. 
304   The risk management processes shall include (1) sound governance and management with the approval and 
periodic review of the strategies and policies by the appropriate governing bodies at the level of the 
financial conglomerate with respect to all the risks they assume; (2) capital adequacy policies in order to 
anticipate the impact of their business strategy on risk profile and capital requirements; and (3) procedures 
to ensure that their risk monitoring systems are well integrated into their organization and that all measures 
are taken to ensure that the systems implemented by all undertakings included in the scope of 
supplementary supervision are consistent so that the risks can be measured, monitored and controlled at the 
level of the financial conglomerate.  Art. 9(2), Supplementary Supervision Directive. 
305   The internal control mechanism shall include (1) a mechanism as regards capital adequacy to identify and 
measure all material risks incurred and to appropriately relate own funds to risks; and (2) reporting and 
accounting procedures to identify, measure, monitor and control the intra-group transactions and the risk 
concentration.  Art 9(3), Supplementary Supervision Directive. 
306   Art. 9(1), Supplementary Supervision Directive.  The processes and mechanism shall be subject to 
supervisory overview by the coordinator.  Art. 9(5), Supplementary Supervision Directive.  According to 
the second paragraph of Annex II, Supplementary Supervision Directive, the competent authorities 
responsible for supplementary supervision shall in particular monitor the possible risk of contagion in the 
financial conglomerate, the risk of a conflict of interests, the risk of circumvention of sectoral rules, and the 
level or volume of risks. 
307   See supra text accompanying note 215. 
308   Art. 9(4), Supplementary Supervision Directive.   
309   See infra C.III.4. for a discussion of the coordinator.  
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significant risk concentration at the level of the financial conglomerate and significant intra-
group transactions of regulated entities within a financial conglomerate.
310  The necessary 
information shall be submitted to the coordinator by the EU-regulated entity which is at the head 
of the financial conglomerate or, where the financial conglomerate is not headed by an EU- 
regulated entity, by the mixed financial holding company or by the regulated entity in the 
financial conglomerate identified by the coordinator after consultation with the other relevant 
competent authorities and with the financial conglomerate.
311  The intra-group transactions and 
risk concentrations shall be subject to supervisory overview by the coordinator.
312  Therefore, the 
coordinator, after consultation with the other relevant competent authorities, shall identify the 
type of transactions and risks regulated entities in a particular financial conglomerate shall report 
in accordance with the provisions on reporting of intra-group transactions and risk 
concentration.
313  Thus, the Supplementary Supervision Directive provides for the development 
of reporting requirements that are specific for each financial conglomerate. 
Where a financial conglomerate is headed by a mixed financial holding company, 
the sectoral rules regarding intra-group transactions and risk concentration of the most important 
financial sector in the financial conglomerate shall apply to that sector as a whole, including the 
mixed financial holding company.
314 
3.  Management Qualifications 
The Supplementary Supervision Directive requires the Member States to provide 
that persons who effectively direct the business of a mixed financial holding company are of 
sufficiently good repute and have sufficient experience to perform their duties.
315  This provision 
is intended to ensure that a manager of a non-regulated entity having a dominant influence on the 
                                                     
310   Arts. 7(2), second subparagraph & 8(2), in connection with Annex II, Supplementary Supervision 
Directive. 
311   Arts. 7(2) & 8(2), second subparagraph, Supplementary Supervision Directive. 
312   Arts. 7(2), second subparagraph & 8(2), third subparagraph, Supplementary Supervision Directive. 
313   Annex II, first paragraph, Supplementary Supervision Directive referring to the reporting provision of Arts. 
7(2) & 8(2), Supplementary Supervision Directive.  When defining the type of transactions and risks, the 
coordinator and the relevant competent authorities shall take into account the specific group and risk 
management structure of the financial conglomerate.  In particular, the coordinator, after consultation with 
the other relevant competent authorities and the financial conglomerate itself, shall define appropriate 
reporting thresholds based on regulatory own funds and/or technical provisions.  Annex II, first paragraph, 
Supplementary Supervision Directive.  If no definition of the reporting threshold has been drawn up in 
accordance with Annex II, an intra-group transaction shall be presumed to be significant if its amount 
exceeds at least 5 percent of the total amount of the capital adequacy requirements at the level of a financial 
conglomerate.  Art. 8(2), first subparagraph, Supplementary Supervision Directive. 
314   Arts. 7(4) & 8(4), Supplementary Supervision Directive.  According to the wording of Arts. 7(4) & 8(4), 
Supplementary Supervision Directive, the sectoral rules of the largest sector in the financial conglomerate 
shall apply “to that [most important] sector”.  However, that does not seem to make sense.  Arts. 7(4) & 
8(4), Supplementary Supervision Directive probably mean that the sectoral rules of the most important 
financial sector shall apply to the whole group. 
315   Art. 13, Supplementary Supervision Directive.  
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performance of a regulated entity is reliable, like a manager of the regulated entity, in particular 
as regards the management of the mixed financial holding company.  This provision responds to 
the recent tendency to manage financial conglomerates along the different business lines of 
conglomerates instead of the traditional legal entity based approaches.
316  The Supplementary 
Supervision Directive also provides that the Member States shall require that persons who 
effectively direct the business of an insurance holding company or a financial holding company 
are of sufficiently good repute and have sufficient experience to perform their duties.
317  
4.  Measures to Facilitate Supplementary Supervision 
One of the principal objectives of the Supplementary Supervision Directive is the 
introduction of measures to facilitate supplementary supervision.
318  Supplementary supervision 
requires the exchange of information among the entities in the financial conglomerate and 
exchange of information and cooperation among the competent authorities involved in the 
supervision of regulated entities in a particular financial conglomerate.
319  
The Supplementary Supervision Directive introduces the so-called coordinator.  
The competent authorities of the Member States concerned shall appoint from amongst them a 
coordinator responsible for the coordination and exercise of the supplementary supervision of the 
regulated entities in a financial conglomerate.
320  The Supplementary Supervision Directive 
provides for the automatic identification of the coordinator on the basis of objective criteria.
321  
However, the relevant competent authorities may waive by agreement these criteria if their 
application would be inappropriate and appoint a different competent authority as coordinator.
322  
The competent authorities shall give the financial conglomerate an opportunity to state its 
opinion on that decision.
323  The coordinator functions merely as a primus inter pares of the 
competent authorities of the Member States involved with the regulated entities of a financial 
conglomerate.
324  A coordinator must be nominated not only for cross-border financial 
                                                     
316   See recital clause No. 8, Supplementary Supervision Directive.  See also 2001 Explanatory Memorandum, 
supra note 122, at 7, sub 2 (Arts. 5 & 6). 
317   Art. 28(4), Supplementary Supervision Directive amending the Insurance Group Directive by adding Art. 
10b, supra note 115; Art. 29(8), Supplementary Supervision Directive amending the Banking Directive by 
adding Art. 54a, supra note 61.  See Art. 6, Banking Directive, establishing management qualifications for 
managers of credit institutions.  See supra A.III.4. & B.II.4. 
318   Arts. 10–17, Supplementary Supervision Directive. 
319   2001 Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 122, at 7, sub 2 (Arts. 7–13). 
320   Art. 10(1), Supplementary Supervision Directive.  The competent authorities of a Member State in which a 
mixed financial holding company has its head office participate in the selection of the coordinator.  Art. 
10(1), Supplementary Supervision Directive. 
321   Art. 10(2), Supplementary Supervision Directive. 
322   Art. 10(3), Supplementary Supervision Directive. 
323   Art. 10(3), Supplementary Supervision Directive. 
324   See Economic and Financial Committee, Report on Financial Stability (Apr. 2000), EFC/ECFIN/240/00–
Final, available at  
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conglomerates but also for financial conglomerates that have several regulated entities in one 
Member State and at least two supervisory authorities are involved.
325  
The tasks of the coordinator with regard to supplementary supervision are:
326  
(1) the coordination of gathering and disseminating of relevant or essential information in going 
concern and emergency situations, (2) the supervisory overview and assessment of the financial 
situation of a financial conglomerate, (3) the assessment of compliance with the rules on capital 
adequacy, risk concentration and intra-group transactions,
327 (4) the assessment of the financial 
conglomerate’s structure, organization and internal control systems,
328 (5) the planning and 
coordination of supervisory activities in going concern as well as in emergency situations, in 
cooperation with the relevant competent authorities involved, and (6) other tasks assigned to the 
coordinator by the Supplementary Supervision Directive or by coordination arrangements 
between the coordinator and other relevant competent authorities.
329 
The coordinator has no decision-making or enforcement authority to impose 
measures and sanctions.
330  The presence of a coordinator entrusted with specific tasks 
concerning the supplementary supervision does not affect the tasks and responsibilities of the 
competent authorities responsible for the regulated entities in a financial conglomerate as 
provided for by the sectoral rules.
331 
To ensure proper supplementary supervision, the competent authorities 
responsible for the supervision of regulated entities in a financial conglomerate and the 
coordinator are required to cooperate closely with each other.
332  The coordinator and the relevant 
competent authorities may enter into coordination agreements to specify the procedures for the 
decision-making process and for cooperation among them.
333  They shall provide each other with 
                                                                                                                                                                          
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/publications/economic_papers/2001/ecp143en.pdf (last visited 
December 1, 2003) [herein Brouwer Report], at 17, sub V.1. 
325   Although the language of the Supplementary Supervision Directive is not clear, it follows from Art. 
10(2)(b)(ii), second subparagraph, Supplementary Supervision Directive, that the competent authorities that 
appoint a coordinator may all be located in one Member State. 
326   Art. 11(1), Supplementary Supervision Directive. 
327   See Arts. 6, 7 & 8, Supplementary Supervision Directive. 
328   See Art. 9, Supplementary Supervision Directive. 
329   See Art. 11(1)(f) and second subparagraph, Supplementary Supervision Directive. 
330   See Presidency of the Council of the European Union, Report No. 14140/1/01 to the Permanent 
Representatives Committee/Council on the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on the supplementary supervision of credit institutions, insurance undertakings and investment 
firms in a financial conglomerate (Brussels, Nov. 30, 2001), available at 
http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/01/st14/14140en1.pdf (last visited December 1, 2003), at 4, sub 2. 
331   Art. 11(3), Supplementary Supervision Directive. 
332   Art. 12(1), Supplementary Supervision Directive. 
333   Art. 11(1), second subparagraph, Supplementary Supervision Directive.  
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any information that is essential or relevant for the exercise of the other competent authorities’ 
supervisory tasks under the sectoral rules and under the Supplementary Supervision Directive.
334  
The competent authorities and the coordinator shall communicate on request all relevant 
information and shall communicate on their own initiative all essential information.
335  The 
competent authorities shall consult with each other prior to their decision with regard to the 
following items, where these decisions are important for the supervisory tasks of other competent 
authorities:  (1) changes in the shareholder, organizational or management structure of regulated 
entities in a financial conglomerate, that require the approval or authorization of competent 
authorities, and (2) major sanctions or exceptional measures taken by the competent 
authorities.
336 
If a competent authority wishes to verify information concerning an entity in a 
financial conglomerate, whether or not it is a regulated entity, that is situated in another Member 
State, it may ask the competent authorities of the other Member State to carry out the 
verification.
337  The requested competent authority must carry out the verification or permit 
experts or the requesting authority to carry out the verification.
338 
5.  Enforcement Measures 
If the regulated entity in a financial conglomerate does not comply with the 
capital adequacy requirements,
339 the requirements concerning risk concentration,
340 the 
requirements concerning intra-group transactions
341 or the requirements concerning adequate risk 
management provisions and internal control mechanisms,
342 or where the requirements are met 
but solvency may nevertheless be jeopardized, or where the intra-group transactions or the risk 
concentrations are a threat to the regulated entities’ financial position, the coordinator, with 
respect to a mixed financial holding company, or the competent authorities, with respect to the 
                                                     
334   Art. 12(1), Supplementary Supervision  Directive. 
335   Art. 12(1), Supplementary Supervision Directive.  Art. 12(1), Supplementary Supervision  Directive 
enumerates eight categories of information that shall be gathered and exchanged.  Member States shall 
authorize the exchange of information between their competent authorities and between their competent 
authorities and certain other authorities, as referred to in Art. 12(1), (2) & (3), Supplementary Supervision 
Directive.  Art. 12(4), Supplementary Supervision Directive. 
336   Art. 12(2), Supplementary Supervision Directive. 
337   Art. 15, first subparagraph, Supplementary Supervision Directive. 
338   Art. 15, second subparagraph, Supplementary Supervision Directive.  The requesting authority may 
participate in the verification when it does not carry out the verification itself.  Art. 15, third subparagraph, 
Supplementary Supervision Directive. 
339   See Art. 6, Supplementary Supervision Directive. 
340   See Art. 7, Supplementary Supervision Directive. 
341   See Art. 8, Supplementary Supervision Directive. 
342   See Art. 9, Supplementary Supervision Directive.  
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regulated entity, shall take the necessary measures in order to rectify the situation as soon as 
possible.
343 
IV.  Equivalent Supplemental Supervision for Parent Undertakings 
  Outside the European Union 
If the parent of a financial conglomerate is a regulated entity or a mixed financial 
holding company having its head office outside the EU,
344 the EU-regulated entities belonging to 
such a “non-EU group” are not directly subject to the rules on supplementary supervision.
345  The 
Supplementary Supervision Directive, however, attempts to apply as much supplementary 
supervision as possible.
346   
The Supplementary Supervision Directive requires a verification whether the 
EU-regulated entity, the parent of which has its head office outside the EU, is subject to 
supervision by the home country of the parent that is equivalent to the supplementary supervision 
of regulated entities provided for in the Supplementary Supervision Directive.
347  The verification 
shall be carried out by the competent authority that would be the coordinator if the criteria for the 
appointment of the coordinator as set forth in Art. 10(2), Supplementary Supervision Directive 
were to apply [herein the hypothetical coordinator].
348  The verification shall be carried out on 
the request of the parent of the financial conglomerate, by an EU-regulated entity in such 
financial conglomerate or by the hypothetical coordinator.
349  The hypothetical coordinator shall 
consult the other relevant competent authorities and the Financial Conglomerates Committee,
350 
and shall take into account any applicable guidance prepared by the Financial Conglomerates 
Committee.
351 
                                                     
343   Art. 16, Supplementary Supervision Directive. 
344   See Art. 5(3), Supplementary Supervision Directive.  
345   See Art. 5(3), Supplementary Supervision Directive.  Other than the BHCA, the Supplementary 
Supervision Directive does not regulate non-EU holding companies that control EU-regulated entities. 
346   Arts. 5(3) & 18, Supplementary Supervision Directive.  See 2001 Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 
122, at 7, sub 2, Art. 14. 
347   Art. 18(1), Supplementary Supervision Directive.  
348   Art. 18(1), Supplementary Supervision Directive.   
349   Art. 18(1), Supplementary Supervision Directive. 
350   The Financial Conglomerate Committee established under Art. 21, Supple mentary Supervision Directive 
assists the EU Commission.  It may give general guidance as to whether the supplementary supervision 
arrangements in third countries are likely to achieve the objectives of the Supplementary Supervision 
Directive, in relation to the regulated entities in a financial conglomerate, the head of which has its head 
office outside the EU.  Art. 21(5), Supplementary Supervision Directive. 
351   Art. 18(1), Supplementary Supervision Directive.  
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When the U.S. regulations under the BHCA require foreign banks to demonstrate 
that they are subject to comprehensive supervision on a consolidated basis,
352 they address the 
questions whether the foreign bank itself is properly supervised by its home country.  The 
Supplementary Supervision Directive, on the other hand, asks whether the EU-regulated entities 
are subject to supervision by the non-EU home country of the non-EU parent of the financial 
conglomerate and whether such supervision is equivalent to the supervision under the 
Supplementary Supervision Directive. 
If the supervision by the home country of the non-EU-regulated entity or the 
mixed financial holding company that has its head office outside the EU over the EU-regulated 
entities in such group is found to be equivalent to the supplementary supervision of the 
Supplementary Supervision Directive, the Supplementary Supervision Directive will yield to the 
foreign supervision. 
In the absence of such equivalent supervision, the Member States shall by analogy 
apply to the EU-regulated entities the provision with regard to supplementary supervision.
353  In 
the alternative, the Member States shall allow their competent authorities to apply other methods 
that ensure an appropriate supplementary supervision of the EU-regulated entities in a financial 
conglomerate.
354  In particular, the competent authorities may require the creation of a 
sub-holding company (which would be a mixed financial holding company) that has its head 
office in the EU, and apply the supplementary supervision required by the Supplementary 
Supervision Directive to the regulated entities in the financial conglomerate headed by the 
European sub-holding company.
355  In any event, the methods selected by the competent 
authorities to ensure an appropriate supplementary supervision “must achieve the objectives of 
the supplementary supervision as defined in the [Supplementary Supervision Directive]”
356 and 
must be notified to the competent authorities involved and the Commission.
357 
For a U.S. observer, it is quite surprising to note that the Supplementary 
Supervision Directive hesitates to regulate directly non-EU holding companies of EU-regulated 
entities.  The United States banking legislation does not show such hesitation with respect to 
                                                     
352   See 12 C.F.R. § 225.92(e)(1) & (2) (2003) (Regulation Y) (election by foreign bank to become financial 
holding company); 12 C.F.R. § 211.24(c)(1)(i)(A) (2003) (Regulation K) (establishment of U.S. office by 
foreign bank); 12 C.F.R. § 225.13(a)(4) (2003) (Regulation Y) (acquisition of U.S. bank by foreign bank). 
353   Art. 18(2), Supplementary Supervision Directive.  Art. 18(2), Supplementary Supervision Directive refers 
to “the provisions concerning the supplementary supervision of regulated entities referred to in Art. 5(2) 
[Supplementary Supervision Directive]”.  Analogy means “similarity in some respects between things that 
are otherwise dissimilar”.  AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY, 4th ed. (2000).  In the context of the 
Supplementary Supervision Directive, this presumably means “to the extent possibl e”. 
354   Art. 18(3), Supplementary Supervision Directive. According to Art. 18(3), second sentence, Supplementary 
Supervision Directive, those methods must be agreed on by the coordinator, after consultation with the 
other relevant competent authorities. 
355   Art. 18(3), third sentence, Supplementary Supervision Directive. 
356   Art. 18(3), ultimate sentence, Supplementary Supervision Directive. 
357   Art. 18(3), ultimate sentence, Supplementary Supervision Directive.  
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foreign holding companies.  For example, the BHCA applies not only to U.S. banks but also to 
foreign banks that control a U.S. bank subsidiary
358 and foreign banks that maintain a branch, 
agency or commercial lending company in the United States.
359 
The EU Commission may also negotiate agreements with third countries 
regarding the means of exercising supplementary supervision of regulated entities in a financial 
conglomerate.
360  In this context, the Commission may submit proposals to the Council, either at 
the request of a Member State or on its own initiative, for the negotiation of such agreements.
361  
The agreements would cover supplementary supervision of financial conglomerates whose 
parent is situated outside the EU but which have regulated entities in the EU and of financial 
conglomerates whose parent is situated in the EU but which have regulated entities outside the 
EU.
362 
D.  Equivalent Consolidated Supervision and Supplementary 
Supervision of Groups Headed by U.S. Entities. 
I.  The Issue 
    If an EU-authorized credit institution is a subsidiary of a non-EU credit institution 
or financial institution, the competent authorities must verify whether the EU-authorized credit 
institution is subject to consolidated supervision by the home country of the non-EU parent that 
is equivalent to that required by the Banking Directive.
363  Similarly, if the parent of a financial 
conglomerate is a regulated entity or a mixed financial holding company having its head office 
outside the EU, the competent authorities must verify whether the EU-regulated entities in the 
financial conglomerate are subject to supplementary supervision by the home country of the 
parent that is equivalent to the supplementary supervision required by the Supplementary 
Supervision Directive.
364 
    The question arises whether EU-authorized credit institutions that are subsidiaries 
of U.S. based parents are subject to equivalent consolidated supervision under U.S. law and 
whether an EU-regulated credit institution, investment firm or insurance undertaking subsidiary 
that is part of a cross-sectoral financial conglomerate headed by a U.S. parent is subject to 
equivalent supplementary supervision under U.S. law. 
                                                     
358   The BHCA applies directly to such foreign banks. 
359   Section 8(a), International Banking Act of 1978, 12 U.S.C. § 3106(a) (2000). 
360   Art. 19, Supplementary Supervision Directive makes Art. 25(1) &(2), Banking Directive applicable mutatis 
mutandis to the negotiation of such agreements.  See supra A.V. for a discussion of Art. 25, Banking 
Directive. 
361   Art. 19(1), Supplementary Supervision Directive in connection with Art. 25(1), Banking Directive. 
362   Art. 19(1), Supplementary Supervision Directive in connection with Art. 25(1), Banking Directive. 
363   Art. 56a, Banking Directive, added by Art. 29(11), Supplementary Supervision Directive.  See supra A.V.   
364   Art. 18, Supplementary Supervision Directive.  See supra C.IV.    
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II.  Equivalent Consolidated Supervision of EU-Credit Institutions 
1.  U.S. Non-Regulated Entity as Parent 
      The U.S. parent of an EU-authorized credit institution may be a non-
regulated entity.  For instance, large financial institutions such as GE Capital Corporation or GE 
Consumer Finance that do not take deposits but are engaged in other financial activities do not 
need a banking license under most states of the United States and their holding companies are 
not BHCs.
365  These entities are not subject to any supervision in the United States and, 
consequently, if they acquire credit institutions located in EU Member States, the EU credit 
institutions are not subject to consolidated supervision. 
2.  U.S. BHC as Parent 
      If a U.S. BHC acquires directly or indirectly an EU-authorized credit 
institution,
366 the BHC and the EU-authorized credit institution are subject to consolidated 
supervision in most of the areas in which the Banking Directive requires consolidated 
supervision.   
      The Banking Directive requires consolidated supervision of the capital , 
the solvency ratio and the adequacy of capital to cover market risks.
367  Regulation Y imposes on 
BHCs the Basel Capital Standards on a consolidated basis.
368   
                                                     
365   Section 2(a)(1) in connection with § 2(c)(2), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1841(a)(1) & (c)(2) (2000).  For instance, 
GE Consumer Finance operates banks in Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, Spain, Sweden and the 
United Kingdom. 
366   A foreign bank is not a “bank” as defined in § 2(c), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c) (2000), and therefore the 
acquisition of a foreign bank by a BHC must meet the requirements of § 4(c)(13), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. 
§ 1843(c)(13) (2000), one of the exceptions to § 4(a), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(a) (2000).  Consequently, 
the acquisition of a foreign bank by an Edge Act corporation, an agreement corporation, a member bank, or 
a U.S. BHC must be made in accordance with 12 C.F.R. § 211.8(c) in connection with § 211.10(a)(1) 
(2003) (Regulation K).  See Michael Gruson, Nonbanking Activities of Foreign Banks Operating in the 
United States, § 9.04[10][e] in Gruson & Reisner, supra note 9 [herein Gruson, Nonbanking Activities]; 
Derek M. Bush & Paul E. Glatzer, U.S. Regulation of International Activities of U.S. Banking 
Organizations, § 14.04 in Gruson & Reisner, supra note 9. 
Every national bank is a member bank, 12 U.S.C §221 (2001).  For a definition of Edge Act corporation 
and agreement corporation, see Gruson, Nonbanking Activities, supra, §9.02[1] note 45. 
367   See Arts. 34–47 in connection with Art. 52(5), first subparagraph, Banking Directive.  See supra A.III.1.   
368   A U.S. BHC is subject to the capital requirements set forth in app. A (Capital Adequacy Guidelines for 
BHCS: Risk-Based Measure (see attachment VI), app. B (Capital Adequacy Guidelines for BHCs and State 
Member Banks: Leverage Measure), app. D (Capital Adequacy Guidelines for BHCs: Tier 1 Leverage 
Measure), and app. E (Capital Adequacy Guidelines for BHCs: Market Risk Measures) to 12 C.F.R. pt. 225 
(2003).  See Gruson, Financial Holding Company, § 10.02 [7][b], supra note 9; Joyce M. Hansen, Ivan J. 
Hurwitz & Diane L. Virzera, Capital Regulation and Supervision of International Banking Organizations, 
§ 4.03[4] in Gruson & Reisner, supra note 9 [herein Hansen, et al., Capital Regulation].   
  See Committee on Banking Regulation and Supervisory Practices [now: Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision], International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards (July 1988, as  
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      The Banking Directive also requires consolidated supervision of 
investments in the non-financial sector.
369  Section 4(a), BHCA generally prohibits investments 
by a BHC in shares of companies other than banks.
370  This prohibition applies to direct and 
indirect investments.
371  Thus, the prohibition on equity investments in companies other than 
banks and the limited exceptions from the prohibition apply on a group-wide basis.  Regulation 
K is more liberal with respect to investments by BHCs, Edge Act corporations, agreement 
corporations or member banks in foreign companies, but the various restrictions on such 
investments are computed by aggregating investments made “by the investor or by an affiliate of 
the investor”.
372  The prohibition of Section 4(a), BHCA does not apply to shares in a U.S. 
company acquired by a U.S. bank subsidiary of a BHC although such shares are indirectly 
acquired by the BHC.
373  Thus, these U.S. investments by bank subsidiaries of BHCs are not 
taken into account when computing the permissible investments of the BHC.  However, because 
the investment powers of U.S. banks are extremely limited,
374 the failure to aggregate 
investments by the bank with the investments of its BHC is not of significance.  Furthermore, the 
capital charges on equity investments, discussed below, apply to most direct or indirect equity 
investments of BHCs and banks.
375 
      If a BHC qualifies as an FHC, the U.S. bank subsidiary of the BHC may 
make equity investments under the merchant banking investment authority.
376  There is no 
absolute ceiling on the amount of merchant banking investments that a BHC/FHC may make, 
nor is there a limitation based on a percentage of the capital of the BHC/FHC.  However, 
Regulation Y provides for a progression of Tier 1 marginal capital charges on equity investments 
in nonfinancial companies, including merchant banking investments, that increase with the size 
                                                                                                                                                                          
amended) [herein Basel Capital Standards].  For a discussion of the Basel Capital Standards, see Hansen, et 
al., supra, § 4.02. 
369   See Art. 51 in connection with Art. 52(5), second subparagraph, Banking Directive.  See supra A.III.1. 
370   Section 4(a), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(a) (2002).  See Gruson, Nonbanking Activities, supra note 366, § 
9.01.   
371   Section 4(a), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(a) (2002).  See Gruson, Nonbanking Activities, supra note 366, 
§ 9.03[1][c]. 
372   See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. § 211.2(m)(4), § 211.2(p), § 211.2(w), § 211.8(c)(3)(i), § 211.8(d) (2003)  
(Regulation K).   Affiliate is defined in 12 C.F.R. § 211.2(a) (2003) (Regulation K). 
373   See Gruson, Nonbanking Activities, supra note 366, § 9.01[1] note 11 and accompanying text.  
374   See, e.g., § 5136, Revised Statutes (National Bank Act of 1864), 12 U.S.C. § 24 (seventh) (2000) 
(prohibiting the ownership of stock) and, as an example of state law, §§ 96 & 97, N.Y. Banking Law 
(McKinney 2001).  The GLBA, however, expands the investment authority of BHCs that qualify as FHCs.  
See Gruson, Financial Holding Company, supra note 9, § 10.04. 
375   See Gruson, Financial Holding Company, supra note 9, § 10.04[2][l] note 593. 
376   Section 4(k)(4)(H), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(H) (2000).  See Gruson, Financial Holding Company, 
supra note 9, § 10.04[2].  
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of the aggregate equity investment portfolio for the BHC relative to its Tier 1 capital.
377  The rule 
requires a parent BHC to deduct from its Tier 1 capital the sum of the appropriate percentage of 
the adjusted carrying value of all equity investments in nonfinancial companies held by it or by 
its direct or indirect subsidiaries.
378  It would seem that the capital charge on equity investments 
in nonfinancial companies by a BHC and its subsidiaries has a similar effect as an investment 
ceiling. 
      Lastly, consolidated supervision under the Banking Directive applies to 
lending limits (control of large exposures).
379  U.S. law, however, does not compute lending 
limits on a group-wide basis.
380   
3.  Member Bank as Parent 
      If a member bank (national bank or state member bank) acquires an EU-
authorized credit institution,
381 the national bank or state member bank and the EU-authorized 
                                                     
377   App. A (II. B.5.a. & b.) to 12 C.F.R. pt. 225 (Capital Adequacy Guidelines for BHCs).  The rule applies the 
same capital treatment to all equity investments by BHCs (including FHCs) in nonfinancial companies 
regardless of the authority under which they are held.  See Gruson, Financial Holding Company, supra  
note 9, § 10.04[2][l]. 
  The capital charge does not apply to investments made prior to March 13, 2000.  Id.  The capital charge 
does not apply to securities held by subsidiaries of the FHC that are registered broker-dealers and to equity 
investments by insurance company affiliates of an FHC under § 4(k)(4)(I), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. 
§ 1843(k)(4)(I) (2000).  Id. 
378   App. A (II.B.5.a. & c.) to 12 C.F.R. pt. 225 (Capital Adequacy Guidelines for BHCs). 
The following diagram shows the deduction for nonfinancial equity investments, App. A (II. B.c.) to  
12 C.F.R. pt. 225 (Capital Adequacy Guidelines for BHCs): 
Aggregate adjusted carrying value of all 
nonfinancial equity investments held 
directly or indirectly by the BHC (as a 
percentage of the Tier 1 capital of the BHC) 
Deduction from Tier 1 capital  
(as a percentage of the adjusted carrying 
value of the investment) 
Less than 15 percent  8 percent 
15 percent to 24.99 percent  12 percent 
25 percent and above  25 percent 
 
Each tier of charges applies, on a marginal basis, to the portions of the adjusted carrying value of the 
BHC’s nonfinancial equity investments that fall within the specified ranges of the BHC’s Tier 1 capital.  
Gruson, Financial Holding Company, supra note 9, § 10.04[2][l]. 
379   Arts. 48–50 in connection with Art. 52(5), Banking Directive. 
380   See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. § 32 et seq. (2003) (national banks); § 103, New York Banking Law (McKinney 2001) 
(N.Y. banks).  
  77 
credit institution are subject to consolidated supervision in all areas in which the Banking 
Directive requires consolidated supervision.  U.S. law imposes on all U.S. banks the Basel 
Capital Standards on a consolidated basis.
382  The authority of national banks and state member 
banks to invest in the equity of foreign nonbanks is regulated by Regulation K
383 on a group-wide 
basis.
384  For purposes of computing the lending limits for loans and extensions of credit to any 
person, the total loans and extensions of credit by a foreign bank or Edge Act corporation 
subsidiary of a member bank, and by majority-owned subsidiaries of a foreign bank or Edge Act 
corporation must be combined with the total loans and extensions of credit to the same person by 
the member bank and its majority-owned foreign subsidiaries.
385  
III.  Equivalent Supplementary Supervision 
      Supplementary supervision applies to financial conglomerates that 
straddle several financial sectors.  Supplementary supervision under the Supplementary 
Supervision Directive applies to capital adequacy at the level of the financial conglomerate, 
intra-group transactions by regulated entities in a financial conglomerate with other undertakings 
in the financial conglomerate, and risk concentration in the financial conglomerate.
386   
1.  FHCs 
      In the United States financial conglomerates are permitted subject to 
various restrictions by the GLBA amendments to the BHCA.  These amendments permit the 
creation of FHCs that have investments in several financial sectors, mainly the banking, 
insurance and broker-dealer sectors.
387 
      Whereas the Supplementary Supervision Directive was promulgated to 
impose additional supervision or cross-sectoral financial conglomerates to deal with the specific 
risks of such financial conglomerates, the BHCA was enacted to prevent circumvention of the 
                                                                                                                                                                          
381   For the power of national banks, state member banks, Edge Act corporations and agreement corporations to 
invest in shares of a foreign bank, see Gruson, Nonbanking Activities, supra note 366, § 9.04[10][e][i] note 
704; Michael Gruson, Investment in Foreign Equity Securities and Debt-Equity Conversions by U.S. Banks, 
Bank Holding Companies and Foreign Bank Holding Companies, 1988 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 441, at 490 
(national banks), 494 (member banks) and 498 (Edge Act corporations and agreement corporations). 
382   See Hansen, et al., Capital Regulations, supra note 368, § 4.03[3]. 
383   12 C.F.R. § 211.5–211.13 (2000) (Regulation K).  Although 12 C.F.R. § 211.8 (2003) (Regulation K) is 
applicable to investments and to activities abroad by member banks, it does not expand the limits of 
investment powers of national banks.  See 12 C.F.R. § 211.8(b) & (c) (2003) (Regulation K) (“subject to 
the limitations set out in paragraphs (b) and (d) of this section”).  A member bank can invest in foreign 
equity securities only through an Edge Act corporation, an agreement corporation or a foreign bank.  See 
Gruson, Nonbanking Activities, supra note 366, § 9.04[10][e][i] note 704. 
384   See supra note 372 and accompanying text. 
385   12 C.F.R. § 211.12(b)(2)(ii) (2003) (Regulation K). 
386   See supra C.III.1. & 2. 
387   See supra note 9.  
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rule of separation of banking from all other commercial activities through the creation of a 
holding company.  Even the GLBA amendments to the BHCA, which permit financial holding 
companies, is more concerned with the careful delineation of this new permission of banks to 
affiliate with nonbank financial companies than with the supervision of the newly permitted 
financial conglomerates.  Furthermore, different from the Supplementary Supervision Directive, 
the GLBA was written to protect the banks in financial holding company groups, not to deal with 
the specific risks of such groups.  The GLBA gives the Federal Reserve Board an “umbrella 
supervision”
388 over the financial holding company.  It remains to be seen whether this umbrella 
authority will lead to a true supervision of the conglomerate as such. 
a)  Capital Adequacy 
        The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System [the 
Board] has the authority, based on its general supervisory power over BHCs, to impose capital 
and capital adequacy requirements on BHCs.  This authority does not diminish once the BHC 
has effectively elected FHC status.
389  Although Regulation Y does not contain any specific 
requirement that, as a condition to the effective election of FHC status, a U.S. BHC must meet 
the capital requirements applicable to all BHCs, there is no doubt that the Board under its general 
supervisory power over BHCs could deny the effectiveness of an FHC election by a BHC, if the 
BHC is in violation of applicable laws and regulations, including the rules of capital adequacy.
390  
The Board may impose capital requirements on a BHC/FHC, not only if it is a mere holding 
company without its own business activities, but, according to the BHCA, even if the BHC/FHC 
is a broker-dealer, insurance company, insurance agent or investment company.
391  It is not clear, 
however, how the capitalization of a company engaged in financial activities other than banking, 
e.g., a broker-dealer or an insurance company, can be computed in accordance to the Basel 
Capital Standards, and – unlike the Supplementary Supervision Directive
392 – the Board has not 
attempted to develop capital adequacy standards for FHCs that are not mere BHCs.
393 
b)  Intra-Group Transactions 
        The supplementary supervision of intra-group transactions under 
the Supplementary Supervision Directive covers all transactions in which EU-regulated or non-
                                                     
388   See Gruson, Financial Holding Company, supra note 9, § 10.07[1]. 
389   See Gruson, Financial Holding Company, supra note 9, § 10.02[7][c]; Hansen, et al., Capital Regulations, 
supra note 368, § 4.03[5][b]. 
390   See Gruson, Financial Holding Company, supra note 9, § 10.02[7][b]. 
391   This follows from § 5(c)(3), BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1844(c)(3) (2000), which prohibits the Board from 
prescribing capital requirements on functionally regulated subsidiaries of a BHC (not functionally 
regulated BHCs).  See Hansen, et al., Capital Regulations, supra note 368, § 4.03[5][b]. 
392   See supra C.III.1. 
393   See Gruson, Financial Holding Company, supra note 9, § 10.02[7][d]; Hansen, et al., Capital Regulations, 
supra note 368, § 4.03[5][b].  
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EU regulated entities are involved.
394  In the United States certain regulatory concerns, such as 
intra-group transactions and risk concentration, are left to the regulators of the constituent parts 
of the FHC.  Transactions between an insured depository institution and its affiliates are subject 
to strict limitations under Sections 23A and 23B, Federal Reserve Act.
395  A bank’s direct and 
indirect parent companies, as well as companies controlled by or under common control with the 
banks are covered as affiliates.
396  Sections 23A and 23B, Federal Reserve Act deal only with 
transactions in which the insured U.S. bank is involved.   
        Transactions between a U.S. insurance company and other 
companies in an insurance holding company system may be subject to supervision under state 
insurance laws.  For instance, under the New York Insurance Law intra-group transactions of 
controlled insurers
397 with other entities in an insurance holding company system
398 are subject to 
certain substantive standards.
399  Section 1505, N.Y. Insurance Law provides that transactions 
within a holding company system to which a controlled insurer is a party must be on fair and 
equitable terms, charges or fees for services performed must be reasonable, and expenses 
incurred and payments received must be allocated to the insurer on an equitable basis in 
accordance with customary insurance accounting practices consistently applied.
400  Certain intra-
group transactions between a domestic controlled insurer and any person in its holding company 
system require approval of the Superintendent of Insurance
401 and in the case of other 
transactions between a domestic controlled insurer and any person in its holding company 
system, prior notice to the Superintendent is required.
402  The books and records of each party to 
intra-group transactions must clearly and accurately disclose the nature and details of such 
transactions.
403  Every controlled insurer must annually report to the Superintendent of Insurance 
                                                     
394   See supra C.III.2. 
395   12 U.S.C. §§ 371c, 371c-1 (member banks); 12 U.S.C. § 1828(j) (state nonmember banks); 12 U.S.C. 
§ 1468(a) (federally insured savings associations) (2000). 
396   For a discussion of affiliates, see Robert E. Mannion & Lisa R. Chavarria, Transactions Between Banks 
and Affiliated Entities, 12.02[3][a] in Gruson & Reisner, supra note 9.  For these purposes, a foreign bank 
controlling a U.S. bank and the foreign bank’s foreign and domestic subsidiaries would be affiliates of the 
U.S. bank.  Id.  Sections 23A & 23B, Federal Reserve Act also apply to U.S. branches and agencies of 
foreign banks.  See Gruson, Financial Holding Company, supra note 9, § 10.07[4][d].  
397   A controlled insurer is an authorized insurer controlled directly or indirectly by a holding company.  
§ 1501(b)(4), N.Y. Insurance Law (McKinney 2000). 
398   Holding company system is a holding company together with its controlled insurers and controlled persons.  
§ 1501(6) in connection with (1)–(5), N.Y. Insurance Law .  
399   Section 1505, N.Y. Insurance Law. 
400   Section 1505(a), N.Y. Insurance Law. 
401   Section 1505(c), N.Y. Insurance Law.  See § 80-1.5(a) & (b), N.Y. Codes, Rules and Regulations, title 11, 
pt. 75, ch. IV. 
402   Section 1505(d), N.Y. Insurance Law.  See § 80-1.5(c), N.Y. Codes, Rules and Regulations, title 11, pt. 75, 
ch. IV. 
403   Section 1505(b), N.Y. Insurance Law.  
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all transactions during the preceding fiscal year with persons within the holding company 
system.
404  Again, some of these provisions only deal with intra-group transactions involving a 
U.S. insurer.
405 
      There are no rules dealing with intra-group transactions of U.S. broker-
dealers, i.e., investment firms in the terminology of the Supplementary Supervision Directive.
406 
c)  Risk Concentration 
      The Board has stated that as “umbrella supervisor” of FHCs
407 it will 
assess capital adequacy of FHCs in relation to the risk profile of the consolidated organization 
and that the Board will review the FHC’s internal risk assessment and related capital analysis 
process for determining the adequacy of its overall capital position.
408  Such review will include 
consideration of present and future economic conditions, future business development plans, 
possible stress scenarios, and Internet risk control and audit procedures.
409 
2.  CSEs 
    The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission [SEC] took a huge step in the 
direction of consolidated supervision of groups that include broker-dealers in two recently 
proposed sets of rules that would (1) permit alternative net capital requirements for broker-
dealers that are part of a holding company system (the holding company and its affiliates are 
called a “consolidated supervised entity” [herein CSE])
410 and (2) create a new framework for 
supervising an investment bank holding company that voluntarily files a notice of intention with 
the SEC to become a supervised investment bank holding company and be subject to supervision 
                                                     
404   § 80-1.4(a), N.Y. Codes, Rules and Regulations, title 11, pt. 75, ch. IV. 
405   However, a foreign life insurer which is authorized to do business in New York which is controlled by a 
person not authorized to do insurance business in New York shall be deemed under certain conditions a 
domestic insurer.  Section 1501(d), N.Y. Insurance Law. 
406   But see 17 C.F.R. § 240.17h-1T(2) (2003) & 2T.  See Form 17-H, Fed. Sec. L. (CCH) ¶ 33,347. 
407   Gruson, Financial Holding Company, supra note 9, § 10.07[1]. 
408   Hansen, et al., Capital Regulations, supra note 368, § 4.03[5][b]; Board, SR Letter No. 00-13 (SUP) (Aug. 
15, 2000) [herein Supervision Letter]. 
409   Hansen, et al., Capital Regulations, supra note 368, § 4.03[5][b]; Supervision Letter, supra note 408. 
410   SEC Release No. 34-48690, ___ SEC Docket ___, 68 Fed. Reg. 62,872 (Nov. 6, 2003) (Alternative Net 
Capital Requirements For Broker-Dealers That Are Part of Consolidated Supervised Entities) [herein CSE 
Release].  
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on a group-wide basis.
411  The proposals were made in response to the EU requirement of 
equivalent supplementary supervision in the Supplementary Supervision Directive.
412 
    The CSE rules would amend the net capital rules for broker-dealers
413 to establish 
a voluntary alternative method for computing net capital for broker-dealers that are part of a 
holding company which has a group-wide internal risk management control system and consents 
to group-wide SEC supervision.
414  A broker-dealer that maintains a certain net capital
415 could 
apply to the SEC for a conditional exemption from the application of the standard net capital rule 
calculation and, upon SEC approval, elect to calculate certain of its market and credit risk capital 
charges using the firm’s own internal mathematical models for risk measurement, including 
internally developed value-at-risk models and scenario analysis.  The SEC recognizes that large 
broker-dealers typically are owned by holding companies that also own other entities engaged in 
securities and non-securities activities worldwide and that the broker-dealer may incur many 
types of risks through its affiliates.  The proposed alternative net capital provisions would be 
conditioned on the broker-dealer and its holding company documenting a comprehensive risk 
management system for identifying, measuring and managing risk, which would be subject to 
SEC review.  Under the proposed rule, a broker-dealer could use its proprietary mathematical 
risk measurement models under prescribed circumstances to calculate its regulatory capital 
requirement.  Broker-dealers wanting to take advantage of the alternative capital calculation 
would need to provide the SEC with access to group-wide information.
416 
    In most instances, the SEC’s supervision on a group-wide basis would consist of 
analyzing records and reports provided by the holding company (or “CSE”) of the broker-dealer.  
Nevertheless, a CSE that is not an entity that has a principal regulator would permit the SEC to 
examine its books and records.  A CSE also would permit the SEC to examine the books and 
records of any affiliate of the broker-dealer that does not have a principal regulator.  As a 
condition to the broker-dealer’s exemption from the standard net capital rule, for a holding 
company that has a principal regulator, the holding company would make available to the SEC 
such information concerning the operations of the holding company that is necessary for the SEC 
to evaluate the financial and operational risk within the affiliate group of the broker-dealer 
(including any risks that could affect the reputation of the holding company or broker-dealer) and 
to evaluate compliance with the conditions of eligibility for computing the broker-dealer capital 
charges in accordance with the proposal.   The SEC would not examine any holding company 
that is primarily in the insured depository institutions business (excluding its insurance and 
commercial businesses) and that arranges to provide the records necessary to meet the SEC’s 
                                                     
411   SEC Release No. 34-48694, ___ SEC Docket ___, 68 Fed. Reg. 62,910 (Nov. 6, 2003) (Supervised 
Investment Bank Holding Companies) [herein SIBHC Release]. 
412   CSE Release, supra note 410, 68 Fed. Reg. 62,874; SIBHC Release, supra note 411, 62 Fed. Reg. at 
62,911. 
413   Rule 15c3-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1 (2003). 
414   See CSE Release, supra note 410, at 68 Fed. Reg. at 62,872. 
415   See proposed rules 15c3-1(a)(7) & (c)(15). 
416   See CSE Release, supra note 410, 68 Fed. Reg. at 62,872–73.  
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supervisory purposes.  The SEC also would not examine functionally regulated broker-dealer 
affiliates.
417 
    In the CSE rules the SEC carefully tries to walk the line between supervision of 
the group and deference to other regulatory agencies.  The proposed CSE rules – different from 
the Supplementary Supervision Directive – do not envision the role of a coordinator to facilitate 
supervision of entities in different sectors of the financial industry.
418 
    A broker-dealer’s use of the alternative net capital treatment of the CSE rules 
would be conditioned on the CSE complying with a series of requirements.  The CSE would be 
required on a monthly and quarterly basis to compute group-wide capital and allowances for 
market, credit, and operational risk as if it were subject to the Basel Capital Standards.  The CSE 
would be required to implement and maintain a consolidated internal risk management control 
system and procedures to monitor and manage group-wide risk, including market, credit, 
funding, operational and legal risks.
419 
    Major financial organizations that do not qualify for SIBHC treatment, discussed 
below, would have the option of becoming a CSE and thereby obtain the benefit of lower capital 
charges for their broker-dealer subsidiaries as well as a consolidated supervisor for EU purposes 
for those that are not BHCs subject to the BHCA. 
3.  SIBHCs 
    Section 231, GLBA amended Section 17, Securities and Exchange Act of 1934
420 
[herein Exchange Act] to create a regulatory framework under which a holding company of a 
broker-dealer may voluntarily be supervised by the SEC as a supervised investment bank holding 
company [herein SIBHC].  The proposed rules also would create a framework for the SEC to 
supervise SIBHCs.  These rules also would enhance the SEC’s supervision of the SIBHC’s 
subsidiary broker-dealers through collection of additional information and examinations of 
affiliates of those broker-dealers.  This framework would include qualification criteria for 
investment bank holding companies [herein IBHCs] that file notices of intention to be supervised 
by the SEC, as well as recordkeeping and reporting requirements for SIBHCs.  An IBHC that 
meets the criteria set forth in the proposed rules would not be required to become an SIBHC; 
supervision as an SIBHC is voluntary.  Taken as a whole, the proposed framework would permit 
the SEC to better monitor the financial condition, risk management, and activities of a broker-
dealer’s parent and affiliates on a group-wide basis.  In particular, it would create a formal 
process through which the SEC could access important information regarding activities of a 
broker-dealer’s affiliates that could impair the financial and operational stability of the broker-
                                                     
417   See CSE Release, supra note 410, 68 Fed. Reg. at 62,873. 
418   See supra C.III.4. 
419   See CSE Release, supra note 410, 68 Fed. Reg. at 62,875. 
420   Pub. L. 106-102, 106th Cong., 1st Sess. (Nov. 12, 1999), 113 Stat. 1838 at 1402 (1999), amended § 17, 
Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78q (2000).  
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dealer or the SIBHC.
421  This regulatory framework for SIBHCs is intended to provide a basis for 
non-US. financial regulators to treat the SEC as the principal U.S. consolidated, home-country 
supervisor for SIBHCs and their affiliated broker-dealers.
422 
    Pursuant to the definitions in the Exchange Act,
423 the term IBHC means any 
person, other than a natural person, that owns or controls one or more broker-dealers and the 
associated persons of the IBHC.  The term associated person of an investment bank holding 
company means any person directly or indirectly controlling, controlled by, or under common 
control with the IBHC.
424  Thus, an IBHC includes the holding company and all other entities 
within the holding company structure that met the “control” test.  A supervised investment bank 
holding company is an IBHC that is supervised by the SEC pursuant to Section 17(i), Exchange 
Act.
425  In order to elect to become an SIBHC, an IBHC must file with the SEC a written notice 
of intention to become supervised by the SEC.
426  Section 17(i)(1)(A), Exchange Act limits the 
entities that are eligible to become an SIBHC.
427  Specifically, an IBHC that is (i) an affiliate of 
an insured bank (with certain exceptions) or a savings association;
428 (ii) a foreign bank, foreign 
company, or a company that is described in Section 8(a), International Banking Act of 1978;
429 or 
(iii) a foreign bank that controls, directly or indirectly an Edge Act corporation
430 would not be 
eligible to file a notice of intention.
431  These exclusions of groups that include banks prevent 
FHCs from electing SIBHC status and substantially limit the number of financial groups that can 
elect SIBHC status. 
    Proposed rule 17i-4 would require an SIBHC to establish, document and maintain 
a system of internal risk management controls to assist it in managing the risks associated with 
its business activities, including market, credit, operational, funding, and legal risks.
432 
                                                     
421   SIBHC Release, supra note 411, 68 Fed. Reg. at 62,911. 
422   SIBHC Release, supra note 411, 68 Fed. Reg. at 62,911. 
423   Section 17(i)(5)(A), Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78q(i)(5)(A) (2000). 
424   Section 17(i)(5)(F), Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78q(i)(5)(F) (2000). 
425   Section 17(i)(5)(B), Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78q(i)(5)(B) (2000).  See SIBHC Release, supra note 411, 
68 Fed. Reg. at 68,912. 
426   Section 17(i)(1)(B), Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78q(i)(1)(B) (2000).  See proposed rule 17i-2. 
427   15 U.S.C. § 78q(i)(1)(A) (2000). 
428   Section 17(i)(1)(A)(i), Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78q(i)(1)(A)(i) (2000).   
429   Section 17(i)(1)(A)(ii), Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78q(i)(1)(A)(ii) (2000).  Section 8(a), International 
Banking Act of 1978, 12 U.S.C. § 3106(a) (2000). 
430   Section 17(i)(1)(A)(iii), Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78q(i)(1)(A)(iii) (2000).  Section 25A, Federal Reserve 
Act, 12 U.S.C. § 611 et seq. (2000) (Edge Act corporations). 
431   SIBHC Release, supra note 411, 68 Fed. Reg. at 62,912.  See proposed rule 17i-2(a). 
432   SIBHC Release, supra note 411, 68 Fed. Reg. at 62,914–15.  
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    An SIBHC would have to comply with the net capital rules applicable to OTC 
derivative dealers
433 as though it were a broker-dealer;
434 however, it could also use the optional 
alternative net capital requirements proposed in the CSE Release.
435  
    Pursuant to Section 17(i)(3)(A), Exchange Act,
436 an SIBHC would be required to 
make and keep records, furnish copies thereof and make such reports as the SEC may require by 
rule.
437 
    Proposed rule 17i-7 would require an SIBHC to calculate the affiliate group’s 
allowable capital and allowances for certain types of risks.  Proposed rule 17i-7 would not set 
minimum group-wide capital levels for SIBHCs; rather, it would require the SIBHC to perform 
certain calculations that the SEC could review to gain an understanding of the financial position 
of the affiliate group and identify any risks it poses to the broker-dealer.
438  The proposed rules 
incorporate a capital computation for the SIBHC that is consistent with the Basel Capital 
Standards.
439 
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433   Rule 15c3-4, 15 C.F.R. 240.15c3-4 (2003). 
434   Proposed rule 17i-4. 
435   SIBHC Release, supra note 411, 68 Fed. Reg. at 62,915, note 51. 
436   15 U.S.C. § 78q(i)(3)(A) (2000).  
437   These requirements of record creation and maintenance and access to records are set forth in proposed rule 
17i-5.  Proposed rule 17i-6 contains reporting requirements. 
438   SIBHC Release, supra note 411, 68 Fed. Reg. at 62,918. 
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